PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXV. No. 95 OCTOBER 1950

THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THE STUDY OF POLITICS

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I

WHAT kind of subject is Politics? Is it a science, an art, a religion or a philosophy? Is the study of politics an independent subject—a subject in its own right—or is it simply a branch of some other and, presumably, superior subject?

These questions require to be answered because there is obvious uncertainty at the moment about the nature and status of the study of politics. The uncertainty is shown by the fact that Politics goes under different names and is associated with different subjects in different universities. Politics is sometimes called Political Philosophy and sometimes Political Science. Some universities confine the study of politics to History. Others make it a branch of Ethics. The latest tendency is to associate Politics and Economics and regard the economic as the most important of the relations of politics.

Among the objections to the independence of Politics, one deserves to be noted. Politics, it is said, is an aspect of a total social situation which it shares with Ethics and Economics. Thus it is a mistake to try to disentangle the political factor and view it in itself.

The view is deceptive because of the element of truth in it. It is true that there are no purely political phenomena and that the real and final fact is the total social situation. But those who deny the independence of Politics reach these conclusions too rapidly. In their anxiety to exhibit the unity of social interests, they forget that the first duty of the scholar is analysis and clear distinction. The specialist is in duty bound to drive his particular wedge through any total situation or concrete unity. If he is a student of politics he must know how to distinguish the political from the other factors in

society so that there is never any doubt that this is the political point of view and the political answer to any social question. The task is not merely a theoretical duty. It is also a practical necessity. The solution of many a social problem has been made the more difficult because of the failure to distinguish in advance the political from the other elements in it.

The only satisfactory way of deciding whether politics is a subject in its own right is to examine the facts of politics and see if there is anything genuinely distinctive about them. The same procedure will also enable us to classify Politics or to say what kind of subject it is. Examination will show that the most essential features of politics are *first* the distinctively group nature of anything that can rightly be called "political," and, *secondly*, the fact that any body of political phenomena is composed of contrary but mutually dependent tendencies. As we shall see, the first of these features enables us to distinguish Politics from Ethics and Economics, and reveals it as a kind of religion. The second feature exhibits the study of politics as in large part a science but as primarily and ultimately a philosophy.[1]

II

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS

Politics is a social interest. Its raw material is composed of group interests and movements. Among its products are group ways of thinking and acting—isms, ideologies, policies, laws, settlements, treaties, social schemes and services. Even persons are group entities from the political standpoint. The political individual is primarily a citizen, a function of a group, a social not a private individual. But if we want to isolate Politics, see what it is in itself, we must discover what is distinctive about the political group, since Economics and Ethics are also social interests.

There are three main types of human association. First, men associate, as in friendship groups, because they like each other. Secondly, men combine because they want the same things and need the help of other men in order to obtain them. The best instance of this form of association is the industrial group. Thirdly, men associate because they fear, respect or admire the same objects, e.g. the religious and the cultural group. Men create religious sects because they

[1] Students of Politics may think it strange that power or the will to power has not been included among the main facts of politics. But power is not a pure political concept. Properly speaking it belongs to Economics. Like material goods, power is a scarce commodity. The demand for it at any particular time is greater than the supply.

have the same notions of God or they form musical and literary societies because they admire the works of a particular composer or author.

While there is something of each of the three types of association in the political group, the distinctive mark of politics is the importance it attaches to the third type of association. Men form political associations in the first place not because they like or have need of one another, but because they are attracted to the same objects. Politics always presupposes a relation to an independent or intrinsically valuable object.[1] Without such a connection one cannot speak of politics or distinguish it from other social interests.

The objects that have been the focussing-point of political groups and movements include the institution of property, social classes, religious dogma, values like security and justice and, of course, the state in which most of these objects are embodied: and they range from the locality which calls forth the strong cohesive force of patriotism to social and political ideologies, theories and doctrines. But the point of importance for our purposes is the light which association through objects throws on the nature of politics. In this respect there can be little doubt that politics is or resembles a religion. Men attach themselves to political objects because of their craving to be identified with something big, significant and eventful. "Wherever man fairly and loyally throws the seat of his value outside his immediate self into something else which he worships, with which he identifies his will, and which he takes as an object solid and secure at least relatively to his private existence . . . there we have in its degree the experience of religion."[2]

A less formal proof of the religious element in politics can be found in the exaggerated interest in politics which is so characteristic of our times. This interest is an inevitable reaction from the highly individualistic and materialistic spirit of the age. Men have turned to politics because their normal manner of life has failed to satisfy them. Ostensibly individualists, they have hungered after a form of group life that can carry them beyond themselves. Politics can satisfy this deep psychological and religious need. Indeed, it is the only secular interest that can do so for the mass of men.

Association through objects is not confined to politics. In fact it is doubtful if any human association can dispense with the device. A group like the friendship group may emanate from direct personal contact, but it cannot last or mature in this pure unmediated state.

[1] It is impossible here to discuss the sense in which political objects can be said to be independent or intrinsically valuable. It is enough to note that there is nothing mystical about them. If they are mainly super-personal, they are not superhuman.

[2] Bosanquet: *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 240.

"I could not love thee, Dear, so much
Lov'd I not Honour more."

Thus social interests are distinguished by the significance they attach to objects rather than by the fact that objects are present in some types of association and absent in others.

The difference in attitude to objects is clearly marked in the case of the three associated human interests—Economics, Ethics and Politics. Each interest produces a different type of group, based on a different principle of human relationship.

Economic things or things from the economic standpoint are for use: they are replaceable things, things that are used to-day and discarded to-morrow. Economic things are also things which satisfy particular needs. Unlike religious or political objects, they do not satisfy the whole self or some aspect of the whole self. It is possible to regard economic things as things in themselves or as intrinsically valuable. But this is a distortion of their true nature. When they are more than instruments their economic value has been perverted like the miser's wealth or it is combined with other values as in works of art.

Since economic groups are formed round things that are merely of use, they are loose associations. Economic combination is possible among the most diverse of men who would not combine for anything else and who have no further end in view than to serve their particular interests. Where political association is intimate, localized in origin and slowly produced, economic association is easy, speedy and world-wide. There are therefore certain advantages in economic association. In particular, it can form the basis or starting-point for closer relationships. But economic relationships in themselves are motived by nothing higher than mutual needs. The principle of economic association is mutual interest.[1]

From the strictly moral standpoint, things are mere means or instruments for amplifying personal relationships. Material means extend the range of moral goodness. Improved means of communication afford increased opportunities for exercising sympathy and charity. Power and organization have the same effect. Power frees character from the limitations of the small face-to-face group and enables it to be a dynamic force in the great society. Without organization, moral goodness tends to be shut up in the family or neighbourhood. Yet from the strictly ethical standpoint, none of these things has any moral value of its own. They lack the qualities of moral

[1] If socialistic and communistic forms of society seem to deny this individualistic account of the economic motive and of economic relationships, one must remember that political considerations dominate economic considerations under socialism and communism.

beings and their own qualities are very different. Power, organization, institutions and material things are mere instruments of the moral will and suspect even at that except under the most stringent conditions.

Private responsibility for conduct is the mark of morality. A moral choice is one which a man makes for himself. Moral responsibility can neither be shared by others nor measured in terms of anything else. It is final and personal. It is true that men need the presence of other men in order to realize their moral capacities—for love, pity, charity, self-sacrifice and the like. There is therefore a moral community of a kind. But the relation between one moral being and another is intrinsically personal. No "object" intervenes except as a mere instrument. The moralist believes that every social problem can be properly solved only by the goodness of one man to another. The function of such an object as the state is simply "to hinder hindrances" to the good life. The moral community is a personal community, a community of sovereign and equal persons. Its principle is mutual respect, the recognition in others of the inalienable power of self-determination and responsibility which one finds in oneself.

To sum up, Ethics and Economics are essentially individualistic interests. The moral and the economic unit is the private person. From the ethical and the economic standpoint, society is simply personal relationships and instruments. Politics, on the other hand, is an essentially social interest. The characteristic nature of politics, that which distinguishes it from other social interests is that, for it, community is a fact. There is an actual solidarity about the political community which is not present in ethical and economic groups. This results from the political attitude to objects. By devoting themselves to the same objects—objects which are, or are regarded as, in some sense superior to persons—men, as political beings, tend to become alike or homogeneous. Their resemblances come to the surface and dominate their differences. Indeed, we can go so far as to say that the strictly political type of unity or like-mindedness is as near uniformity as is possible among human beings. The pure form of politics is a totalitarian state. The strictly political individual is a member with public functions, not a unit with private rights and interests.[1]

That the political community can travel far from its first or pure form as sheer solidarity or uniformity is demonstrated by the liberal democratic type of state. For liberal democracy is capable of combining like-mindedness and individual differences or, at least, of maintaining equilibrium between them. But the liberal democratic

[1] The over-politicized totalitarian states of our own day have afforded ample proof of this political tendency when it is given free rein.

state is not a pure political construction. It is the result of the necessary relationship of politics with ethics and economics, since it is the latter interests, as we have seen, that cultivate individual differences and insert them into the social field.

III

POLITICS, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

The second of the distinctive features of political facts enables us to carry the description of the study of politics a stage further and, finally, to understand its nature as a whole.

Investigation will show that the essential facts and concepts of politics are always found in pairs. We speak of order and liberty, the state and the individual, government and people, rights and duties, and so on. The members of any pair of political facts or ideas are closely related, so closely, indeed, that it is impossible to think of one without the other. To think, for instance, of government is to think at once and necessarily of the people. Similarly rights imply duties and duties imply rights.

But while the terms of a political relation are inseparable and meaningless apart from each other, they are far from being in a state of natural harmony. They are opposites and are continually tending to fly apart. The forces of order and organization would drive out liberty if they could, and liberty would become licence and dispense with order, were it given a free hand. In a word, politics embodies what has been described as "the principle of polarity." It is composed of opposite tendencies, which co-exist and are mutually dependent but which, in themselves, are poles apart.

Each pair of political opposites creates its own set of problems, but for obvious reasons it is the widest or most comprehensive pair that is involved in the problem of the kind of subject Politics is.

Viewed statically or as a field of experience, politics can be said to be divided into two main parts. On the one hand is the part composed of emotions, sentiments, 'isms, doctrines and values and which, in these and other respects, has much in common with religion. On the other hand, there is the organized part of politics, the part composed of laws and administration and which we normally call government. Since government deals with laws and uniformities, it lends itself to scientific treatment and the study of government can be fairly termed Political Science. But the division of politics into a religious and a scientific part is too hard. Politics as religion and as science are really tendencies. Moreover, as instances of the essential political principle of polarity, they are opposite or polar tendencies. Each would usurp the place of the other if it could. The religious

tendency would confine politics to emotions, creeds and 'isms. The scientific tendency would exclude emotion and turn everything into order and organization.

Exaggerated forms of the religious tendency are to be found to-day where elements of fascism and chauvinism still linger or political movements strongly react against what they regard as the extreme scientific materialism of the age. But in the democracies the religious tendency keeps more or less to itself nowadays. It is only genuinely aroused when attempts are made to substitute administrative regulations for the rule of law or governments interfere with personal rights and private interests, when they have no mandate for doing so.

The case of the scientific tendency in politics is very different. In conformance with the scientific spirit of the times it is forcibly active. Thus in its modern form, the problem of the kind of subject Politics is, is largely a question of the proper limits of the application of science to politics.

The use of certain scientific methods in government is now a commonplace. For instance, no modern government can dispense with statistics in making and administering laws. But in recent years science has overstepped the boundaries of government. It has begun to invade what I have called the religious sphere of politics, particularly that part of it known as public opinion. Such rule of thumb methods of registering public opinion as the vote are being re-enforced by the methods of organizations like Mass Observation, Gallup Polls, Institutes of Public Opinion, and the Public Relations branches of government departments. But the impact of science on politics is more profound than the measurement and prediction of public opinion. The achievements of science which are most significant for the study of politics affect it indirectly. They are to be found below the surface of politics, in Sociology or in neighbouring subjects like Economics, where the facts lend themselves more readily to the laws and uniformities of coexistence and sequence which science seeks to reveal.

With the quest of science for laws in human behaviour no right-thinking person can cavil. No one wants a world divorced from law. A great deal of personal misery and social conflict could be avoided if men knew and obeyed the permanent lines of structure on which their lives and affairs are ordered. Least of all can the student of politics take exception to the purpose of the scientist, since his own subject is largely made up of laws based on real or assumed uniformities in human conduct. Moreover, the laws of the state are not properly founded unless they are tied to the laws of psychology and economics and the wider laws of the physical and organic worlds. But at this point science and the study of politics part company.

Conformance to law is only one aspect of political conduct. On

the other side of the political shield are emotions, 'isms, traditions and values and, at the utmost extreme from law, is the uniqueness of individual experience. The student of politics cannot deny these things or dismiss them as meaningless. Apart from the fact that the laws of the state are crude and rigid and cannot control the sensitive and spontaneous activities of life, the cardinal principle of the polarity of political facts involves that one extreme is as necessary as the other. While, then, there are laws in politics there are also persons, and because there are persons some place and justification must be found for feelings and values and the other "subjective" features of political conduct.[1]

It would be foolish to try to exhibit the limitations of science in politics by defending the subjective factors in politics by themselves. The frequent waves of popular hysteria caused by political 'isms and the rigid and often retrograde political moods induced by traditional political beliefs and practices, make a poor showing when confronted by the detached attitude of the scientist—the man who allows the object he is investigating and not his private feelings and prejudices to govern his thoughts and actions. The personal elements in politics can be justified, if at all, only when they are found in reasonable quantities or are exercised with reason—a statement which rightly suggests that the issue between science and the complete study of politics centres round the use and interpretation of reason.

Of the several forms of reason or reasoning the best for our purpose is the form of discussion. Discussion is not merely a high intellectual exercise in itself! It is also used by both science and politics, and therefore forms the necessary link between them. The general object of scientific and political discussion is the same. It is to pool information, collate the findings of different interests and points of view, and thus arrive at a total or public conception of the subject under discussion. But the results of discussion in the case of science and politics are very different. The use of discussion by science is purely instrumental. Such qualitative and subjective factors as emotional states, historical attitudes and value judgments are not incorporated in the conjoint idea in which scientific discussion results. The "rough work" is kept on one side and is not contained in the answers to scientific questions.

It is quite otherwise in political discussion. The full force of the personality or character of each member of the discussion group—

[1] It will be obvious to the reader that in introducing the private person we are now dealing with Politics in the broad sense or in combination with Ethics and Economics. This has been done in order to bring out the full strength of the antimony between the scientific and the "subjective" features of political conduct although the antimony is also present in a more modified form in Politics as such or Politics, strictly speaking, e.g. in the relation of government and people.

his emotions, beliefs, traditions and values as well as his intellect—must be brought to bear in political discussion, if the discussion is to be effective. What is more to the point, the policies, laws or public ideas that result from political discussion embody the views and interests of those who have helped to make them. Of course the individual loses something in the give and take of discussion. But what he sacrifices is not the feelings, beliefs, purposes, values and opinions of which he is composed, but only what is crude, rigid, partial, biassed and narrow in them.

While, then, science accounts for a great deal of politics, it does not account for the whole of it or the wholeness of it. Another mental discipline is needed to grasp politics in its entirety. That discipline is philosophy.

Philosophy's claim to be the crowning phase of the study of politics rests on the resemblances between the two subjects. Both are concerned with the eternal antinomies of thought—the reign of law and the freedom of the human spirit. Philosophy and politics are also alike in being synoptic or constructive. Where the former attempts an intellectual solution, the latter tries to effect a practical compromise. In particular the synoptic aspect of philosophy takes into account what science leaves out. It includes experience in the moral, social, aesthetic and religious fields as well as the results of science. Of course, there is a sense in which science is also synoptic. But the synoptic outlook in science is restricted to special provinces. The philosophers' synopsis is more comprehensive. Philosophy tries to view experience as a whole and not merely, like the sciences, in this or that aspect of it.

Philosophy also resembles politics rather than science in incorporating a personal factor in its results. Philosophy is no less impartial or objective than science. The philosopher, like the scientist, must rid himself of private likes and dislikes and reason throughout on the basis of the relevant facts. Nevertheless a synoptic philosophy is not completely impersonal. It includes something of its author in much the same way as political ideas embody the personalities of those who have helped to make them, or as the creations of great artists are at once personal and public. Of course, something of the personal element in philosophy is due to circumstance—to the limitations of time and place that necessarily condition the philosophers' thinking—or to failure on the philosophers' part to rid himself of purely subjective preferences. But neither of these reasons fully account for the individual quality of all the great philosophies. The truth is that the principle of polarity rules in philosophy as in politics and the extremes of universal law and the uniqueness of personality meet in philosophical and political systems and produce something which is composed of both.

IV

POLITICS AND HISTORY

A discussion of the kind of subject politics would not be complete without a reference to the relation of Politics and History. The two subjects are closely related—so closely, indeed, that the historian would be justified in challenging the right of philosophy to be the supreme form of the study of politics. But the rival claims of history and philosophy cannot be dealt with here. The most we can do is to show that history supports the view that the scientific approach to politics is limited and must be supplemented by philosophy or by history itself.

The basic fact of history, as of politics, is the fact of change or becoming. Thus history is not completely rational in the sense in which the term is understood by science or logic. For change contains a surd or alogical element. This does not mean that history is a mere manifold of contingent facts. It exhibits orders and connections. But the orders and connections of history are not those of science. Science deals with the common and repeatable. Its world is reversible. But historical facts are essentially irreversible, and once-occurring and they cannot be resolved without remainder. Thus in their final analysis the facts of history are diverse and unique.

While historical facts cannot be grasped in their entirety by logic or science because of the contingent element in them, they are not therefore incomprehensible. But like everything else that is unique they will only fully respond to a kind of sympathy or what, in particular, may be called a sense of history. The same is true in a more active or practical sense of political facts. Mere reason will not lead the statesman or the political theorist to the heart of political events. A thorough knowledge of politics needs what Machiavelli called "a grasp of occasion" and Aristotle, with greater insight, named "practical judgment" or "practical reason."

The surd in history and its mental counterpart "the sense of history" are particularly significant for the study of politics in South Africa. Here as in other parts of the British Commonwealth, e.g. Eire and Canada, are political movements in which the sense of history is so deeply rooted that they are largely impervious to universal reason and even to the more genial and personal form of reason by discussion. These intransigent elements in current politics should be regarded sympathetically rather than be deplored and condemned. They are the reactions of historical romanticism against the materialism of the age. As such they form the historical extreme of the political principle of polarity, of which the other extreme is science. They may, therefore, be a necessary and valuable element in a new constructive political philosophy.

ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT

R. C. CROSS, M.A.

In his 1947 British Academy lecture on Naturalistic Ethics, Mr. W. F. R. Hardie is concerned to ask himself whether a naturalistic theory of ethics can give a "satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions,"[1] or whether some form of non-naturalism is demanded by our moral experience. It will be remembered that after a careful sifting and examination of certain features of our moral knowledge or convictions, Mr. Hardie suspends judgment between naturalism and non-naturalism, observing that "on the one hand philosophers who start from the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking, and are most careful and accurate in their rendering of these facts, have tended to be led to objectivist and anti-naturalistic conclusions. Where they least carry conviction is in the moral epistemology which they assume or defend. When we reflect, with the epistemological issue in mind, on the actual process in ourselves of moral reflection and decision, we are more inclined to sympathize with a 'moral sentiment' theory than we ought to be if the rationalists are wholly in the right."[2] In what follows I wish to consider another feature of our moral experience which Mr. Hardie did not examine in his lecture and which appears to be of considerable importance, namely the situation where, to put it very roughly for the moment, we find ourselves at variance with another person or persons on a moral issue, where, for instance, I hold that a certain course of conduct is right, and the other person or persons hold that it is wrong, or *vice versa*, and where further we may pursue divergent courses of action accordingly. I wish to ask myself whether the naturalistic commentary on this situation of ethical disagreement is altogether satisfactory when we consider it in the light of "the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking," whether, in fact, to use another phrase of Mr. Hardie's, it squares altogether with "our fundamental moral convictions" in regard to such a situation. The naturalistic commentary with which I am primarily concerned is that which is now sometimes labelled "the emotive theory of ethics," and is to be found admirably developed, for example, in Professor Stevenson's book *Ethics and Language*. I describe this as a naturalistic theory out of deference to recent discussion and in particular following Mr. Hardie. In such discussion

[1] W. F. R. Hardie, *Naturalistic Ethics*, Henriette Hertz Lecture, British Academy, 1947, p. 1.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

"naturalistic" has been used of ethical theories which hold that ethical terms and sentences are understandable wholly by reference to "natural" characteristics, and by a "natural" characteristic again has been meant "any characteristic which either (*a*) we became aware of by sending sensa which manifest it or by introspecting experiences which manifest it; or (*b*) is definable wholly in terms of such characteristics and the notions of cause and substance." A simple form of naturalistic theory then would be one which maintains that "this is right" means "I approve of this," where the word "right" refers to a natural characteristic as above discussed, namely the feeling of approval which I experience and can introspect. In the emotive form of the theory, the ethical terms and sentences are, of course, no longer taken as primarily describing, or referring to, even such natural characteristics; their primary function is to express feelings or attitudes, and evoke feelings or attitudes in others. But again we become aware of these feelings or attitudes "by introspecting experiences," that is, they are "natural" characteristics. Thus again the account of the functioning of ethical terms is wholly by reference to "natural" characteristics and again therefore this form of theory may be called "naturalistic." As I say, however, I myself use the label mainly as a means of identification out of deference to recent discussion. I doubt whether the familiar antithesis which it suggests between naturalism and non-naturalism, natural characteristics and non-natural characteristics, is now particularly helpful in discussing ethical problems any more than the equally familiar objectivism-subjectivism antithesis in the sense in which these antitheses are usually understood. I do not wish therefore to concern myself at present with this antithesis. I am concerned with the simpler question whether the sort of account of ethical disagreement given by the emotive theory is altogether reconcilable with our ordinary moral thinking. I do not hope for any very positive or definite results from an inquiry of this sort. As has often been pointed out, an appeal to "our ordinary moral thinking" or "our fundamental moral convictions" is an appeal to what is vague and confused in the extreme, and not nearly so "fundamental" as appears at first sight. There are the methods of criticism which may more effectively lead one to wonder whether the emotive theory is an entirely satisfactory commentary on our ethical utterances and our ethical behaviour. Yet it seems worth while also to leave more technical methods at times, and look at the emotive theory in this more general way. It is the more important to attempt this because the emotive theorist seems to feel that ethical disagreement presents no difficulties for him. Thus, for instance, Mr. Robinson writes: "The emotive theory of ethics completely escapes the argument that subjectivist theories are inconsistent with the obvious truth that

men disagree and argue with each other about moral matters"[1] I am not so clear myself that the emotive theory, at any rate without some further elaborations, "completely escapes" all worries about ethical disagreement or that it can completely satisfy us about some of the most stubborn of our ordinary convictions about this situation, convictions whose very stubbornness seems to demand careful attention. What these are, and the details of the situation itself will, I hope, emerge in the course of the argument.

I begin with what G. E. Moore has to say in Chapter III of his book *Ethics* about the bearing of ethical disagreement on theories of the older naturalistic sort. In that chapter Moore advances several arguments which he believes to show that ethical terms cannot function simply as describing or referring to the feelings of the person using them. It is the third of the arguments used there which is of particular interest.[2] Moore himself, when he wrote the *Ethics*,[3] regarded it as "an absolutely fatal objection" to the theory he was opposing. He begins the argument by asking whether it can possibly be the case that when we judge an action to be right or wrong, each of us is only asserting that *he himself* has some particular feeling towards it. He then points out that this question is "merely a question of fact; a question as to the actual analysis of our moral judgements—as to what it is that actually happens, when we *think* an action to be right or wrong." It is worth calling attention to this, because it also describes the method which I am attempting to follow. Throughout I am trying to disentangle and keep in mind "what it is that actually happens" in ethical disagreements when we reflect on such situations fairly without any bias towards any particular theory. Moore now comes to the consequence of the view he is criticizing, which he holds is "plainly not in accordance with the facts." "The consequence," he says, "is this. If when one man says 'This action is right,' and another answers, 'No, it is not right,' each of them is always merely making an assertion about *his own* feelings, it plainly follows that there is never really any difference of opinion between them. The one of them is never really contradicting what the other is asserting. They are no more contradicting one another than if, when one had said, 'I like sugar,' the other had answered, 'I *don't* like sugar.' In such a case, there is, of course, no conflict of opinion, no contradiction of one by the other: for it may perfectly well be the case that what each asserts is equally true; it may quite well be the case that the one man really does like sugar, and the other really does *not* like it. The one, therefore, is *never*

[1] *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, Supplement, Vol. XXII, p. 100.

[2] G. E. Moore, *Ethics*, pp. 100 f. Cf. the discussion of these arguments by C. L. Stevenson in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, pp. 71–90.

[3] Cf. for his later views, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, pp. 536–554.

denying what the other is asserting. And what the view we are considering involves is that when one man holds an action to be right, and another holds it to be wrong or not right, here also the one is *never* denying what the other is asserting. It involves, therefore, the very curious consequence that no two men can ever differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong. And surely the fact that it involves this consequence is sufficient to condemn it. It is surely plain matter of fact that when I assert an action to be wrong, and another man asserts it to be right, there sometimes is a real difference of opinion between us: he sometimes is denying the very thing which I am asserting." I have quoted the passage at some length, since it provides a very clear statement of a particular point of view. Two points may be noted in passing. Firstly, throughout the argument it is assumed that the action the two disputants are discussing is the same action. That is to say, Moore is describing a situation where the factual side, as opposed to the ethical side, is agreed. If this were not so, then the assertions of the two disputants would not necessarily be incompatible at all, since each might be making his assertion about a different action, and both assertions might well be true. This raises a general point of some importance, for it might be maintained that in all cases where so-called ethical disagreement occurs, the disagreement can eventually be traced back to a disagreement about the empirical facts, and that wherever people did hold the same beliefs about the facts, they would never in fact disagree ethically. On this view, then, where one man said an action was right and another man said it was wrong, we would simply assume that they were not talking about the same action. We would assume, that is, that they were not agreed in their beliefs about the empirical facts, and that, if they were so agreed, they would then also agree ethically, that is, both say the action was right or wrong, as the case might be. This assumption might be used by widely different ethical theories—it might be used for example by an "objectivist" or equally by a "subjectivist," and I do not see how it could be conclusively refuted. At the same time, I do not see any way in which it could be conclusively established. It seems that it would have to remain an assumption. Moreover, as an assumption it does seem dubious if it can hold in all cases; for there do seem cases where, so far as we can see, people are agreed in their beliefs about the empirical facts, that is, are both considering the same action or state of affairs and where nevertheless their ethical pronouncements differ. I think most writers on ethics are prepared to admit such situations, and I myself accept that such situations do occur. The second point to be noted in Moore's argument is the general background which it suggests. It suggests that actions have among their various characteristics ethical characteristics which are

there to be apprehended, and that in an ethical utterance, *e.g.* "This action is right," we are asserting that the action in question (let us call it X) has this particular characteristic, namely rightness. Ethical terms, that is, stand for or refer to characteristics (though, of course, of a special sort) in the same way as non-ethical terms like hard, round, etc.; and in our ethical sentences we predicate these characteristics of the subject of the sentence—in our present case the action X. Further, our assertion is true or false according as X has or has not the ethical characteristic we assert of it. Thus ethical disagreement arises when A predicates rightness (a term which stands for a particular ethical characteristic) of X, and B denies that X has this predicate—X either has this predicate, or it does not have it, and the assertion of one or other of the disputants is false. The two assertions—X is right and X is not right—are logically incompatible. There is therefore a difference of opinion about the ethical characteristic of X, and the ethical disagreement is primarily rooted in this difference.

Now, of course, at this point we may begin to ask what sort of characteristics these ethical characteristics are. We do not sense rightness, for example, in the same way as we sense a colour; nor is rightness referrible to a feeling of ours—that is the view we have just been combating. Must they then be "non-natural" characteristics? But what is gained by calling them such, and how do we come by knowledge of them? If they are "apprehended by intelligence"[1], are the reports of intelligence reliable? Do we intuit these characteristics as self-evidently and necessarily belonging to certain actions? But how are we to regard this sort of self-evidence or deal with the criticism for instance that "unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is useless as a test of a proposition's validity"?[2] And so on. The difficulties are familiar, and, to put it mildly, formidable. Mr. Strawson dealt with some of them in a recent article in PHILOSOPHY on "Ethical Intuitionism."[3] I am not, however, interested in these difficulties at the moment, beyond making sure that we do not forget them. My immediate point is the sort of account that can be given of ethical disagreement which will square with our ordinary moral experience of this situation. Granted that Moore's analysis may open up an immensely difficult background, it is, I suggest, at any rate at first sight a very plausible analysis of "what it is that actually happens." In particular he brings out the point, which does certainly seem to accord with our ordinary moral convictions, that ethical disagreement is unlike the

[1] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 87.
[2] Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936 ed.), p. 156.
[3] *Philosophy*, Vol. XXIV, January 1949.

"I like sugar" (said by A) and "I don't like sugar" (said by B) situation. He himself interprets this unlikeness in terms of difference of opinion—"it is surely plain matter of fact," he says, "that when I assert an action to be wrong, and another man asserts it to be right, there sometimes is a real difference of opinion between us." I do not wish to imply that I assent to Moore's interpretation of the unlikeness, but that there is an important unlikeness I do agree. Indeed this seems to be one of the most stubborn features of ethical disagreement, namely our conviction, when we go on disagreeing, that it is not, as in the sugar case, a mere matter of taste, a mere matter of just being different from each other, but that there is still a dispute between us. This is for the moment only a rough attempt at characterizing the unlikeness, and we must try to clarify it later. For the present, the main point is that Moore's analysis in terms of "difference of opinion" does try to account for the unlikeness, albeit at heavy cost in other directions. Let us now see what the emotive theory has to say.

Now the older naturalistic theory which Moore had in mind in his discussion of ethical disagreement to which we have been referring still took ethical sentences as functioning descriptively, but insisted that all that they described was the speaker's feelings—thus, for instance, if I said "X is good," this was interpreted as a statement about my feelings towards X, as meaning "I approve of X." As is well known, the emotive theory takes quite a different view of the primary function of ethical sentences. On this view their primary function is not to assert or describe at all, but to express feelings or attitudes and to evoke feelings or attitudes in others; and it must be remembered that to express an attitude in this sense is not at all the same as simply to assert that one has the attitude. To suppose that their primary function is descriptive—even though only descriptive of the speaker's feelings—is to be misled by grammatical form. They look like descriptive sentences, but their actual function is very different. How then does this general account affect Moore's discussion? Moore's difficulty was that on the older account, where ethical disagreement occurred, one person A asserting that an action X was right and the other B maintaining that it was wrong, all A would be asserting would be that he approved of X, and all B would be asserting would be that he disapproved of X; but in that case A and B would not be really contradicting each other, and there would be no real difference of opinion between them. Their statements would be perfectly compatible. But in that case then, Moore thought, they could not really be disagreeing at all, and this was inconsistent with "plain facts" in such a situation. Thus he rightly concluded that an analysis of the plain facts of ethical disagreement showed that this older view could not be true. Now in the new view, where A

says in such a situation "X is right" his words are not primarily descriptive at all. They express his own feeling of approval, and they appeal emotively to B to share this feeling. Similarly when B says "No, X is wrong," he in turn is expressing his own feeling of disapproval, and seeking by the emotive power of the ethical word "wrong" to win A over to share this feeling. There is a real difference between A and B, and they will continue to disagree and to argue; but the difference and disagreement is one not in opinion, as Moore thought, but in attitude—and the further ethical discussion which may ensue between A and B will have the function not of seeking to bring about a change of opinion, but of seeking to secure agreement in attitude by the emotively persuasive power of the ethical terms used. The ethical disagreement, that is, centres round disagreement in attitude. It is none the less real and important for that—"an emotional conflict," Mr. Robinson remarks "is more serious than a logical contradiction."[1] Thus to use a simple illustration taken from Professor Stevenson, John and his mother both recognize the dangers in John's playing football (this must be American football); they are agreed about the dangers, that is there is agreement in belief; but John's mother does not want him to play, and John still wants to play. In such a case, Professor Stevenson would say, John and his mother can correctly be said to disagree, but the disagreement is not in belief, but in attitude. And this illustrates the sort of disagreement that is involved also in the situation we have been describing as ethical disagreement.

We must now ask ourselves whether this account is able to deal adequately with "the ostensible facts" of our experience of ethical disagreement, with our ordinary convictions of what is happening in such a situation, in such a way as either to account for these convictions or at any rate to satisfy us that if some of them have to be abandoned nothing is lost by so doing. Now in some early formulations of the theory we are discussing, such as, for example, that of Professor Ayer in *Language, Truth and Logic*, chapter vi, there was a tendency to concentrate primarily on the expressive aspect of ethical terms, as expressing the feelings of the speaker, and to assimilate them to cries or ejaculations. But if one took this assimilation strictly and added no more to the theory, an initial difficulty would seem to arise. If in using ethical words we were merely giving vent to or evincing our feelings, and that were all, the presence or absence of an audience would seem to be of little importance. But it is quite clear that very often, if not always, in using ethical language we do in fact have an audience very much in mind, and are in fact, by the very use of language, seeking to communicate something to our audience, or at any rate to affect our audience in some way. We

[1] *Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplement.* Vol. XXII, p. 100.

are not simply concerned with giving vent to or evincing our feelings. It would be tempting to say that so far as the audience was concerned we were using the ethical terms to let them know that we had these feelings. This suggestion, however, would have to be handled very carefully, for it could easily bring us back to the older form of naturalistic theory in which "this is right" simply meant "I approve of this"—a view which Professor Ayer had already rejected, and whose difficulties in giving a satisfactory account of ethical disagreement we have already seen. The more developed form of the emotive theory avoids this initial difficulty by stressing not merely the expressive aspect of the ethical terms, but also their power to influence the hearer. Thus when we use them we are not merely evincing our feeling, but are seeking to persuade others, by the use of these emotive terms, to share our feeling. This feature of ethical language Professor Stevenson, it will be remembered, seeks to characterize by means of an imperative sentence—e.g. "This is right" means "I approve of this; do so as well," where the imperative sentence is intended to bring out the emotive aspect of the ethical word in relation to the hearer. This way of accounting for our deliberate use of ethical terms in the presence of an audience is in fact already allowed for by Professor Ayer, though curiously enough only as a sort of rider to his view. "It is worth mentioning," he writes, "that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action."[1] Yet without the rider, it is hard to account for their deliberate use to an audience without, as we have seen, slipping back into the view that in such a case we are using them simply to assert to the audience that we have this feeling. At any rate, the fully developed form of the theory avoids this difficulty, and seems to provide us with a satisfactory account of how ethical arguments arise. They arise because by the use of ethical terms A is urging B to adopt a certain attitude to X through the emotive power of these terms, and B may be unwilling to adopt this attitude. He may himself have a different attitude to X, and he will proceed, by the use of different ethical terms to seek to induce A to adopt his attitude instead, and thus ethical argument begins. It seems doubtful, however, whether it it were merely a question of persuading other people to adopt the same attitude as ourselves, we should attach the same importance as we do to ethical disagreements and to attempts to reconcile them by ethical argument. What we are really anxious about is that people should act in certain ways, and certainly there are some ethical words such as "right," "ought," etc., which seem much more intimately bound up with prescribing courses of action than with merely persuading people to feel in certain ways. I myself should regard this as highly significant

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936 ed.), p. 160.

for the view we take of the function of ethical terms. The emotive theorist, however, thinks that the connection of the ethical words with action is through feeling. What a man does depends on the attitude he has, and the ethical terms are concerned not with the doing, but with the feeling which is a necessary preliminary to the doing. Provided we accept this, the emotive theorist, as can be seen from the quotation from Professor Ayer above about "stimulating action" would be quite prepared to allow the securing of action as a background to ethical disagreement.

Let us agree then that on the emotive theory we have accounted for ethical disagreement—it is at bottom disagreement in attitude—and also for the argument that arises where such disagreement occurs. Let us next ask, how, when disagreement in attitude is revealed, argument proceeds, and what its relevance is to such disagreement. Argument on this view is directed in the first instance to ensuring agreement in belief about the facts of the situation. Almost any ethical theory will insist that where ethical disagreement occurs it is wise to make sure as a first move that the two disputants have really got the same facts before them, and to this the emotive theory is no exception. For it too, beliefs about the facts are at the least one very important source for our having the attitudes we do have. It is important, however, to note the account the theory gives of how beliefs function relatively to attitudes. The connection between beliefs and attitudes is a factual, causal connection. Sometimes when we produce our "supporting reasons" against an adversary, he may accept these reasons, and consequently alter his beliefs; and this alteration in his beliefs may cause an alteration in attitude. It may; but sometimes it may not, since the change in belief will only cause a change in attitude so far as the latter is "rooted in" belief. Thus where in an argument arising out of an ethical disagreement we advance "reasons" for the attitude we are adopting, and hope thereby to win our opponent over to our attitude, the "reasons" do not operate logically, but if they do operate, they operate causally. "The supporting reasons," to quote Professor Stevenson, "have no sort of *logical* compulsion"[1]; or, to quote again, they are "related to the (ethical) judgment psychologically rather than logically. . . . They serve to intensify and render more permanent the influence upon attitudes which emotive meaning can often do no more than begin."[2] Thus, the advancing of "supporting reasons" is one way of seeking to overcome ethical disagreement. We hope that if a man, as we say, gets the facts right, then a right view of the facts will cause him to change his attitude. Yet this appeal to the facts is not the only way of seeking to cause a psychological change in our adversary. It is in fact an "indirect" method. There is also the more direct

[1] *Ethics and Language*, p. 30. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

method of exhortation and persuasion. Many words, and particularly ethical words, have a strong emotive meaning, and such words themselves, in virtue of their power to evoke feeling, and quite apart from any descriptive meaning, may cause a change in the attitude of the hearer. "To what extent," Stevenson asks, "*will* agreement in belief cause people to agree in attitude? If the answer is to be grounded not on hopes but on facts, it must necessarily run thus: we usually *do not know*, before the outcome of any argument, whether the requirement holds true for it or not; and although it is often convenient to assume that it does, to prolong enlightening argument and delay purely hortatory efforts to secure ethical agreement, the assumption can only be heuristic, without a proper basis of confirmation." On this view then exhortation and persuasion are an alternative method additional to the appeal to the facts, and in certain circumstances may be a preferable method. Nor is this surprising, for when in ethical disagreement I cling to my utterance "X is right" my sentence does not mean that there is some characteristic "rightness" which is inherent in the facts or follows from the facts in some quasi-logical sense of "follows from." (I have in mind the sort of view to be found in Dr. Ewing's book *The Definition of Good*, e.g. p. 53, "When we see that something is intrinsically good or some act morally obligatory, we also see that it must be so—its factual properties being what they are.") All it means is that I happen to approve X, and I want you to approve X too. Even though you have precisely the same beliefs about X as I have, you might still not approve it; but what I want to ensure is that you do approve it, and if beliefs won't do the trick, then persuasion may.

Now if we pay regard to "what it is that actually happens" when we disagree ethically I think we are bound to feel some qualms about this account. I think we have a tolerably stubborn conviction that we are not just trying to make our opponent share an attitude that we happen to have towards X. At the very least we would want to say that at any rate the attitude we had was the "right" attitude. What we would mean by this it might be difficult to say, but we would, I think, be clear that we intended it to mean something different from "an attitude of which I happen to approve, and which I want you to approve." Further, we would, I think, be worried by this possible alternative set before us of "rational" methods (i.e. the introducing of supporting reasons) and non-rational persuasive methods. The latter, we might think, come very near to propaganda, and we would find it hard to persuade ourselves that in our earnest discussion of a moral difference we might after all be simply using propaganda. We tend to regard the propagandist as an unscrupulous and dangerous person, against whom we must be on our guard. Now Professor Stevenson has some very interesting things to say on

this point in *Ethics and Language*, particularly in his chapter on Moralists and Propagandists. He describes a moralist as "one who endeavours to influence attitudes," and argues that while he may do this indirectly by the "rational" method of advancing supporting reasons, he may also do it directly by persuasion or exhortation; and he further agrees that the same can be said of propagandists. He therefore asks how moralists and propagandists are to be distinguished. His answer is to point out that both "moralist" and "propagandist" are words with a strong emotive meaning. In particular, "propagandist" has a strong derogatory emotive meaning. Provided the emotive meaning of both terms is completely neutralized, however, he has no objection to saying that all moralists are propagandists, or indeed that all propagandists are moralists. "Either statement," he says, "can be made true by definition, without violence to the boundaries of conventional usage."[1] Yet I doubt if this is satisfactory. When we reflect on "what it is that actually happens" (to use Moore's phrase) in ethical disagreement, it is hard to convince ourselves that it is merely a matter of using any means available, whether "rational" or "non-rational," to make the other person feel as we happen to feel. We tend still to adhere to the notion that this is precisely what the propagandist does, and what the moralist does not do, and that there is an important distinction between the two for which the theory, however carefully elaborated, fails to account. But of course the distinction goes back to the central position of the emotive theory. It goes back to the fundamental view that if we disagree ethically our disagreement is at bottom one of attitude, and that our ethical language has as its primary function the expressing and the evoking of attitudes.

The hard core of ethical disagreement then on the view we are discussing is to be found in feeling or attitude. Now let us suppose that A and B have exhausted all their arguments about the facts—that there is no difference in belief between them—and that they have also exhausted all their means of persuasion. At this stage argument ceases, but clearly disagreement does not cease. It would be, to use Moore's phrase, contrary to "plain matter of fact" to say it did, and of course in his view what remains is "a real difference of opinion." On the emotive view, what remains is "disagreement in attitude." Now this looks acceptable, and it seems to square with our conviction that there is still a real disagreement, a real "subject of dispute" (to use a phrase of Sir David Ross's) between us. When we examine the phrase "disagreement in attitude," however, against the background of the emotive theory, we may feel less happy about it. On the theory the situation is that the facts being what they are, and A and B being what they are, the one approves and the other

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

does not. Can they be said to disagree? In a certain use of the word they clearly can. If I like grapes and you dislike grapes, we may perhaps be said to disagree in our taste for grapes. As sensible people, however, we shall acknowledge the fact that our tastes differ; it is simply a fact to be recognized and accepted; it does not constitute a dispute between us. It will in fact I think be true to say that in some sense of the words we agree to disagree on the subject of grapes. We are just different from each other in this matter, and we are quite content to recognize that this is so. Now it is typical of ethical disagreement that we do not agree to disagree; that while we are prepared to agree to disagree over our taste for grapes and regard it as foolish to assume there is a dispute between us, we are not prepared to agree to disagree on matters of right and wrong, nor do we regard it as foolish to assume that there is a dispute between us. The sense, that is, in which we use the word "disagreement" in ethics is not that in which we speak of a "disagreement" in taste. This is the point we mentioned earlier in connection with Moore, and it might be thought that the emotive theory is unable to deal adequately with this unlikeness between a question of taste and a question of morals. This need not, however, necessarily be so, since the emotive theory can maintain that the peculiarly moral attitudes are to be distinguished from mere likings and dislikings precisely by the sort of features under discussion. In particular the moral attitudes are closely associated with action and a moral attitude opposed to ours may lead to action which we wish to avert, and which we are prepared to go to great lengths to avert. I think in fact the emotive theorist might admit that he has so far not done enough in the way of characterizing the "peculiarly moral attitudes,"[1] and I suspect that it may not be too easy to do so satisfactorily. But Professor Stevenson has done a little in this direction in *Ethics and Language*, and elsewhere. One may quote, for example, from his essay in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, what seems to be a fair sample of the position he might adopt: "None of us is so remote from society that he can survey the divergent attitudes of others without feeling insurmountable urges to take sides, hoping to make some attitudes preponderate over others. We are none of us "isolationists" in *all* matters, simply because what others do and approve of doing is so often of near concern to us."[2]

This latter quotation brings me to two final points. The first is a continuation of what we have just been discussing. Granted the additions just made, does this account in terms of "disagreement in attitude" satisfy us that this is the sort of use of the word "disagreement" we have in mind when we speak of "disagreeing" on a

[1] *Stevenson, Op. cit.*, p. 90.
[2] *Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, p. 90.

moral question? The account, with the above additions, explains why in a matter of mere liking or disliking we may be willing to go our separate ways, whereas this may not be so in a question of morals: we may not be able, in a question of morals where action may ensue, to leave things as they are. But does this adequately characterize our use of the word "disagree" in a case of ethical disagreement? My doubt may perhaps be illustrated in this way. There is a very familiar use of the word "disagree" in which two men are said to disagree when they hold logically incompatible opinions, that is, opinions which cannot both be true. One or the other must be false, and if after discussion they each still adhere to their opinion, each maintains that the other is mistaken and will of course continue to disagree with him. This is the sort of disagreement that has often been taken to occur in ethics too, for example by G. E. Moore in the passage quoted earlier in this paper: "It is surely plain matter of fact that when I assert an action to be wrong, and another man asserts it to be right, there is sometimes a real difference of opinion between us." Disagreement and subject of dispute remain, not simply because two opinions, and the attitudes and actions that may follow from them, are different, but because each of the disputants knows that the ethical opinions they hold cannot both be true; and the disagreement and dispute that persist are rooted in this notion that the other man is mistaken. The emotive theory rejects this appeal to truth or falsehood, but it still retains the word "disagreement"—disagreement in attitude. What it must mean, however, primarily by disagreement is difference, not certainly a difference of taste, where we are content to let things go, but difference where we feel a sharp conflict between our opponent's attitude and our own, where we want him to share our attitude, and regard his attitude and the action that may follow from it as a potential danger to society or to ourselves. It is his attitude against ours, and they are just different. The difficulty in this, however, is that in our ordinary thinking in a case of ethical disagreement we do not think merely that our opponent is different from us, but that, to use a very ambiguous phrase, he has gone wrong somewhere, and it is this feature that the Moore account preserves. Now the emotive theory may be able to do something up to a point to preserve this feature—it may be able for example to provide us with criteria for calling some attitudes enlightened and others unenlightened and so on, and it may allow us to use this sort of language to alleviate our worries. But I think it can only do this up to a point, because in the end we feel for it as we feel, and our ethical sentences express and seek to evoke in others the attitudes that we happen to have. I think, therefore, that the emotive commentary leaves us still with ethical *difference*, and that by calling this "disagreement" it conceals a difficulty. At the same time I

should not myself wish to subscribe to the true-false view in ethics of the sort represented in the passages from G. E. Moore that I have been using, and frequently elsewhere. I do not think that what is primarily involved in morals is knowing that something is the case, any more than having certain feelings. I think that what is involved rather is knowing how to act, how to cope with situations, and that our ethical utterances are neither true nor false, at least in the sense usually given to true and false in this connection, nor merely emotive. I think, instead, that in the case of some of the most important of them anyhow, a commentary in terms of rules or prescriptions for action is likely to be more illuminating than either the ordinary true-false view or the emotive view. I think too that there are correct or intelligent procedures in coping with situations, and incorrect or unintelligent procedures, and that when in ethics we have exhausted arguments about the facts and go on disagreeing, we are not simply experiencing different attitudes, but are disagreeing on the procedure to be adopted. Further, the procedure to be adopted does not depend on how we happen to feel, but there are correct procedures and incorrect procedures for dealing with the situations in which we are placed. That is why there is still dispute and disagreement between us.

This brings me to the last of my two final points. Suppose a situation (and such situations do, I think, arise, though they are fortunately rare), where we see some individual or group of individuals pursuing a certain line of conduct which we ourselves are convinced is wrong, and which perhaps closely affects the lives of others. Moreover the individual or individuals concerned may be, so far as we can see, quite in agreement with us about the facts, but still they insist that their action is right and persevere in it. In such a situation we may have to make a moral decision leading to action—in William James's phrase, we are presented with a living option, and we must decide whether to interfere or not. In certain cases, to use ordinary language, we may decide in the end, with however much reluctance, that "it is our duty to interfere." Now if we have thoroughly grasped the view of the emotive theory we know that in the long run it is simply our attitude against that of our opponent. The position, I think, despite all elaborations still remains as it was put by Professor Ayer, "we say that it is impossible to argue with him because he has a distorted or undeveloped moral sense; which signifies merely that he employs a different set of values from our own. We feel that our own system of values is superior, and therefore speak in such derogatory terms of his."[1] Also of course in the case imagined it is not merely a matter of speaking but of acting, and of acting perhaps with very serious consequences to our opponent. Yet we know that our action arises from the attitude we happen to have,

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 166.

just as his action arises from the attitude he happens to have. Our attitudes are the causal product of the various factors in our experience and environment. Yet from a common-sense point of view, if this is the story, it would seem to provide a strong recommendation to live and let live. Now in a general sort of way this is an excellent recommendation; but unfortunately it is one that sometimes cannot be accepted. Here again, however, the emotive theorist will insist that it is precisely one of the features of "the peculiarly moral attitude" involved that in such a case we are not prepared to live and let live. We have, in such a case, to use our earlier quotation from Stevenson, "insurmountable urges to take sides." Yet if this is what is said, I do not think it is altogether satisfactory. An "insurmountable urge" one cannot help regarding with suspicion. We have all a number of "insurmountable urges," some of them far from what we would regard as moral, which we would regard it as our job to control and keep down as far as we can. Yet in the situation we are envisaging, it is one of our most stubborn convictions that we should be "failing in our duty" if we let things go; and it does not seem to me to be adequate to explain the notion of "failing in our duty" in terms of an "insurmountable urge." Also granted that we do interfere, it is in the end still the imposition of our attitude and the suppression of our opponent's attitude; and these attitudes are the attitudes we happen to have. The emotive theorist will have none of the attempt to comfort us in what we are doing by the assurance that our opponent's action is based on false moral judgments, and that our decision to do what we do is based on our apprehension of ethical truth. In this I should myself regard him as right. As I have already said, for a variety of reasons I do not myself think that our ethical sentences and ethical actions are based on knowing that something is the case. On the other hand, in a situation such as we have just been envisaging, the emotive theorist will also not allow us to differentiate between intelligent and unintelligent action, correct procedures and incorrect procedures, except in so far as such differentiations are themselves eventually and in the long run defined in terms of attitudes. In the long run he comes back to attitudes which happen as they happen and to "insurmountable urges." As I have indicated the commentary which the emotive theorist provides can be extended and elaborated with great subtlety, but I suspect some of us may still feel dissatisfied with it, both in the case of ethical disagreement which we have just been examining, and also in ethics generally. And I suggest the dissatisfaction is difficult to avoid if the emotive theorist continues to ignore the importance of "knowing how" in moral conduct, and rules or prescriptions in moral language. It seems to me that a satisfactory ethical commentary must take account of these.

APPRAISALS

T. D. WELDON, M.A.

I PROPOSE to examine what I take to be the point at issue between subjectivist and objectivist theories of ethics and to explain that the controversy between them is unreal. It springs from a misunderstanding of the nature of appraisal sentences. What I hope to show is that if such sentences were really analysable in the way in which the critics and many of the supporters of subjectivist theories suppose, then those theories would indeed, as it is sometimes put "fail to do justice to the facts of moral experience." But it seems to me that objectivist theories are no better off. They make exactly the same mistake though in a more sophisticated way. I therefore propose to see whether any useful results can be achieved by construing appraisal sentences on rather different lines.

By appraisal sentences I mean (a) sentences of the form "I approve of . . ., I think well of . . ., I commend . . ., etc." I shall call these simple appraisals. (*b*) sentences of the form " . . . is good, . . . is meritorious, . . . is praiseworthy, etc." I shall call these moral appraisals. In these terms, subjectivist theories assert that moral appraisals can always be expressed without change of meaning by simple appraisals, though perhaps the addition of an imperative sentence of some kind is required to complete the translation. Objectivist theories deny this possibility and claim that moral appraisals assert truths about the independent world and not psychological facts about the speaker.

Let us begin by considering simple appraisals. What is meant when it is said that A approves or disapproves of X? To take a simple case, what does "Mr. Jones disapproves of unpunctuality" assert? An obvious answer is that it asserts an ordinary biographical fact about Mr. Jones, and phrases like "sentiments of disapprobation" and "feelings of repugnance" invite us to construe it in just this way. It is then like saying "Whenever Mr. Jones is confronted with a case of unpunctuality, he feels slightly sick, or experiences a neuralgic pain." This accounts for the use of the word "subjective" since Mr. Jones's pains are obviously not felt by anybody else. But it involves a violent distortion of the ordinary use of "disapprove."

We need not bother to ask whether Mr. Jones's alleged spasms are intermittent and, if so, whether or not he is correctly said to disapprove between them, for it is easy to see that his feelings, if he has any, are at most only a minor and inessential part of his disapproval. The answer to the question "How do you know that Mr. Jones disapproves of unpunctuality? is not "Because he feels sick." Lord

Nelson felt sick and indeed was sick when he went to sea, but he did not disapprove of seafaring; and the normal answer about Mr. Jones is, "Well, he scolded Miss Smith when she was late last week, he threatened to report Miss Simpson to the manager, he always snaps and fidgets when he is kept waiting," and so on. Very likely he does suffer from a feeling of some sort, but we should not withdraw our statement if he assured us that he did not: we should withdraw it or qualify it very heavily if we believed that he felt twinges but we also noted that he took no action. The dialogue between Alice and Tweedledee on the moral sentiments of the Walrus and the Carpenter illustrates this point. "They were *both* very unpleasant characters."

The anecdotal story of disapproving, then, must be discarded. It is just an instance of the common tendency to construe as a categorical statement what is really a semi-hypothetical one, and then to postulate a single nuclear mental state or activity connected causally with the episodes to which the categorical statement is deemed to refer.[1] More simply, it is assumed that Mr. Jones's acts of rebuking, fretting etc., are the outcome or expression of a mental state called "disapproving," and the obvious candidate for this causal job is thought to be an actual twinge or spasm of some sort. Hence "disapproving" is wrongly equated with "having a feeling," and rebuking is wrongly related to this feeling as effect to cause. In fact, however, as the normal procedure of confirmation clearly shows, Mr. Jones's disapproval is what he actually does and would probably do if occasion arose. But no single item of that behaviour is indispensable any more than the feelings which may or may not occur are indispensable. He might not have reported Miss Simpson at the time but simply have been rather unenthusiastic in recommending her for promotion.

There are, however, some difficulties about construing simple appraisals in this way which need to be considered. First, it may be argued that, even if such an account is adequate to the trivial instance I have chosen, it will not do for situations in which the disapproval expressed is of the higher type called moral disapproval and is not merely irritation at the interruption of a habit or routine activity; and this objection is particularly strong when the moral indignation is not expressed but concealed. For if it is correct, as it seems to be, to say that people "suppress" or "conceal" their sentiments, especially on moral issues, they must surely have sentiments to conceal, and those sentiments after all are their disapprovals. They are concealed just as a man may conceal his headache or his twinges of anxiety in order to avoid spoiling the party. This point is easy to elucidate. It is not denied that "feeling shocked" and "feeling irritated" are legitimate expressions. They are like "feeling sick" and

[1] See G. Ryle *The Concept of Mind* especially pp. 126 ff. In this and what follows I assume the correctness of Professor Ryle's account of modal sentences.

"having a sinking feeling in the stomach"—and they can be concealed in the same way, namely by trying not to act as people with headaches normally act. It is agreed that the punctual Mr. Jones may feel nausea at every instance of unpunctuality, and, if he does, he will probably conceal it when the offender is his employer just as he will conceal his headache at his employer's dinner party.

But what is happening on such occasions is not that he is hiding something called "his disapproval" by suppressing an effect or symptom from which its existence could be inferred. His attitude can perfectly well be described by saying "He would have scolded, groaned or grasped his head, but restrained himself because . . . ." He merely refrained from uttering the rebuke which he would have uttered if the delinquent had been his secretary and not his employer. Feelings, in fact, are not a cause though they are sometimes an accompaniment of disapproving words, thoughts and acts.

The second difficulty is more awkward. What are we to say of the man who approves of prohibition in the sense that he makes speeches in favour of it, subscribes to temperance associations and votes for temperance candidates at elections, but who also approves of alcohol by getting drunk from time to time in the solitude of his bedroom? Clearly this is not an isolated case. High-minded people do travel without railway tickets, make false income tax declarations and defraud the customs. Approval (in my sense) of a law frequently goes with approval (in the same sense) of infringements of the same law on special occasions.

Certainly this inconsistency needs attention, and it is tempting to argue that such a man does not *really* approve of the law and to construe this as meaning that, while his overt actions suggest approval, the subjective feeling, which *is* approval, is absent. But again, this episode account breaks down. For clearly the inconsistent man may perfectly well experience a glow of self-satisfaction both when he gives his prohibition vote and when he opens his whiskey bottle. We do not know whether he does or not and our judgement of him would not be altered if we did know. There is a real difficulty about such inconsistencies and I shall refer to this again. For the moment it is enough to point out that the explanation of them in terms of feelings is just not an explanation at all.

This point is reinforced if we consider aesthetic approvals or appreciations which are also frequently misinterpreted as "feelings" or "emotions." When a man is said to appreciate Beethoven, what is meant is that he takes trouble and spends money to go to Beethoven concerts, that he listens carefully and criticizes intelligently, that he has at least a working knowledge of Beethoven's technique and so on. It is true, as in the other cases I have considered, that he may also have emotional disturbances at performances of Op. 131, but, if he

does, they are rather a hindrance to appreciation than an essential part of it.

Simple appraisals, then, should not be construed as psychological reports on the feelings of the speaker. But the fact they have been and are misconstrued in this way is what leads objectivists to protest against the suggestion that moral conduct, or for that matter, any intelligent behaviour, can be described in terms of them. Kant and his followers are quite right in condemning emotional sentimentalism or *Schwärmerei*.

The next question, however, is what objectivists have to offer as a substitute, and it is here that moral as distinct from simple appraisals are brought into action. At first sight it appears that the whole idea of approval is discarded. What we are interested in is no longer "Mr. Jones disapproves of unpunctuality" but "Mr. Jones knows that unpunctuality is wrong." Approval, however, is not by any means completely rejected. It is agreed that Mr. Jones, because he knows that unpunctuality is wrong, has a feeling of repugnance when he meets it. Thus the wrong account of disapproval is accepted, but the feeling of it is now regarded as a consequence, and not a very important one, of the possession of an item of knowledge which is very important indeed, namely the knowledge that something is wrong. The erroneous notion of approval appears by this method to have been excluded from ethics proper and relegated to the status of a psychological accident. It is still slightly relevant as an indication of character that a man should be shocked or gratified by some kinds of conduct. But it is not crucial.

What is more important is that something very like what I consider to be the proper use of "approval" is covertly reintroduced in the phrase "knows that . . . is wrong." For "wrong" is not a simple descriptive word like "yellow." It is an approval word, and it is at least tempting to say that sentences in which it occurs can be replaced by others of the form "God" or "the State," or "most people disapprove of . . . ." This is the subjectivist argument. It is rightly countered by the objectivists who say that such translations will not do if "approve" is construed anecdotally. It seems to me, however, that the objectivist case itself will not hold water as it is usually formulated.

Consider "Mr. Jones knows that unpunctuality is wrong." How does he know it? Several answers have been put forward, but they do not differ much in principle from one another. Roughly they are:

I. He just knows it. It is obvious or self-evident.

II. He infers it from a limited number of self-evident axioms.

III. He applies a test to it which it satisfies, or refers it to some universal criterion or fundamental principle. The validity of this principle must

then be self-evident. It must be a "dictate of reason" which nobody outside a lunatic asylum who understands the meaning of the words used could possibly reject.

It does not matter which of these is selected for, whichever it is, the account offered of Mr. Jones's behaviour in rebuking Miss Smith is both unplausibly complicated and incompetent to explain what takes place. All of them involve a piece of reasoning or theorizing. In *I.* this is restricted to recognizing unpunctuality as a species of wrong. The process in *II.* and *III.* is more intellectual. But it is immaterial whether he is supposed o ask and answer "Can universal unpunctuality be willed without self-contradiction?" or "Does it contribute to the greatest happiness of the greatest number?" In either case he has to carry out a piece of dispassionate theorizing. He also (probably) feels a spasm of repugnance. But neither of these produced his rebuke. For it is admitted that he may say to himself "I know unpunctuality is wrong" and do nothing and he may utter rebuke without feeling disapproval. So we have to introduce a further factor called act of will to produce the rebuke.

What is perfectly correct about this type of view is that it wants to treat the disapproving conduct both as intelligent and as an action, that is, as something I do and not as something that happens to me. It is not just a reflex movement caused by a state of pain. Kant, for instance, was perfectly justified in his insistence that the good will is not a "mere wish but the straining of every means so far as they are in our control" and also that right acts are acts done on principle and not simply the effects of feelings or emotions.

But the story is wrong all the same and wrong in very much the same way as the emotive story which it rightly sets out to discredit. For both alike suffer from the unquestioned assumption that appraisal sentences, whether simple or moral, must report an event or a series of the events. They must be categorical statements about identifiable occurrences. The nerve of the emotive argument is that there are no appropriate episodes in the world outside the speaker to be reported, and that therefore there must be appropriate events in his inner life, namely his feelings. The objectivist retort is that these are not the right kind of facts for appraisals to report, so there must be facts or truths about the independent world to fill the bill. And we are again offered a single nuclear mental activity, in this case practical reason to explain what takes place. This activity is either hitched on to a specific occurrence called a feeling of respect, or else harnessed to a volition or spontaneous act of will (or perhaps a series of these) in order that Mr. Jones may reach the office at 9.30 and rebuke Miss Smith for failing to do so. It may be noted in passing that nobody except in defence of the theory ever claims to notice all or any of these goings on, or cites them as evidence for the truth of "Mr. Jones

disapproves of unpunctuality." But even if we accept the defence that they were noticed once but have now been forgotten or become so familiar that we no longer notice them, we are really no better off. For the programme which according to this account we always carry out in order to formulate any appraisal statement is one which cannot be carried out at all. We may suppose if we are very careless about it that something comparable to geometrical reasoning with axioms, theorems and conclusions is involved. But clearly this is not the case.

I. There are no appraisal axioms of the kind required which are very widely, let alone universally accepted. This is very often concealed by a verbal trick. "Everyone," it is said, "disapproves of cruelty and treachery." Of course they do, for this is an analytical statement. "Cruelty" means "hurting people without justification," and "treachery" means "acting (wrongly) against the interests of someone whom you have a duty to support." One only need ask "Is corporal punishment cruel?" or "Is telling the police that your friend uses red petrol in his car treachery?" to see that it is not as easy as that.

II. The recommended criteria are either so abstract as to be vacuous (as in Kant and Mill), or they are precise (as in the notion of the concrete State). If they are the former they are useless for they can be used either way, and if they are the latter, the result of applying them is highly controversial.

But it is no use looking for better criteria or more highly trained intuitive faculties, for the whole idea is wrongly conceived. "Unpunctuality is wrong" does not report the discovery of a novel fact like "Swiss pillar-boxes are yellow." There are no new sins waiting to be discovered and named after their finders like mountains in central Africa or chemical elements. Appraisal statements are not the conclusions of theorizing and therefore the question "How does Reason become practical?" is unprofitable. What has happened is simply that "intelligent conduct" has been wrongly construed as "action caused or impelled by the conclusions reached by theorizing," and so we get the notion of the nuclear process and the anecdotal report, though in a more efficient and sophisticated form than that which they assumed in the earlier subjectivist account.

What, then, is the upshot if we reject both the suggested interpretations and regard both simple and moral appraisal sentences as semi-hypotheticals? I have already maintained that simple appraisals are of this type. "Mr. Jones disapproves of unpunctuality" is a statement not about any specifiable feeling or action on the part of Mr. Jones, but about a whole group of actions, some of which he has done or would do under certain circumstances. This will probably not cause much trouble. But the suggestion that similar treatment can be given to moral appraisals is clearly much more controversial. Let us at least consider how this might be done.

As a first approximation I suggest that such moral statements are about the approvals (in the sense already accepted) of some authority or other. This is deliberately vague. I take "authority" to mean something like "a person or body whose approvals are normally accepted by the speaker as basic, i.e., not subject to criticism or enquiry."

There are first some rather obvious difficulties to be met, and what I have to say in answer to these will, I hope, help to elucidate the view I wish to maintain.

1. It may be objected that, if "X approves . . ." is equivalent to "X performs or would perform certain actions," "it is wrong to . . ." must be construed on different lines; for each of the relevant actions can itself accept ethical predicates. We can ask "Ought Mr. Jones to have rebuked Miss Smith?" "Would he have been justified in reporting Miss Simpson?" and so on.

This, however, is not very serious. In spite of the verbal form of such questions, few would now maintain that actions are atomic occurrences each of which is the proper object of appraisal and ethical statements in abstraction from its context. Even "like" and "dislike" are inappropriate unless something more than a piece of reflex behaviour is involved. It is the great merit of coherence theories that they have emphazised this point.

2. If "approves of" is equivalent to "attempts to promote, would actively support" etc., there are many kinds of action traditionally regarded as ethical in character of which most people in fact neither approve nor disapprove, since they show no tendency either to promote or to suppress them.

This, I think, can be accepted though it needs some qualification. It is always possible that people would do something if the occasion arose. Many who had not previously bothered about it were found to disapprove strongly of the abolition of capital punishment in this country and of the introduction of prohibition into the United States. (It is perhaps worth repeating here that their activities were their disapproval and not symptons or expressions of it.) On the other hand it would seem that comparatively few people either approve or disapprove of the Lord's Day Observance Act or the suppression of blood sports. In general, I am inclined to think that we do often use both simple and ethical appraisal sentences without any precise meaning but even so we do not in practice use them nearly as frequently as we might be expected to do if, as has sometimes been suggested, practically all our actions were properly describable in moral terms.

3. "But surely," it may be argued, "silent disapproval and secret moral condemnation occur? It seems at least not to be nonsense or self-contradictory to talk about them." Taken strictly, such phrases are nonsensical. They are, however, commonly used to signify minimal disapproval in the proper sense. Thus many Germans dis-

approved of Hitler. In fact they only grumbled and made jokes about him in private. But they would have removed him if it could have been done at only a very slight cost to themselves. A lot of "strong moral convictions" are like that.

4. We certainly do use moral sentences about simple appraisals. We can properly say "I know that Mr. Jones disapproves of unpunctuality, but is he right to do so?"

This is much more complicated. Sometimes indeed it is simply equivalent to "Is this approval consistent with his other approvals?" "Ought the burglar to have drunk the whiskey?" This is a straightforward question about coherence and need not be further considered here. The only authority involved in such cases would be Mr. Jones himself. Usually, however, the answer given and expected involves more than this. "Yes, his religion demands it," "It is the law," "His parents expect it of him" are all proper responses. (Of course they would not be proper responses nor would the question be a proper question if "to disapprove" meant "to feel an involuntary twinge or qualm.")

5. The fact that such answers are given is not in dispute, but the matter cannot be left there. For just what is meant by saying that moral statements are always about the actual or possible behaviour of some authority or other? If such sentences are to have any precise meaning, we must be able to specify the authority involved. It must be God, the State, or the individual's own conscience, and it is the primary job of ethics to say which of these *is* the final authority.

This is a real difficulty, and it is closely connected with another which must be formulated before any solution can be attempted.

6. The whole of this story, it will be said, is manifestly absurd since it is just another attempt to translate normative into descriptive statements, and it is well known that such attempts are fruitless.

This would certainly be a valid criticism if I were trying to "reduce" both simple appraisals and moral statements into sentences in the indicative about specific actual states of people and their environment. But that is just what I object to doing. Indeed most of my case is that semi-hypotheticals cannot be replaced by categoricals in the way in which subjectivist and objectivist theories both try to replace them.

This, however, is only a partial answer. The real problem which is implicit in 5 and 6 has got to be faced. I think it is this. To make an ethical statement is generally held to presuppose the acceptance of a standard of some sort and to assert that something comes up to that standard or satisfies that norm. This suggests that "That is wrong" is the same sort of statement as "Those cars are below the standard required for the export market," "Those papers are not up to the standard of third class honours." The latter statements however are

clearly hypothetical, and present no difficulty. What is peculiar about ethical sentences and what makes them supposedly incapable of being construed in this way is the fact that they are concerned with an absolute standard and not simply with the application of an arbitrary or accepted rule. Now it should be observed that no difficulty is felt here provided that some authority, God, the Church or the Kremlin, is recognized as the basic and unchallengeable arbiter. Under such conditions there is nothing odd or unconventional in maintaining the equivalence of "That is wrong" with "X disapproves of that." "Thou shalt not kill" is properly equated with "If you approve of killing, i.e., if you act in such and such ways in such and such circumstances, you will be disapproved of by X, i.e., he will tend to act in such and such ways." To interpret this as just a threat is quite erroneous. It is to rush straight into Hobbesian oversimplification of what authority is. Disapproval, it must be insisted, involves a whole complex of behaviour and not a simple tit for tat.

Matters become much more complicated, however, when belief in an Absolute Authority is weakened or discarded. When this happens the resulting ethical vacuum tends to be filled by the claim that, although no authoritative person or body can be found, the acceptance of an absolute ethical standard is a rational or logical necessity. The argument, of course, is Platonic and it is interesting that it was produced at the time when an ethical vacuum was proving troublesome. Briefly it is that one can properly ask of any measuring rod whether it is exactly a foot long, but it is not grammar to ask whether a foot is exactly a foot long. So you must admit that you have an idea or absolute standard length to start with since your question about measuring rods is certainly a sensible one. Similarly, you can always ask "Is X good?" so you must have an Idea or Absolute Standard of Good in terms of which such questions can be put and answered.

I do not propose to enter into any detailed or adequate statement of this argument here. There is, however, one point about it which must be noted, namely that the conclusion to which it leads is not now accepted either in scientific or in ordinary usage. It certainly makes sense to say that for most purposes pendulums are better measures of time than pulse beats, and that there are far more accurate standards of measurement than pendulums can provide. But such statements are not taken to involve the ideas of absolute time or absolute standards of measurement—indeed it is generally considered that these phrases are meaningless. Statements about measurements are normally analysed into hypotheticals of the form "If you require accuracy within such and such limits, the standard you need is so and so." Pendulums will serve your purpose if you are studying railway trains but not if you are interested in electrons.

In fact it has been found perfectly possible to revise the grammar of physics in such a way that the revelant phenomena and processes can be properly described without the introduction of absolute standards; and the contention that standards of this type are an inescapable necessity if we are to talk sense about moral sentences is therefore highly suspect. The most plausible argument for it, and it is a strong one, is this. If we admit the absence of such a standard, and of the incorrigible moral principles which might be expected to be derived from it, it seems that we can never say with much confidence that any moral or political system is superior to any other. "They do things like that in Russia and we do them differently here" would have to be the last word. This certainly looks bad, but it is not as serious as it looks. It is frightening because we still try to construe approval statements as categoricals and to ask for some single, identifiable items in situations, moral and political, which can be extracted and appraised. But, fortunately, we all know perfectly well how to deal with approvals in many departments. There is nothing difficult in the statement that one wine or cheese is superior to another, though such statements cannot be translated into reports of the recognition of a single specified ingredient or any collection of ingredients; nor can the reports of tutors on their pupils. The trouble is simply that ethical (and aesthetic) appraisals are traditionally supposed to be very difficult to analyse and not just rather complicated. Yet even here it is inevitably admitted that we do know what to do about disagreements in aesthetic and moral matters. True, our efforts to improve our own and other people's tastes are not always very successful but we know how to make them and we often know when they are not worth making. "I think you would approve of this if . . . " is the only way to start, and when it does not work, the only thing to do is to try again.

Nobody nowadays is very surprised when democratic institutions do not commend themselves to the Scythians immediately, or even after a lot of trying. Improving moral standards is indeed not the same thing as improving techniques of measuring and weighing or even as improving standards of aesthetic appreciation. But these activities have a lot more in common than is sometimes supposed. There are no absolute standards but that is not to say that there are no standards at all or that the best existing standards cannot be improved.

ON THE SYNTHETIC ASPECT OF MATHEMATICS

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In the most recent edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*, Professor A. J. Ayer still maintains that pure mathematics is analytic, being in fact merely a vast system of tautology.[1] He is much more confident about this than are most contemporary professional mathematicians who have investigated the foundations of their subject. Following the breakdown of the efforts both of Frege and of Russell and Whitehead to derive pure mathematics from logic, i.e. to prove that the denial of any *one* proposition of mathematics would necessarily be self-contradictory, Hilbert attempted to prove the more modest thesis that pure mathematics is consistent, i.e. that no *two* propositions of mathematics can contradict each other; but in 1931 Gödel discovered that even this thesis was undecidable according to the "rules of the game." As Weyl has recently lamented, "From this history one thing should be clear: we are less certain than ever about the ultimate foundations of (logic and) mathematics."[2]

The sense in which Ayer uses the terms *analytic* and *tautology* implies also that in his view the activities of pure mathematicians lead to nothing new. It is true that he remarks that "there is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs." But, he continues, "we can also see that there is a sense in which they may be said to add nothing to our knowledge. For they may be said to tell us what we know already."[3] This denial of novelty in mathematics is as typical of contemporary positivism as the prophecy of Comte that the composition of the stars would never be revealed to us and the objections of Mach to the atomic hypothesis were characteristic of nineteenth century positivism. Indeed, one wonders why the term *positivism* should have been appropriated by successive philosophers whose common outlook could be so much more fittingly described as *negativism*.

Leaving on one side the "deep" logical objection to Ayer's conception of mathematics, namely that it would apparently entail the existence of "undecidable tautologies", I propose instead to consider some other objections to his point of view. In his lucidly argued

[1] Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic*. London, 1948, pp. 75–87.
[2] Weyl, H., *American Mathematical Monthly*, **53** (1946), p. 13.
[3] Ayer, A. J., *op. cit.*, pp. 79–80.

chapter on *The A Priori*, Ayer quotes with complete approval the dictum of Hans Hahn, "Ein allwissendes Wesen braucht keine Logik und keine Mathematik,"[1] and he mentions $91 \times 79 = 7189$ as an example of a tautology that we do not see in a flash merely because of the feebleness of our intellects. According to this view, the possibility of invention and discovery in mathematics is due solely to the limitations of our reason. From the above example and its context it is clear, however, that Ayer regards the activities of mathematicians to be adequately typified by the multiplication tables. This idea of mathematics is much too narrow.

What are numbers? This question must have arisen when Pythagoras enunicated his doctrine that "things are (or resemble) numbers," if not before. It appears that, in contrast to the Ionian materialists, the Pythagoreans emphasised *form* as the principle differentiating the primitive unity of matter into its constituent parts. Numbers came to be regarded as forms characterizing "things," and it seems that the Pythagoreans regarded numbers as patterns of units arranged in definite order and formation. Thus, the numbers $3, 6, 10 \ldots \frac{1}{2}n(n+1), \ldots$ were classed as *triangular*, the numbers $4, 9, 16, \ldots n^2, \ldots$ as *square*, and so on. This idea that numbers possess shape has, of course, long been abandoned in the crude sense of Pythagoras, but during the last hundred years or so *pattern* has again become an important factor guiding us in our attempts to extend the number concept, for example to hypercomplex numbers, matrices, etc. Furthermore, the key to a proper understanding of classical algebra, in particular the theory of equations, has been shown to be the concept of algebraic form.

Similarly, the study of higher arithmetic, or theory of numbers, soon reveals that many of the activities of mathematicians are of a different character from those associated with the multiplication tables. In a great deal of mathematics, the main object is the proof rather than the answer, and often the principal point of interest is the *form* of the proof. To take a simple example, knowledge of the existence of an infinity of primes is as familiar to every mathematician as the theorem of Pythagoras; but the form of the proof, for example considering the number $p_1 p_2 p_3 \ldots p_n + 1$, where $p_1, p_2, \ldots p_n$ are the first n primes and showing that it is itself either a prime greater than p_n, or else must admit as a factor a prime greater than p_n, so that in either case a prime greater than p_n must exist, is one in which it is still possible to delight long after one can visualize the entire argument "instantaneously."

We thus see that mathematicians pursue at least two different objectives: on the one hand, they seek precise answers to problems; on the other, their aim is the construction and contemplation of

[1] Ayer, A. J., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

proofs and formal relationships. But this is not all. For instance, in his stimulating essay, *Esquisse du Progrès de la Pensée Mathématique*, the Belgian historian Pelseneer has drawn attention to problems from the Sanskrit of Brahmagupta and Bhascara which begin "dis-moi vite, dis-moi directement, . . . expressions qui auraient grandement choqué les Grecs."[1] Here the emphasis is not merely on getting the answer, but on getting the answer *quickly*. Thus, we find a third objective in mathematics, the desire to obtain solutions with the utmost economy of effort. In practical mathematics techniques are evolved for obtaining short cuts to the answers, and absolute accuracy is usually no longer demanded, and may be meaningless. Instead, the standard of accuracy depends on the precision of the data analysed, and use is often made of computing machines. In this type of mathematics, in which the Hindus with their superior numerical symbolism surpassed the Greeks with their superior logical technique, numbers are regarded essentially as operations or processes.

The idea that mathematics is in essence a maze of tautology probably has its origin in the concept of numbers as *static forms*, (nouns and adjectives), the Greek concept. To this the Hindus, Arabs and West Europeans have opposed the concept of numbers as *dynamic forms*, or processes (verbs).

Let us consider from these two standpoints in turn the particular proposition, discussed by Kant, that $7 + 5 = 12$, which has been re-examined by Ayer[2] who maintains that it is true *a priori* because on his interpretation it is tautologous or analytic, whereas Kant believed that it is synthetic. There are five symbols involved. If *seven*, *five* and *twelve* are regarded as the names of certain classes, as in the Frege-Russell theory, what do *plus* and *equal* signify? The process of addition seems strangely artificial when applied to cardinal numbers because, strictly speaking, cardinal numbers are independent of one another. Moreover, the cardinal number concept is extremely recondite and sophisticated. Cassirer has remarked that, if for example we group meat and cherries together under the attributes "red, juicy and edible," we do not obtain a concept of any value.[3] Why then should we group together a couple of apples, a brace of pheasants and a pair of shoes under the concept "two"? The answer is that the concept is an *open* one, and we must combine all conceivable dyads to obtain it; but this is an infinite process, and consequently we are confronted with the notorious difficulties which have long been associated with the question of whether infinite

[1] Pelseneer, J., *Esquisse du Progrès de la Pensée Mathématique*. Paris, 1935. p. 91.

[2] Ayer, A. J., *op. cit.*, pp. 77 *et seq.*

[3] Cassirer, E., *Substance and Function*. Chicago, 1923. p. 7.

processes are completely amenable to finite logical analysis. In the face of this still unsolved problem which lies at the very core of mathematics we cannot yet be *certain* that even from the "static" Frege-Russell aspect mathematics is mere tautology.

Instead of regarding numbers as Platonic forms, we may consider them to be generated from a primary operation *plus one* by successive iteration. We then find that each positive integer must be looked upon as an operation, formed by repeating the operation *plus one* according to a particular pattern which matches a given master-pattern. For example, the operation "7" i.e. *plus seven*, is equivalent to the master-pattern symbolized by (+1+1+1+1+1+1+1). The operations "5" and "12" can be defined in a similar manner. The equations discussed by Kant can now be interpreted as signifying that the operation "12" can also be obtained by combining the operations "7" and "5" in a way which formally resembles the operation of repetition of *plus one*. From this operational aspect too, the property of numbers discussed by Kant is not *obviously* tautological.

These difficulties can be avoided, of course, if we choose to regard "7 + 5" and "12" merely as two different *names* for the same concept or process, and this is the solution which Ayer has adopted. "We see, then," he writes, "that there is nothing mysterious about the apodeictic certainty of logic and mathematics. Our knowledge that no observation can ever confute the proposition '7 + 5 = 12' depends simply on the fact that the symbolic expression '7 + 5' is synonymous with '12,' just as our knowledge that every oculist is an eye-doctor depends on the fact that the symbol 'eye-doctor' is synonymous with 'oculist.' And the same explanation holds for every other *a priori* truth."[1] From this "linguistic" point of view, however, mathematics would be no more than a potentially endless catalogue of synonyms for isolated concepts or processes, for example the positive integers, and there would be effectively nothing for the mathematician to do because there would be no calculations for him to perform. He would merely consult his "dictionary," just as the tyro consults his multiplication tables. If mathematics were no more than this, superhuman intelligence would not be required to discover that it was devoid of interest.

The outstanding achievement of the great masters, however, has been their power of imagining *new* forms and associations of mathematical concepts, whether it be the discovery of unsuspected relationships by a Ramanujan, who may have only the haziest idea of what is meant by a strict proof,[2] or the construction of rigorous chains of argument by a Hilbert. Gauss, for example, constructed

[1] Ayer, A. J., *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[2] Hardy, G. H., *Ramanujan*. Cambridge, 1940, p. 11.

no fewer than *six* different proofs of the law of quadratic reciprocity. It is unlikely that his object was that of the physicist who repeats a particular experiment to make sure of the result. The first proof must have been sufficient to convince him of the truth of the theorem; presumably, his object in constructing further proofs was purely *aesthetic*. Unfortunately, although from time to time attempts have been made to construct a mathematical theory of aesthetics,[1] no one has yet investigated at all seriously the aesthetics of mathematical invention and discovery.

Logic is but one aspect of mathematics, the analytic; the impulse to create new mathematics often springs from the aesthetic sense, which is synthetic. In a great tapestry, the fabric which we see corresponds exactly to the material used by the weaver. Similarly, in one sense it may ultimately be possible to prove conclusively that part of elementary mathematics, at least, is pure tautology. But the arrangement of the coloured threads which makes the tapestry a miracle of the weaver's art is not inherent in the yarn; it has been created by the artist. If we interpret Kant's conception of mathematics in a similar way, we see that he was right in emphasizing the role of construction in[2] mathematics and so maintaining that this discipline is synthetic. Just as a chain is more than the mere aggregate of its component links, so mathematics is more than a grand array of isolated identities.

[1] Birkhoff, G. D., *Aesthetic Measure*. Harvard, 1933. For a recent account of Renaissance views on this question, see Blunt, A., *Artistic Theory in Italy*, 1450–1600. Oxford, 1940.

[2] Unlike Kant, of course, we no longer regard the construction of, and appeal to, the figure as an essential feature of a geometrical proof.

DISCUSSION

ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

The present state of ethical theory and practice is disquieting. Objectivism, in all its varieties, is unconvincing, and subjectivism, hedonic or emotive, is intellectually incredible and socially intolerable. No one is ethically content—except the dogmatist and the sceptic, who act willy nilly with the exponents of "might-cum-persuasion makes right." Can we find a happier middle region between these inhospitable poles? Perhaps the very limitations of human valuation will provide the ground that ethics requires.

Let us begin by considering the conditions which must hold if ethical action is to be possible:

1. Only if the agent can provide a justifying reason for his choice of action can he claim to act ethically. For ethical action is a species of purposive action, and to act purposively entails the ability to give justifying reasons for one's choice of action. ("Justifying" here is to be understood as "putatively justifying"). Thus ethical action presupposes putatively grounded ethical judgment.

2. Justifying reasons must be acknowledgeable by all competent judges, i.e. by all persons who (1) are acquainted with all relevant knowledge of the nature and consequences of the alternative courses of action, (2) allow as far as possible for congenital, cultural and idiosyncratic bias, (3) are capable of sane and serious reflection, and (4) are able to make survey of their experience and to draw conclusions from it. For the judgment "the action A is ethically preferable to its alternatives B (in this situation)" entails "A ought to be done" which in turn entails "every competent judge is capable of acknowledging the ground of the judgment 'A is ethically preferable to B' and consequently would be able to set himself to perform A as an *ethical* act, (i.e. an autonomous act for which the agent can provide a justifying reason)." We can assure ourselves of this requirement of acknowledgeability by observing that whenever we resolve, and not merely settle, an ethical disagreement, we have achieved not only a factual, predictive, valuational and attitudinal agreement between the disputants, but a joint acknowledgment of the ground of the ethical judgment. Without this, the agreement could not be said to be ethical, whether the judgment be right or wrong or neither, but merely an agreement to disagree ethically. Unless ethical disagreement is in principle resolvable, ethical judgment is impossible, for we should be unable to claim that our choice ought to be acted upon.

3. The ground of judgment must contain reference to the foreseeable consequences, occurrent and dispositional, of the choice of action. This obvious requirement hardly needs proof; however, we can demonstrate its necessity by recognizing that it is always possible that a competent judge might deny the ethical preferability of a foreseeable consequence of the chosen action whose consequences are ignored.

4. Ethical judgment must have a contemporaneous and single (i.e. non-serial) justification. It cannot be grounded in the mere fact of its future and multiple occurrence in similar situations. The ground of judgment is not an hypothesis, awaiting verification, for hypotheses cannot be acknowledged, though they may be confidently proposed.

5. The ground of ethical judgment must permit us to decide between competing claims or *prima facie* obligations. This evident condition is unfulfilled by any of the theories (e.g. intuitionism) which recognize such "obligations."

6. The impulsion to ethical judgment must be self-imposed; it must be neither an external compulsion nor an internal conformity to orthodox norms. A good man is something more than a good boy.

If we believe that the arguments of extreme subjectivists against the possibility of ethical action are inconclusive, we may proceed to test the more plausible objective theories by inquiring whether they satisfy these conditions. Detailed examination is out of place here, but even a casual survey may show how the main varieties of objectivism fail to provide adequate objectivity: religious, metaphysical, consciental, intuitive, rational, naturalistic, evolutionary, social, psychological, utilitarian, humanist and other kinds of objectivism are found wanting. A more thorough inquiry will confirm this impression. We are left with the difficult and perhaps impossible task of constructing or synthesizing a theory which can satisfy our six conditions. In the course of this construction it will be surprising if we can not make use of concepts and principles developed in two millennia of objective quest.

In our human experience we may clearly distinguish animal and human functions, states, dispositions and reactions. On the basis of this empirical distinction, we may define "animal function" as the class of all functions concerned with maintaining the metabolism of the organism, and with the biological continuance of the species, that is to say, all somatic and somatic-supporting functions, e.g. the provision of food, shelter and clothing, and the material side of social structure and process. Accordingly, "distinctively human function" may be defined as the class of all our non-animal functions. These will include, for example, the practice and appreciation of art, science (but not technology), philosophy, love, and "good works," and an ethically mixed assortment of incidental activities, wit and humour, playing games, killing for sport, crime and fraud, and so on. Within the class of distinctively human functions, we may distinguish the "indispensable human functions," which may be defined as those distinctively human functions without which our distinctively human experience would at best remain merely repetitive or at worst lapse into animality; in other words, as any function whose denial would result in the deprivation and ultimately the destruction of our humanity. If, for example, scientific enquiry, reflective thought or artistic creation and appreciation were to cease at the end of our century, human function and experience would degenerate into the repetition of techniques, crafts and arts hitherto practised, and in time this repetition would lead to selective somatic specialization, the cerebrum would atrophy, and our species would gradually descend into animality, enslaved by instinct, habit and bodily function.

The indispensable human function with which we are concerned is valuation, i.e. all human activities associated with preference: enquiry, discovery, purposeful contemplation, assessment (evaluation), preferential choice and the enjoyment of that choice. Indisputably, preference for one way of doing, explaining, regarding, interpreting, enjoying, creating and appreciating things to alternative ways is the *sine qua non* of science, art, philosophy and love. In other words, one of the generically human activities is conscious choice between what we regard as "better" and "worse." When a person is not engaged upon the preparatory enquiry into, the making or the enjoyment of this choice, he is either "resting on his oars" as a human, or reverting temporarily to an animal condition. It would be priggish and hypocritical to deny ourselves the pleasures of these diversions, but we must insist on specifically human endeavour during the significant portions of our lives. To refuse is to

disqualify oneself from human society and conduct, and consequently from the discussion of ethics and non-ethics.

We often accompany our valuations with claims to knowledge, viz. assertions that the object is really good or truly valuable. Whether or not these assertions possess meaning, according to the definition of "meaning" in vogue, they, like other claims to knowledge which transcends sensory verification and logical analysis, cannot be certified. So, at least, is the most probable reading of experience acknowledgeable by all competent judges. The utmost conviction is not certification, and no certifying test has been proposed that could be acceptable to all of them. This does not preclude the possibility that a means of certification adequate to objective ethical judgment will not be discovered in the future; we can maintain only that our experience so far has not provided one. Denied certifiability of valuation, may we not claim validatability? It is true that our valuational judgments may be said to be correct or incorrect, in the jejune sense of verified or disconfirmed predictions of our future value experience. But validation requires the assessment of each value-experience in its own right; we must establish the validity of individual value-experiences as well as verify our predictions of them, and this we cannot do. There are no acceptable criteria for defining "competent valuer" apart from those defining "competent judge." Valuation has no ground.

Valuation is a non-terminating function. We should have reason to accept our valuations with finality only if they had been certified. We cannot rest on our preferences, though we may retain some of them under criticism throughout our lives. An object can be preferred only by comparison with alternatives; whenever we refuse to re-assess our preferences in relation to new alternatives which we either seek or have presented to us, we cease to value in the proper sense. It is sometimes affirmed that valuation can be improved. This we may allow for valuation in the merely predictive sense, but we cannot know whether or not valuation proper has been improved. We may only describe the change, the scope of its data, the valuational practice and "experience" of the valuer, and so on.

All valuation is auto-valuation. One can control the data and means of valuation, and therefore the development of the valuational potentialities of another, but one cannot perform his valuation for him. An imposed "valuation" is no valuation. One cannot implant valuation, but one can persuade another to revalue, on the basis of new data or means, and one can influence or interfere with valuation. As we shall see, the empirical fact of valuational interference constitutes part of the ethical ground. Let us examine the nature and consequences of interference with valuation.

Valuational interference includes the following four types of interpersonal action and intrapersonal attitude:

1. Valuational coercion, the physical prevention of valuation and the imposition of a quasi-valuation. This is so common in our world that illustration would be otiose.

2. Valuational persuasion, i.e. all forms of non-coercively altering another's valuation which are not solely concerned with inviting the valuer to adopt for himself the "best" valuation that all the available data and means, and the maximal development of the valuer's potentialities, permit.

3. Deprivation of valuational data and means. Deprivation involves any restriction or distortion of available means and data. The data of valuation are constituted by (*a*) the physical world, (*b*) human products and (*c*) the valuations and persuasions of others; the means of valuation by (*a*) the subjective conditions of "optimal" valuation, determinable empirically only by each person for himself (e.g. sound mind and body, satisfaction of animal

needs, freedom from pain, worry, distraction, threat of coercion, etc.), and (*b*) the property and equipment requisite for carrying on the valuation (e.g. artist's materials, scientist's laboratory, scholar's library, etc.).

4. Unnecessary interference with any non-human thing or process. We do not certainly know whether or not any thing or process embodies value. By "unnecessary" we shall mean "not indispensable to our sustaining animal functions and to our indispensable human functions."

We are now ready to state the ground of objective ethical judgment. The ground consists of the following empirical propositions, not knowledge-claiming, but conclusions from experience acknowledgeable by all competent judges, and an ultimate hypothetical:

(*a*) valuation is an indispensable human function.

(*b*) valuation is uncertifiable and unvalidatable.

(*c*) valuation is necessarily autonomous and non-terminating.

(*d*) any valuational interference is a deprivation of indispensable human function, both of the interferor and the interferees.

(*e*) if one is to act humanly, i.e. to refrain from depriving any indispensable human function, one must refrain from valuational interference.

The impulsion and motive provided by the ground arise from the hypothetical (*e*). The nature and intensity of the motive is of course idiosyncratic; not everyone may desire to be consistently human, particularly when he becomes aware of what is required of him. Nevertheless, these idiosyncratic reactions to the ground, as distinct from the "I can not do otherwise" impulsion which is acknowledgeable by all competent judges, are irrelevant to ethics, human society, law and justice. Knowing the ground of ethical choice and action, we can use laws, institutions, customs and other means of enforcement and stimulus to move people to ethical actions, or at least to prevent them from acting unethically. The motive of ground can be ethically supported by the motive of law.

The empirical and hypothetical propositions comprising the ethical ground can be summarized in the form of a maxim: "minimize valuational interference," which, in traditional language, might be called the fundamental principle of morals. As such, it is also the fundamental principle of interpersonal relations, politics and society.

By inspection, it is clear that this ground satisfies the criteria of objective adequacy, i.e. the conditions that make ethical action possible:

1. The agent must be able to provide a justifying reason for his choice of action.

2. Justifying reasons, i.e. the ground of judgment, must be acknowledgeable by all competent judges.

3. The ground of judgment must contain reference to the foreseeable consequences of the choice of action.

4. Ethical judgment must have a contemporaneous and single justification.

5. The ground of ethical judgment must permit us to decide between competing claims or *prima facie* obligations.

6. The impulsion to ethical judgment must be self-imposed.

The satisfaction of conditions 5 and 6 is not immediately obvious; let us look at them more closely. Before we approach the difficult problem of obligational conflict, we may conveniently distinguish the ethical *pur sang* from the moral. The class of ethical choices includes the moral and excludes the immoral, but is more extensive; non-moral ethical judgment makes choice among alternatives whose foreseeable valuational interference is either nil or equally minimal, (e.g. the conflicting valuations of two persons, the satisfaction of either not interfering with the valuations of any other persons).

The moral is that to which all competent judges have an acknowledgeable impulsion, whereas the ethical is that for which, lacking this impulsion, one can have only a personal preference, however profound one's conviction of its rightness may be. While the moral alone is obligatory, the non-moral ethical is pre-eminent as the "higher" human function. Purely ethical endeavour is creative, as art and science are creative, for ethical choice is completely autonomous and spontaneous, and not determined, as is moral choice, by the extra-imposed need for avoidance of valuational interference. There is a certain priggishness in merely doing what is "right." Rather, let moral "right" be legalized, and our task becomes the quest for and creation of ethical "right." Conformity and pure ethicality are incompatible. On the analogy of Kant's project "to deny knowlege in order to make room for faith," our object has been to define morals by denying the pseudo-objective claims of moralists in order to permit free and yet disciplined scope for ethics.

We are now ready to engage the crucial problems of ethical disagreement and valuational conflict. Ethical disagreement in general comprises (i) factual disagreement about ethical data, (ii) moral disagreement, and (iii) valuational disagreement. Factual and moral disagreement are resolvable by closer empirical examination of the ethical data and forseeable valuational interference, and their resolution permits an ethical, because moral, choice to be made. The valuational disagreement, though amenable to persuasion, may remain, perhaps in some cases causing emotional or intellectual distress, but not in any way preventing moral choice and action. For obviously the ethical choice for every person involved in ethical disagreement, whatever his valuation may be, is the moral choice, which is unarguable.

When two alternative actions involve equally minimal valuational interference, the two valuers P and Q (or the two valuations of one person) are in valuational conflict. It may be possible to prefer one valuation to the other on the ethical ground that one is of the kind which will tend, if promoted more than the other, to bring about a change in the human condition which will diminish the minimal limit of valuational interference achievable. If this forseeable ground of preference does not obtain, P and Q are at valuational impasse, and no ethical decision can be made, apart from the compromise of giving them, as far as possible, equal scope for their impassed valuations. This compromise is based not on Mill's ungrounded assumption that each person should count as one, or on Kant's metaphysically derived imperative that everyone should be treated as an end-in-himself, but solely on the empirical fact of valuational fallibility and the human need to minimize valuational interference. Such impasses help to constitute the problem of interpersonal ethics, and it is here that valuational invitation plays its most urgent part. Because of the insufficiency of means and the limited accessability of data, the achievable minimum of valuational interference is still large, and the achieved minimum, swollen by immorality and ignorance, much larger. How should necessarily limited valuations be apportioned? The only ethical way is that which promotes the greatest possible alleviation of valuational interference, both directly, and through social, political, economic and intellectual changes. Any situation in which valuational interference is unavoidable is immoral, and we are morally impelled to prevent these situations or to mitigate them as much as possible.

The alleged problem of obligational conflict is no problem. We cannot certainly know that we have obligations, though we may be convinced of our duties. Thus it is not my "obligations" which conflict, but my valuations. Usually this conflict is resolved by finding that one choice is likely to cause less valuational interference than the others; morality dissolves the antinomy.

But sometimes there is no foreseeable moral preference and in these cases a genuine conflict exists, viz. a valuational impasse. Some obligational conflicts prove on examination to be merely conflicting *prima facie* obligations which, as we have seen, are ethically groundless and irrelevant to moral choice. Most of the so-called conflicts of obligations discussed by the deontologists are of the former, morally resolvable variety and present no problem. But the latter are difficult because they are non-moral and therefore ethical *pur sang*. This valuational *angst* and the endless quest for truth it helps to urge contribute greatly to the dignity of man.

The satisfaction of condition 6 ("the impulsion to ethical judgment must be self-imposed") is more readily confirmed. Although the human necessity to refrain from valuational interference is extra-imposed, the impulsion to ethical preference, which arises on contemplation of the ethical ground, derives its efficacy from the person who feels it, and who is free to accept or reject his humanity. In this sense, impulsion, though not self-generated, is self-imposed.

From our maxim "minimize valuational interference," we may derive prohibitions adequate to the stability of a just society, and most of the traditional moral laws. In politics we should find it necessary to replace the basic concept of personality, society, nation, or class by the concept of "personity," the valuer who refrains from valuational interference. For his needs the social structure and process should be designed. Using a grounded principle, we may escape the positive barrenness of liberalism, the coercive chaos of subjectivism and the sordid humbug of *laissez-faire*. And above all, we may free creative ethical endeavour from the trammels of conformity and the norms of pseudo-objective orthodoxies.

J. L. Fraser.

DISCUSSION

TOYNBEE AND HIS CRITICS

New ideas are seldom received with moderation. When Spengler's *Decline of the West* appeared it was greeted with wild enthusiasm, which collapsed like a pricked bubble under criticism. Now that Toynbee, a generation later, has taken up the theme, there seems to be a determination not to be caught a second time. His critics have no wish to be unfair, and much of what they say is true enough; but to anybody who has a sympathetic understanding of what he is attempting most of it seems entirely irrelevant and misleading.

Toynbee's critics fall broadly into two classes—those for whom he says too little, and those for whom he says too much. In the first class are those who complain that he does not define his civilizations, that he does not say whether he is for or against Christianity, or that he does not explain how the deterministic aspects of his results can be reconciled with his liberalism and his avowed belief in free will. Yet if Toynbee had given precise answers to these and other questions, if he had come forward with a cut-and-dried philosophical system, these same critics might well have been the first to complain that he was imposing *a priori* conceptions on the facts of history—a charge that has been made against every philosophy of history, and one which it is very difficult to refute. Surely we can respect the integrity of a historian who declines to go beyond the facts, or adopt opinions before compelled by the evidence. The reader may feel disappointed, because he will be looking for

answers to his own problems; but the historian, like the scientist, must work austerely, searching for truth, not for opinions.

As for the second class—those critics who consider Toynbee's work too speculative—if they are not fairly cancelled out by the first class, they must accept the onus of showing that his results are unsound, either by disputing his data, or by showing (as many suggest) that other results equally fit the facts. This has not been done. Anybody familiar with Spengler's work will recognize the restraint and caution of Toynbee's.

It is well to remember that there are three Toynbee's—Toynbee the historian, Toynbee the scientist, and Toynbee the philosopher. Of Toynbee the historian one hears universal praise. The immense sweep of his knowledge, its general precision and reliability, though it may humanly be open to controversy here and there, compels admiration. More than this, he is no mere encyclopaedist, but a creative historian, who has illuminated many obscure tracts of time; in particular, his treatment of the Near East, from earliest Syrian to modern times, is a monumental achievement in itself. This solid groundwork of historical fact must never be overlooked.

Of Toynbee the scientist one hears very little; of Toynbee the philosopher far too much. He preludes his *Study of History* with a declared intention of applying the methods of science to the data afforded by history; yet critics persist in regarding him as a philosopher, not as a scientist. This confusion (and Toynbee himself is not free from it) is bad, for it is responsible for much of the misunderstanding that has arisen. Unlike the true philosophers of history, he has no system to prove, he seeks no final cause, no ultimate meaning, no absolute truth. Quite plainly any attempt *ab initio* to discover orderly processes in the complex world of experience is science, and not philosophy; and that, beyond question, is what Toynbee is primarily doing. L. T. Hobhouse, who did much the same for primitive societies, called himself a sociologist. The confusion in Toynbee's case has arisen largely because his conclusions impinge upon our practical interests, and raise (for us) questions of value, which have always been the proper and peculiar field of philosophy. For example, he asserts that Western civilization, though not yet decadent, will become so unless religion once again becomes a vital force. This is the kind of thing that philosophers have said in the past, and it is easily mistaken for philosophy now. Whether it is true or not does not for the moment concern us; the point is that it is of the nature of a medical diagnosis, based on a study of symptoms in similar organisms (speaking metaphorically) under similar conditions; and consequently scientific, not philosophical.

The same confusion has led to a complaint that he does not define his terms. A philosopher's business is the elucidation of concepts, and the one thing inexcusable for him is vagueness and inconsistency. But a scientist, groping in the dark, cannot be so fastidious, even in the most advanced sciences; the modern chemist confesses his inability to define a chemical element, but still uses the conception; and the modern physicist uses two contradictory formulae to account for sub-atomic behaviour, and is obliged to put up with the inconsistency. If Toynbee cannot define a civilization better than as "an intelligible field of study," it may be an admission that his science has not gone very far yet, but there is nothing illegitimate in it if it enables him to get to work. He was too honest to retain Spengler's water-tight civilizations, which would have been easier to work with, but were not warranted by the facts. Yet Spengler's conception too had its pragmatic justification; and having served its turn it has quickly given place to Toynbee's more fluid one. The only ultimate test of such provisional instruments of thought is neither their clarity nor their truth, but whether they lead to any useful results.

Once we clearly grasp that Toynbee is primarily a pioneer of scientific thought, we shall see plainly enough that much of the criticism levelled against him is as unjust and irrelevant as that in former times against Galileo and Darwin and other innovators whose scientific ideas could be mistaken for philosophy. We have learned by now the true criterions on which to judge the pioneers of the physical sciences. Consider Kepler, for instance, whose position in astronomy has some analogy with that of Toynbee. Kepler began with every possible wrong preconception—a belief in the perfection of circular movement, mystical ideas about numbers and regular solids, an extraordinary taste for ingenious and far-fetched analogies, even a belief that each planet was guided in its course by a divine spirit; but he was an accurate and well-informed observer, he was loyal to his facts, and he obtained results on which modern science has been built. Toynbee has none of Kepler's faults and eccentricities (Spengler had), but neither Kepler's failings nor Toynbee's general soundness are really relevant; the test in each case is—What useful results? And by "useful" is meant here not usefulness in the guidance of life, or in the solution of your problems and mine or those of our times, but usefulness in introducing order into a complex field of phenomena.

What is Toynbee's field? What science is he promoting? It is no new one, but it has not yet earned the status of a science. We all have common-sense opinions about the growth of societies; even if we believe it wrong to do so, we habitually think of America as a young nation, of China or India as very old, and of Europe as somewhere between. Years of laborious thought have been devoted to attempts to clarify these notions, as a glance at Flint's half-completed *History of the Philosophy of History* will testify, and all have failed, sometimes for lack of knowledge, but more often because preconceptions (nationalist, political, religious, or philosophical) have overthrown loyalty to facts—in fact, because science was mistaken for philosophy. Toynbee is the first to see it as a scientific problem, and to devise a scientific technique applicable to it.

There is something amazing and baffling in the phenomenon of growth, not only in relation to societies, but wherever it occurs. We ourselves are born, we pass through childhood to maturity, and so to middle age and old age, with an astonishing regularity. No boy of twelve ever died of old age, no man of thirty has been still a child. The existence of a norm of growth (however liable to accidental influences) is so taken for granted that we legislate upon it, passing laws as to when we may smoke or drink, when we may marry, when we are fully responsible for our actions, and in some cases when we must retire. Yet we know nothing about it, in any scientific sense. Apart from some work on educational psychology relating to childhood, and biological studies of pre-natal growth and babyhood, nobody has ever undertaken to describe and map, much less explain, the norm of growth of the human being, physical and mental. In the case of animals and plants the process has been more carefully observed, but is no better understood. This is an enormous field still open to scientific investigation—perhaps many enormous fields, for nobody can yet say whether or in what respects the growth of this or that animal or plant or of the human mind has any analogy with others.

The growth of human societies, if it exists, certainly cannot be assumed to obey such regular laws, and Toynbee is right in repudiating at the outset any preconception that a society is in any sense an organism. Some would go further, and say that history, being (as it is) the outcome of individual human wills, can have no orderliness whatever. But that too is a preconception, and must not prejudice the enquiry; let us be frank and admit that we do not know. Granting the utmost possible freedom to the human will, it is still

conceivable that millions of such wills in close inter-relationship may result in regularities of a kind by the mere operation of statistical laws. We occasionally catch glimpses of sociological processes even in the highest cultures; for example, T. S. Eliot in his *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* sees an élite hardening into a class, and a class into a caste, through the fact of family life. If we study such reactions in history as that of the Restoration after Puritanism in England, or the Catholic Counter-Reformation after the Reformation, we may be not unwilling to believe that, however powerful great leaders or movements may be, there is a tendency for society as a whole to swing back to a norm of some kind, though it may elude definition; and not by any mechanical law, but through the vigour and purpose of its individual members.

And—the supreme test—Toynbee's methods have been justified by results. Of some of them we may well be doubtful, but others are so well attested and so clearly analysed that they seem firmly established as a basis for all future investigation. Let me specify some of these latter:

(*a*) The supreme importance of religion as a clue to all social and cultural history. (Another interesting link here with T. S. Eliot. Compare Spengler, who gave at least an equal place to culture.)

(*b*) The part played by the dominant minority, with its philosophy, and the development of the universal state.

(*c*) The part played by the proletariat, internal and external, with its religion, and the development of a universal Church.

(*d*) The process by which a new affiliated civilization emerges within the sphere of influence of its apparented civilization, resulting in the displacement and frequent bifurcation of civilization.

All these are entirely new to historical thought, or developed beyond recognition—a very substantial achievement.

In one respect (if I may be allowed to turn critic myself) I consider that Toynbee is unfortunate. He thinks always in terms of rise and fall, of growth and decline—apparently an unconscious analogy with the organism—and so introduces values unnecessarily and invites criticism on philosophical grounds. If there is one respect in which an organism (growing from a single cell) differs from a society, it is that the latter has no definite birth or death; and this suggests that history is a fluid continuous process, and that every phase is useful and creative in some way or other. If we call it progress or retrogression, growth or decay, in whole or in part, we are imposing some extrinsic value on what is, from the purely scientific point of view, merely change. In the tree the decay of the flower is the beginning of the fruit, the fall of the leaf is the starting of the new buds; even in the human being old age is not a disease, but a fulfilment. In all growth the stages are there, but the values are our own. In Toynbee's work they are far from essential, and I should like to see him dispense with them.

In the interest of knowledge, and in other interests too, we must, in face of such a serious and important enquiry as this, lay aside prejudices and judge it on its proper standards or not at all. Some critics seem to have fears for Christianity; but the worst disaster for Christianity would be another disgraceful controversy such as attended the birth of the Copernican and the Darwinian theories. Some are afraid that Western civilization may be proved decadent, though Toynbee himself definitely refuses to follow Spengler in this respect. Some feel that they are being robbed of free will, and that the theory conduces to destroy incentive; a quite unreasonable fear, for nobody regards his growing older day by day as affecting his own free will, and Toynbee proclaims that free will (apparently on some such statistical lines as those

suggested above) is the operative factor throughout. If there are no regularities or norms of social growth, further enquiry will quickly make this plain; but if there are, our only chance of controlling and directing them lies in a fuller understanding.

Some people may still find it incredible that a science of this kind can ever be achieved. A few years ago our older psychologists took the same view of the new psychology as a science of behaviour, but it has come. The great achievements in physical science have diverted attention from recent revolutionary changes of thought in relation to human activities, very much as in the seventeenth century a dominant pre-occupation with theology obscured and threatened the birth of the physical sciences. And as, in these latter, while chemists and physicists were exploring small-scale phenomena, the astronomers were investigating the large-scale manifestations of matter and motion which were to provide the clue to them all; so nowadays, while biologists are studying the structure of organisms and psychologists their behaviour, Toynbee's work on collective processes may not inconceivably lead to a synthesis of the organic sciences. By all means let us criticize, but as historians or as scientists only, and away with irrelevancies.

G. A. Birks.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

A NEW Philosophy of History for our age of transition from the Christian era to the period of world-unity, combined with a penetrating analysis of our present situation, is offered by Karl Jaspers' *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Artemis-Verlag, Fr. 14.80). Jaspers is, however, more post-Hegelian than post-Christian, and in fact anti-Hegelian, but pro-Christian. Rejecting Hegel's dictum that the appearance of Christ is the "axis of world history," i.e. the aim of the preceding, and the origin of the subsequent, centuries, Jaspers tries to discover the real *axis* of history empirically at about 500 B.C. Eager to find a common historical origin for East and West, he claims the time from 800 to 200 B.C. as *axis-time*. He believes that in these centuries, man as we know him to-day, with his religion, art, philosophy, and science, emerged in China, India, Iran, Palestine, and Greece. He further believes that a new *axis-time* is approaching, and the analysis of the three tendencies leading to it, i.e. of socialism, world-unity, and faith, forms one of the most valuable parts of the book. Like Toynbee he believes that a return to a transformed Biblical faith is necessary, if the West is to be saved. Pessimistic about the immediate future, he is optimistic concerning the remote future. History, as the history of single nations, states, or civilizations, is at an end. World History is only just now beginning. This is a book of European importance. It formulates the crucial question, whether Europe has still the spiritual strength to avoid a relapse into its Asiatic background with its despotism, uniformity and loss of personal liberty. In Jaspers' development, it marks a transition from reflecting upon mere possibilities to a consideration of historical reality. His booklet, *The Spiritual Situation of our Time* (1931) concluded with a chapter on "What may become of Man," but what really did happen to man in the meantime proved that reality is much richer in possibilities than the liveliest imagination could possibly foresee. Does he now actually reach reality, or rather a "possible" History, as the stage on which man reveals himself in all his potentialities, and which moves from one fictitious *axis-time* to another equally fictitious? Jaspers' *Einführung in die Philosophie* (Artemis, Fr. 7.90), most enjoyable and a masterpiece of book-production, is the best introduction to his own philosophy. It emerges here as a possible form of philosophizing in an age of transition; original, sincere, cultivated and stimulating. His method is still the way of reflection, but this now includes meditation and self-examination. Jaspers rightly demands of a philosopher (1) a thorough knowledge of one special science, (2) an equally penetrating knowledge of at least one great philosopher, and (3) sincerity in his daily conduct and acceptance of responsibility for whatever he is doing. Should he succeed in educating a generation of philosophers on these lines, that would indeed give new hope for the future of European philosophy. Jaspers' Inaugural Lecture, *Philosophie und Wissenschaft* (Artemis, Fr. 1.30), discusses in a clear and competent manner this important problem and clearly exposes the confusion of some contemporary conceptions of science, e.g. in Marxism. His lecture, *Unsere Zukunft und Goethe* (Artemis, Fr. 3.–), rejects a Goethe cult, but stresses the new manner in which Goethe could be appreciated by the present generation. All in all, Jaspers represents the best in German tradition, and is now one of the leading European philosophers.

Can the same be said of Martin Heidegger? I wonder. Since 1927 we have waited for the second part of his *Sein und Zeit*, and now we receive, instead, in a sort of anticlimax, his *Holzwege* (V. Klostermann, DM. 13.50). Heidegger on a *Holzweg*, i.e. on a cart-road in a forest leading nowhere, that is the first impression. The book consists of six papers, of which three are historical, two refer to art, and one refers to metaphysics. The two papers, *Hegel's Conception of Experience*, which is a thorough analysis of part of the Preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind;* and, *On Nietzsche's dictum, "God is dead,"* are worthy of notice and would repay serious study. The latter contains a profound analysis of Nietzsche's nihilism as well as of nihilism in general. Heidegger rightly maintains that Nietzsche refers to the dissolution of the *Christian* idea of God and of the realm of transcendent values, but that, nevertheless, he was in search of God and of new values. Nihilism is claimed as the fundamental movement (*Grundbewegung*), and even as the law of European History, and as being identical with metaphysics, understood as the history of the truth of being. This is a sort of inverted Hegelianism transformed into an ontological mysticism. The Absolute which appears in different historical forms is now "nothing," whereas each of its appearances claims to represent true reality. Heidegger exercises his painstaking thinking as a philosopher-poet. Thinking is, for him "the poesy of the truth of being, forming part of the historical dialogue between the thinkers." One can either faithfully accept this poetry as *the* revelation of truth, or regard it as an *Holzweg*. Neither the test of logical consistency, nor that of empirical verification are applicable to poetry which, however, may be a true expression of the spirit of an age.—Heidegger's two small essays, *Was ist Metaphysik?* and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Klostermann, DM. 2 each) are indispensable to all those who want to understand the English translation; especially the first one which contains a new untranslated introduction of 16 pages.

Josef Pieper's *Über das Ende der Zeit*, Kösel Verlag, written from a Catholic point of view, reflects an eschatological mood in contemporary Germany. But does it make sense to talk of "the end of history," "the end of philosophy," and of "the end of time"? These are emotional expressions which do not refer to actuality, and, in the last case, not even to possibility. Much more attractive is Pieper's *Musse und Kult* (Kösel Verlag, DM. 3.60). Protesting against the over-rating of action and work in the modern world, he stresses the importance of leisure as an indispensable basis for thought, "cult" and culture. Aloys Müller's *Welt und Mensch in ihrem irrealen Aufbau* (Ferdinand Dümmler, DM. 8), is an introduction to a system of philosophy *in nuce*. Following the tradition of Plato, St. Augustin, Duns Scotus, and Husserl, and assimilating contemporary ideas, he interprets man as a wanderer between the worlds of Nature and Mind, who participates in a realm of values. F. J. von Rintelen in his books, *Dämonie des Willens* (Kirchheim & Co.), and *Von Dionysos zu Apollon* (Metopen-Verlag) is a gallant and timely defender of the Mind against the attacks of a philosophy of life which glorifies the will to power, and against a positivist overestimation of calculating reason. As if to illustrate the spiritual chaos of our time, Jean Gebser, a Swiss writer, announces, simultaneously with the prophecy of the end of History, the dawning of a new epoch of humanity in a most ambitious work, *Ursprung und Gegenwart* (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, DM. 18.50). On the basis of the analysis of a few pictures by Picasso and Bracque, in which the same person is drawn simultaneously in frontal view and in profile, he concludes that a new "a-perspective" perspective and, correspondingly, a new "a-perspective" world, are emerging. Although he tries to strengthen this thesis by an elaborate philosophy of history, it is evidently false. He mistakes an interesting, but

in fact impossible and unrealizable, experiment of post-perspective painting for a new form of human creativity. His excursion is, however, amusing and provocative.—Arthur Hübscher's *Philosophen der Gegenwart* (Piper) gives fifty popular sketches of contemporary philosophers, mostly German. It confirms that there are no new German philosophers of importance, and gives an unusual photograph of Hugo Dingler which looks like a death-mask.

A study of impersonal, i.e. collective, thought is attempted by P. Feldkeller in *Das Unpersönliche Denken* (De Gruyter, DM. 12). It is the result of experiences under the Nazis, but it is a misnomer to describe as "thought" what is really a mixture of collective ideas, emotional attitudes and propaganda. Thinking is always personal, but can be exercised without personal responsibility; and in so far as this book is an appeal for responsible thought, it is welcome. Personal thought of the highest level is expressed in non-technical language by Max Planck in his *Vorträge und Erinnerungen* (S. Hirzel). This collection of that great physicist's papers is invaluable to any serious student of epistemology, who desires to understand scientific method as it arises from the co-operation of creative imagination, observation and experiment. "Every new hypothesis is like a sudden jump into the dark, logically inexplicable." The origin and development of quantum theory, causality, causal and statistical laws, and the limits of science, are here discussed in an authoritative manner. The interdependence of logic and mathematics with experience is discussed in a stimulating way by Victor Kraft in *Mathematik, Logic und Erfahrung* (Springer, Wien). It is a commendable attempt to overcome the conventionalist attitude of some Logical Positivists, according to whom logic and mathematics are based on arbitrary conventions.—The well-known physicist C. F. von Weizsäcker, in his book *Die Geschichte der Natur* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), attempts to compress in twelve lectures the history of the Universe as well as of Man. The second principle of Thermodynamics, and the tendency towards differentiation, are, according to him, the basis of historicity in inorganic and organic nature.—Hans M. Peters's *Grundfragen der Tierpsychologie* (Ferdinand Enke, DM. 17), are of unusual interest because they combine original observations and experiments with the formulation of new questions concerning the instinctive behaviour of animals. One is surprised to learn that there are three family types among fish, i.e. parent-families, father-families, and mother-families, and that the youngsters have accordingly different optical schemata. If e.g. they have a mother-schema, they respond at once to a mother-dummy. Kant's somewhat obscure chapter on Schematism receives unexpected illumination through these studies of different types of schemata found in animals.

It is a good sign that moral questions are beginning to be discussed again in Germany. Hans Reiner's lecture, *Das Prinzip von Gut und Böse* (Karl Alber) is a first attempt to re-open the discussion by way of a transformation of Scheler's ethics and a critique of Heidegger's rejection of the concept of value. A real contribution to the moral re-education of his people is made by O. F. Bollnow in his book, *Einfache Sittlichkeit* (Vandenhoeck &. Ruprecht, DM. 5.50). It contains small essays, dealing with simple facts of daily life, like "doing one's duty," sincerity, reliability, fairness, and compassion. Relatively weak in fundamentals, e.g. in its critique of the Kantian concept of duty, it is strong in its observation and phenomenological description of specific phenomena, e.g. of anger. It is quite true that often small, and apparently unimportant papers, written at random, reach a higher degree of perfection than comprehensive works. Gerda von Bredow's *Sittlicher Wert und Realwert* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, DM. 4.80) is a sober piece of work, but a trifle academic. She discusses, on the basis of Hartmann's ethics, the

realization of values within a specific situation. She stresses that values depend, not only on specific behaviour, but also on the situation in which they are realized. She concludes with a re-interpretation of the Ethics of Stoicism.—Most important among ethical treatises is Alexander Pfänder's posthumous *Philosophie der Lebensziele* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, DM. 9.80). When I once asked Husserl, which of his pupils he would consider to be the most important, he answered at once: "Pfänder." This answer seems *prima facie* surprising seeing that others of his pupils were far more interesting and better known. But Pfänder's work has quality. He knows how to formulate questions which should be asked within teleological ethics.—What are the ends which we should pursue? What is the value of those possible ends? What kinds of value do they represent? Are they agreeable, noble, or morally good? Have these ends different degrees of value? What is the highest end for man? What is the value of these ends for different types of men, for the two sexes, or for different individuals? What is the basis of our knowledge of our specific end? Why should I purposefully pursue a specific end in life? What have I to do in order to realize this end? Do social groups and states also have ends, and if so, how do they pursue them? I gather that the formulation of these questions is of greater interest to the English reader than the distinction between transitive, transcendent and reflective ends, or Pfänder's final answer. For this is "self-realization" in a specific form. Hans Welzel's essay, *Vom irrenden Gewissen* (J. C. B. Mohr, DM. 1.50), discusses, from the juristic point of view, a problem which is likewise of ethical importance. It concerns the fallibility of conscience, or the question whether someone who has acted according to his conscience, but whose decision was mistaken, is responsible. Welzel remarks on the problem of "lawful injustice" (cf. *Philosophy*, 1949, p. 265), that a law which no longer treats human beings as persons, but merely as objects, loses its validity. Erich Rothacker's *Probleme der Kulturanthropologie*, and Heinz Heimsoeth's *Geschichtsphilosophie*, (H. Bouvier) are reprints from a volume *Systematische Philosophie*, ed. by N. Hartmann in 1942. Though discussing the problems objectively, they, nevertheless, reflect the mood of that time. It is difficult to understand why they are reprinted without the slightest alteration and without leaving out the nonsense about the official race-theory current at that time.—W. Hellpach's *Deutsche Physiognomik* (de Gruyter, DM. 15), attempts a comparative physiognomy of the German tribes. Many statements of this book are beyond possible verification, because the momentous historical events of the last decade have mixed many of the tribes together inextricably. Physiognomy is an entertaining pastime, but not a science.—Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (F. Enke, DM. 12.80), is one of the best sociological studies which I have seen in recent years. It concerns the history and function of the Intelligentzia in European society since the days of the Renaissance. Three functions are claimed as characteristic of this group, the spiritualization of existence, the rationalization of life, and the critique of power. The book suffers from the ambiguity of the word *Intelligenz* which may mean in German "intellect" as well as "intelligentzia," and from the fact that the "intelligentzia" as a social phenomenon is an indefinite group which may include very different types of men. His critique of Mannheim's *freischwebender Intelligenz* may be of interest to students in this country.

Students of Leibniz will welcome the collection of papers, published under the title *Leibniz zu seinem* 300. *Geburtstag* (de Gruyter), especially N. Hartmann's *Leibniz als Metaphysiker*, J. E. Hoffmann's *Leibniz' Mathematische Studien in Paris*, and K. Dürr's *Leibniz' Forschungen im Gebiet der Syllogistik*.

Hartmann discusses the problem of individuality and draws attention to Leibniz's contribution to the problem of the freedom of the will.—G. Martin's *Wilhelm von Ockham* (de Gruyter, DM. 10.50) is interesting because of its unusual approach. Ockham's razor, famous in this country, is not mentioned at all; and the thesis that Ockham is a nominalist is rejected. Instead he is claimed to be a "transcendentalist," who starts with the problem of unity and for whom the transcendental categories (i.e. all categories except substance and quality) are modes of unity.—H. Schöck's *Nietzsches Philosophie des "Menschlich-Allzumenschlichen"* (Mohr, DM. 8.40) analyses, in a thorough and competent manner, his attitude to History and his theory of value.—W. Ziegenfuss' *Philosophen-Lexikon* (de Gruyter, Vol. I, DM. 30), is an obvious choice for libraries. It is a lexicon of philosophers, mostly of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Some of the entries, e.g. that of N. Hartmann, are written by the philosophers themselves. The book is valuable as a reference book; but it has been produced under very difficult circumstances, and it is to be hoped that inaccuracies and mistakes will be corrected in the second edition.

Curiously enough, the number of new German periodicals is still increasing. The *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger*, edited by Dr. G. Schischkoff, Schlehdorf am Kochelsee, publishes comprehensive reviews of new philosophical books. *Symposion, Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, Bd. I (Karl Aber) is not so much a periodical as a collection of dissertations and of chapters of unpublished books, each of which is valuable in itself. Papers concerning the origin of the conception of law in Anaximander and Heraclitus (E. Wolf), the apriority of human knowledge according to St. Thomas (G. Siewerth), the metaphysics of subjectivity in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (W. Struve), and Hegel and Marx (R. Heiss) may interest our readers. Heiss shows that Marx's critique of bourgeois society is anticipated in Hegel's dialectic of civil society to a much higher degree than is usually supposed. He concludes that the dialectical method was for Hegel "an instrument for describing and understanding certain data, whereas, in the hands of Marx, it becomes an instrument of critique, dissolution, and prophecy," i.e., one may add, of revolution.

Ernst Cassirer's *Vom Mythus des Staates* (Artemis, Fr. 14.80) is unique in so far as it is a retranslation into German of a work of a German professor, originally published in English by the Oxford Press. It seems to be easier to understand in German, for the simple reason that in the English term "myth" the connotation "purely fictitious narrative" prevails, whereas the German term "mythus" means "a specific primitive imaginative interpretation of experience which in spite of its imaginative aspect has an objective meaning." The title is, moreover, misleading. It should be "*Mythos* and *Logos* in the History of Political Theory." In broad outline, Cassirer sketches the whole history of this theory. His conception is clear. *Mythos* dominates primitive thought. Political philosophers from Plato to Rousseau tried to replace it by *Logos*, i.e. by a rational theory of the State. The romantic reaction of the nineteenth century, however, produced new political myths (Carlyle, Gobineau, and Hegel). The serious student will find this book interesting. He should learn that even in an age of reason the danger of a relapse into primitivism persists. He may, at the same time, question whether it is correct to call Plato the founder of the theory of the legal state, or Hegel the most influential political thinker of all time.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

NEW BOOKS

Cosmogony. By CHRISTIAN EHRENFELS. Translated from the German by Mildred Focht, Ph.D. (New York, 1948. Pp. ix + 223.)

This book is a translation of a work by Christian von Ehrenfels, the famous author of the article *Über Gestaltqualitäten* and of the *System der Werttheorie*. Its original was published in 1916, in the middle of the first World War, and has, in consequence, been completely buried and neglected. But it contains some philosophical ideas of importance, and Miss Focht has done a service in translating it, and in translating it so well.

The most significant point in the whole treatise is to be found in its first chapter: it hasn't (to my knowledge) been previously dwelt on by philosophers, nor considered in its full bearings. This is the fact, obvious on a little reflection, that it is *much* easier to infer the content of the past from that of the present, than to make similar inferences in regard to the future. As Ehrenfels puts it: we can form a most confident picture of the main events in our history over several past millennia, basing ourselves on things remembered and observed by persons now living, yet we should be hard put to it to be similarly confident about any human event within the next few years, or even weeks. And it is the same in connection with non-human as with human matters: we can be more confident as to the state of the earth's surface, plants, animals, climate and so forth, in remote geological epochs, than we can be in regard to its fairly near future. Yet it is hard to give reasons for this odd asymmetry. It doesn't seem to have anything to do with the facts of memory, for it is found in fields where memory is of little importance, and one would think, moreover, that the span of memory which affords us a secure base for reasonings in regard to the past, would afford us an equally secure base for reasonings in regard to the future. (Memory would seem, in fact, to be nothing but a *special case* of the asymmetry we are considering, a living witness to the fact that past events leave much more reliable signs behind them, than future events can throw before them.) Nor does it seem to be connected with time or causation, as we ordinarily think of these, for we can very well imagine a course of events that would simply be our own world-history *in reverse*—subject, of course, to laws suitably transposed—in which we should find it just as hard to reconstruct the past, as we now find it to forecast the future. This would be a world—now often seen, since the time of Ehrenfels, on the cinema—where a ripple would first form on the edge of a pond, and then swell steadily towards the centre, to be followed by a set of ever larger, converging ripples, until, on the arrival of the last, largest ripple at the centre, a stone would emerge with sudden noise, leaving the water behind it miraculously still. Or where a set of foot-prints would become more and more clear-cut with the lapse of time, until they were ultimately walked upon (and blotted out) by some suitable creature moving in reverse. In such a world we should have a providential *conspiring* of things towards predictable results, and an emergence out of wholly indefinite, undiscoverable sources, which is just the contrary of our present experience. And Ehrenfels remarks rightly that the world in question wouldn't merely strike us as queer, but definitely crazy: it would be a world where what is wildly and intrinsically *improbable* was always occurring. It would, in fact, be much more startling than the original asymmetry that led us to think of it.

The point raised by Ehrenfels in this chapter seems to me to be very im-

portant, and to light up a number of dark corners in our ordinary notions of causality. It is plain to me, after reading him carefully, that we *do* think of causal influence as transmitted along a number of fairly constant, relatively independent lines, capable in the future of so many diversions, blind endings, interferences, interweavings that they couldn't possibly be covered by a rational formula, *but whose past almost certainly falls within narrowly defined limits*. We think, that is, that any unified and classifiable piece of becoming (one that isn't wholly mixed and nondescript) can have, at best, a few possible origins, though we see no limit to its possible outcomes, unless it can be wholly isolated or disturbed only in specific ways. For any distinguishable "piece of becoming" is a thing with a definite inner unity and coherence, which couldn't plausibly be explained in too many different manners, or through the chance concourse of too many independent factors, whereas its outcome may be infinitely various, according to its confluences with other causal streams, and may even be so thoroughly muddled as not to seem a proper continuation of anything whatever. Thus a speech spoken or written by Mr. Bevin is a thing so organized and characteristic, that we can't readily think of it as having any other origin than a certain sort of person set in certain typical circumstances, which we know *do* produce the kind of script or utterance in question, but we set no limit to its possible "repercussions," according as it may impinge on this or that type of audience, or be variously abridged, translated, contraverted, interpreted, repulped, reconstituted, buried, burnt, or subjected to the many other vicissitudes of this transitory life. It looks, in fact, as if we were somehow committed, even in our ordinary, non-scientific thought about causation, to some principle of increasing muddle not unlike the physical law of entropy. I put these reflections forward, not because I think I have achieved clearness on the matter, but because I think they show how interesting is the issue raised by von Ehrenfels.

I don't think, however, that he has dealt with his problem in an interesting manner. He has harked back to the mythic dualism of Plato and Pythagoras, and has made his world the joint product of two opposite "principles," the one formless, passive and chaotic, and the other orderly, formative and active. He tells us that his active principle, "after an eternity of self-imprisonment," is stimulated to its first act of creation through the chance emergence of an orderly form in the general corporeal muddle, and that this first act commits it to an endless series of subsequent acts, in which it strives valiantly to set bounds to chaos. This orderly principle is of "psychic or psychoidal character," and achieves greater lucidity and firmness of purpose as the world-process develops. It functions, in relation to ourselves, as a sort of communicating Oversoul, which can plan and act *through* us, and which has need of our co-operation in the worsting of chaos. Ehrenfels wouldn't regard these views as "metaphysical" in the unfavourable modern sense: to him they seem abundantly and uniquely confirmed by the actual course and content of experience. To me, however, they seem vague in content and of doubtful explanatory value, and though I don't share the current prejudice against "transcendent entities" or modes of explanation, I can see no good reason for adopting them.

J. N. Findlay.

Goethe. By Albert Schweitzer. (Adam and Charles Black. 1949. pp. 84. Price 6s.)

This book is made up of two addresses delivered by Schweitzer at Frankfurt-on-Main, the first in 1929, the second in 1932, and an essay contributed to the review *Europe* in the latter year. The first address, entitled "My Debt to

Goethe," was delivered when Schweitzer received the Goethe Prize for services to humanity; the second, entitled "Goethe's Message for Our Time," was delivered at the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of Goethe's death. It was altogether suitable that these historic addresses should be reprinted in the present year. The first is a very noble statement: simple, direct, and indeed naïve, in a way in which only a very great man's writing or talking can be. Schweitzer, the twentieth-century prophet of *Christian* "reverence for life", here generously expresses his debt to the greatest of his non-Christian predecessors, thus affording an invaluable lesson—moral and intellectual—to both Christians and non-Christians alike. The second address, delivered shortly before Hitler's rise to power, is as much a political statement as a piece of appreciative interpretation. But Goethe's political message for that time—as indeed it had been for his *own* time—was a pathetically impotent one. Indeed it may be doubted whether, for all his greatness, Goethe ever really faced political realities: and was Schweitzer facing then, one wonders, when he exhorted his fellow countrymen in 1932 to "strive to be real men!" This Goethean advice is no doubt morally relevant to every age, but as political advice it is all but irrelevant. To say this is not to blame Schweitzer. Something of a political character he *had* to say: and could any man living confidently suggest what would have been a politically effective and beneficial message to Germany at that time?

The essay entitled "Goethe—Thinker," originally issued in a French review, is—or at least ought to be—of particular interest to students of philosophy. No other man of letters has ever exercised a comparable influence on a powerful contemporary philosophical movement; yet Goethe distrusted and disliked philosophy all his life. On this point Schweitzer has some interesting things to say. He elaborates the passage in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* where Goethe tells us that the position he adopted while at Strasburg to the current French and German philosophies was to determine his attitude to philosophy during the remainder of his life. Briefly, he saw that the various forms of eighteenth-century Rationalism had no *information* to give, contained no explanatory principles of a genuine scientific character (such as would yield to new information) and, as a result of their claims to all-inclusiveness, were likely to deaden imagination, scientific or poetical. Now Schweitzer claims that Goethe saw precisely these failings in the idealist systems of Kant and his successors. Of course Goethe felt the influence of this idealism, and his conversations and writings occasionally bear traces of its terminology—and worse, of its intellectual conceit, pretentiousness and wrong-headedness. Besides, no one could say as much and write as much as Goethe did without saying and writing a lot of silly things. But his best remarks show how completely he escaped from the intellectual pretences and befuddlements of his age. Consider, for instance, this statement to Eckermann: "Man is not come into the world to solve the problem of the universe, but to find out where the problem begins and, as a consequence, to keep within the bounds of the accessible." Again he had the tremendous merit of confessing that he found wholly unintelligible the current Rationalist teaching about the world that lies beyond the reach of the senses: hence his remark to the metaphysician Jakobi, in 1784, "God has punished you by giving you metaphysics; me He has blessed by giving me physics."

But what, more specifically, were Goethe's reasons for rejecting all, or almost all, the metaphysical systems with which he came in contact? Schweitzer mentions two reasons: First of all there is what Goethe called his "impenitent realism." He could not but believe that natural science discovers facts—or truths or relations or what not—which are as they are irrespective of our interest in them or discovery of them. Moreover, his experience as a scientist

had taught him that success in science means the elimination of everything subjective: hence any logic or theory of knowledge which denies—even by "transcending"—this fundamental fact about scientific inquiry seemed to him wholly incredible. Here, then, was one main ground for Goethe's distrust of philosophy; one which explains not only the outbursts against seminary metaphysics and logic which we find in *Faust*, but his descriptions of the *Critic of the Pure Reason* as a dungeon "which restrains our free and joyous expeditions into the field of experience," and of Hegel's dialectic as a "disease" best cured by the study of natural science. On this score at any rate Goethe's "commonsensism," philistine though it seemed to his philosophic contemporaries, would be wholly respectable today. The second reason Schweitzer mentions is this. The German Idealists (and their British and American successors) were at one with most previous metaphysicians in seeking to attribute to the *universe* a meaning which would enable man to attach meaning to his *own* existence. Goethe seems never to have felt this intellectual and moral need; he felt himself directly—and here his poetic sensibility re-enforced his commonsense—"an inmate of this active universe," and this feeling was so ungainsayable with him and so morally commanding, that any intellectual argument—or conjuring trick—aimed at enhancing or securing man's place in nature, filled him with repulsion.

Schweitzer's essay helps us to recognize that Goethe's thought—or perhaps we should say, the revolution in our ways of thinking and feeling about human individuality in which he played so important a part—deserved a better philosophical development than that supplied by German Idealism. But it also reminds us how important a part Goethe's thought was to play in the development of Schweitzer's own ethical philosophy. In that philosophy metaphysical scepticism and supreme moral confidence are combined in a manner that, to students of philosophy, inevitably suggests Kant. In fact Schweitzer's philosophy, despite the chasm that stretches between Christian and non-Christian, has a much closer affinity to the scientific realism and and moral enlightenment of Goethe.

W. B. GALLIE.

The Elements of Social Science. By R. M. McIVER, Associate Professor of Political Economy in the University of Toronto. (London: Methuen. 1949. Pp. vi + 177. Price 9s. 6d. net.)

This is a reprint, with only slight revisions, of a work with the same title published in 1921. No doubt it would be a different book if it was being written for the first time to-day. In particular it is probable that Professor McIver would give greater attention to questions of terminology: he would also have a clearer and more definite conception of what social science is all about and of how far and in what way its practitioners can safely and profitably indulge in generalization. But the reprinting can perhaps be justified by the large number of careful and sensible discussions of social questions which the book contains. These discussions cover a wide range, from questions concerning the origin and past development of civilization to the urgent practical issues of the day; and even the contemporary reader cannot fail to learn from them.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Philosophy for Pleasure. By HECTOR HAWTON. (Watts & Co., London, 1949. Pp. 207. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are accustomed to think of books on philosophical subjects as having one of several aims: to further the cause of scholarship, to clarify some problem

or problems, to propound a new theory or to develop or modify an old one. But all such aims presuppose a professional or semi-professional audience. However, we also recognize as a legitimate and indeed valuable aim the introduction of "philosophy"—either its history or one of its particular branches—to beginners or to a wider non-professional audience which is interested generally in speculative problems.

It is this last aim which has inspired the author of the book under review, and it has resulted in his attempting a historical outline of philosophical speculation from the early Greek period down to the present day. The first question that arises, therefore, is this: has the author adequately performed his self-imposed task? But another, and equally important, question is this: since many other writers have already attempted this same task, has the present writer got something the others haven't got?

Professor A. E. Heath, in his Introduction, makes a far-reaching claim for Mr. Hawton's superiority in this connection: "When I had finished reading the manuscript of this book I came to the reluctant conclusion that Mr. Hector Hawton, though not an academic person, had beaten the professional philosophers at their own game. How? . . . because this harvested material has been passed through a clear and critical mind, and then presented with freshness and vivacity."

My own impression, after reading *Philosophy for Pleasure*, is that this claim is hardly substantiated. Certainly Mr. Hawton has a lively and enquiring mind, and can present his summaries of philosophic thought from the Pre-Socratics to the Logical Positivists with clarity and readability. Yet the enormous amount of ground he has attempted to cover in the space of 200 pages inevitably makes his approach somewhat superficial. Moreover, not nearly enough justice has been done to the difficult nature of the problems which have faced philosophers of the past; and Mr. Hawton's obvious bias in favour of modern empiricism seems to have prevented him from calling attention to the metaphysical dogmas on which that empiricism necessarily rests. And this, in a book for beginners, is unfortunate.

Nevertheless, granting these inadequacies (which are sufficient to clear Mr. Hawton of the charge of having beaten professional philosophers at their own game), it is fair to assume that *Philosophy for Pleasure* may well encourage its readers to study some original philosophical texts, or at least to read some professional exposition of one or more of the numerous theories glanced at. And thereby it will have performed a useful service.

J. Hartland-Swann.

The Mathematical Analysis of Logic. By George Boole. Pp. 82. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1948. Price 7s. 6d.)

In the Introduction to *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic*, Boole says: "We might justly assign it as the definitive character of a true Calculus, that it is a method resting upon the employment of Symbols, whose laws of combination are known and general, and whose results admit of a consistent interpretation. That to the existing forms of Analysis a quantitative interpretation is assigned, is the result of the circumstances by which those forms were determined, and is not to be construed into a universal condition of analysis." The object of the book is the construction of a calculus which shall admit of another kind of interpretation, namely a logical. The calculus is conceived and developed as a calculus of classes; but in the section called "Hypothetical Propositions" (where "hypothetical" is to be read as including "disjunctive" and "conjunctive") Boole shows how it may also be interpreted

as a calculus of propositions. Propositions for which the class-interpretation is appropriate are those resolvable into denials of the existence of one or more compound classes; propositions for which the propositional interpretation is appropriate are those resolvable into denials of the truth of one or more compound assertions. A "compound class" and a "compound assertion" are, respectively, the logical product of two or more classes or of two or more assertions. This shows the possibility of the dual interpretation; and illustrates also both the range and the limitations of Boole's system. It should be added that some of Boole's own remarks on interpretation suggest that he believed the interpreted laws of his calculus to be psychological laws.

If we confine ourselves to the class-interpretation, the essentials of Boole's system are roughly as follows. The symbols x, y, z, etc., are to be regarded as class-name variables. (Boole calls them "elective symbols" and says that they stand for "operations of selection" of the members of the relevant classes). The logical product of x and y is represented by xy and the logical sum by $x + y$; or, in other words, xy is to be read as "x's which are y's" or "things which are both x and y," and $x + y$ is to be read as "x's and y's" or "both things which are x and things which are y." The symbol 1, or unity, is to be read as "everything" (the universal class); and the symbol $1 - x$ stands for the class of things which are not x. The expressions $x + y$, xy, $1 - x$ are themselves elective expressions. The equation of any elective expression to 0 is equivalent to the denial that the corresponding class has any members, or "exists." The equation to 0 of any elective expression representing a logical sum entails the equation to 0 of all the elements of that sum; a rule which does not hold in ordinary algebra, but obviously holds for this interpretation, since no elective expression can represent a negative quantity. The equation of any elective expression to another represents the identity of the membership of the two classes. Some of the laws of ordinary algebra (e.g. $xy = yx$ and $x(u + v) = xu + xv$) will hold for this interpretation, whereas some laws of Boole's calculus (e.g. $x(1 - x) = 0$) will not hold without restriction in ordinary algebra.

The most impressive feature of the system is the elaboration of general rules for the processes which Boole calls *development* (or *expansion*): *elimination*; and the *solution* of elective equations. I shall roughly indicate the character of the first two of these processes by an example. Suppose we have the propositions: (1) that there are no x's which are not y's; (2) that there are no y's which are not z's. In Boole's symbolism, these can obviously be combined into the elective equation

$$(E) \quad x(1 - y) + y(1 - z) = 0.$$

The expansion of this expression consists in its resolution into the maximum possible number of denials of the existence of compound classes involving in their expression the elective symbols x, $1 - x$, y, $1 - y$, z, $1 - z$. Now, in general, $y(x + (1 - x)) = y$, since $x + (1 - x) = 1$. Thus the first term of the left side of (E) can be developed in respect of z into $xz(1 - y) + x(1 - z)(1 - y)$, while the second term can be developed in respect of x into $yx(1 - z) + y(1 - x)(1 - z)$, which yields as the development of the whole equation the expression

$$(D) \quad xz(1 - y) + x(1 - z)(1 - y) + yx(1 - z) + y(1 - x)(1 - z) = 0.$$

Boole gives, as a general rule for the development in respect of x of any elective expression, the formula

$$f(x) = f(1)x + f(0)(1 - x)$$

which can be interpreted as an instruction, first, to substitute 1 for x throughout the expression to be developed, multiplying the result by x and, second, to substitute 0 for x throughout, multiplying the result by $(1 - x)$; and it will easily be seen that the application of this rule, repeated in respect of x and z, to (E) will yield a result equivalent to (D). The equation is already fully developed in respect of y, since y or $(1 - y)$ are present in all terms on the left-hand side. Since each term of (D) may be separately equated to 0, the whole process of expansion may be said to yield the sum total of denials involved in any proposition with which the class calculus is designed to deal.

Suppose we now wish to eliminate y from the equation; i.e. to find that part, if any, of the information contained in the equation, which concerns the relations of the classes x and z alone. Consider the second and third terms of (D). They are identical except that y is a factor of one and $(1 - y)$ of the other, That is to say,

$$x(1 - z)(1 - y) + yx(1 - z)$$

may be rewritten as

$$x(1 - z)((1 - y) + y)$$

which, since $(1 - y) + y = 1$, is itself equal to

$$x(1 - z).$$

This last term may therefore be equated to 0, and the resultant equation interpreted as the conclusion "There are no x's which are not z's." Here, again, Boole supplies a general formula, i.e. a formula for the elimination of x from any equation of the form $f(x) = 0$. As the above illustration informally shows, the way to find an element in a developed equation, independent of x, which can legitimately be equated to 0, is to look for two terms which are identical except that x is a factor of one and $(1 - x)$ of the other. The common element in the two terms is then the element we are seeking. That is to say, if the development of $f(x)$ with respect to x is $f(1)x + f(0)(1 - x)$, then the elements, if any, which can legitimately be equated to 0 independently of x, are the elements common to both $f(1)$ and $f(0)$. But the common element of two elective expressions is their product. So that if $f(1)x + f(0)(1 - x) = 0$ is the development with respect to x of the equation $f(x) = 0$, then the equation $f(1)f(0) = 0$ yields whatever results may be obtained which are independent of x or $(1 - x)$. Armed with this general formula for elimination, we see that the elimination of y from the equation (E) can proceed without the detour through expansion in respect of x and z. For (E) is already fully developed in respect of y, i.e. is already in the form $f(1)y + f(0)(1 - y) = 0$. Applying the formula $f(1)f(0) = 0$ to (E), we directly obtain the result $x(1 - z) = 0$.

These results, together with a method of finding the value of any elective symbol involved in a given equation in terms of the remaining elective symbols (the solution of elective equations), are developed in their full generality in the last two sections of the book. The exposition makes few concessions to the non-mathematical reader; to whom Venn's *Symbolic Logic* may be recommended, as a useful guide-book to Boole.

The sections called "On Expression and Interpretation," "Of Conversion" and "Of Syllogisms" are concerned with what might be called a secondary interpretation of Boole's system in terms of the propositional forms recognized in traditional logic. Their object is to show how the traditional forms of proposition may be expressed in his symbolism, and how all the traditionally

valid forms of mediate and immediate inference may be deduced within the system. Although providing an impressive demonstration of the power and generality of Boole's method, these sections are not altogether satisfactory. He treats them as a limited application of the class-interpretation of his calculus as we have already described it; but, in fact, the two interpretations are different, and, in part, incompatible. Suppose we are dealing with the three elective symbols x, y and z; and suppose that $xy = 0$. Then it follows that $xyz = 0$, and $xy(1 - z) = 0$. But Boole, when concerned with the interpretation of his calculus in terms of the traditional logic, allows $xy(1 - z) = 0$ to be read as "All xy's are z" and, in conformity with the traditional rules, makes it yield $xyz = v$, *where* v *is not null*: which contradicts the original hypothesis.

Messrs. Blackwell are to be congratulated on the reprinting of this admirable little treatise, which, first published in 1847, has possibly contributed more to the modern development of formal logic than any other single work except the same author's *Laws of Thought*.

P. F. Strawson.

Hegel's Early Theological Writings. Translated by T. M. Knox. With an Introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner. (University of Chicago Press. 1948. Pp. xi + 340. Price 27s. 6d.)

The core of this book is the first English translation of two early writings of Hegel, which were given to the world in 1907 when Herman Nohl published *Hegel's theologische Jugendschriften*; viz. *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*, 1795–6, and *The Spirit of Christianity*, 1798–9.

These vigorous essays are of very great importance for the study of Hegel's development and for the understanding of his mature philosophy. The former is mainly an anti-clerical *apologia* to explain why Jesus, desiring to teach a religion of virtue, was yet himself in some measure responsible for the positive and legalistic structure of doctrine and religious practice which Christianity in the hands of the Churches became. The Roman Church is the chief sinner, but the Protestants receive their share of criticism. The initial fault lay with the Jews. Jesus could not have touched them had he not accepted some continuity with their formalistic and servile religion and proclaimed himself the promised Messiah. He could not wholly avoid the substitution of his own authority for the free dictates of the individual conscience. To spread his faith he had to found a sect, and this sect had to grow into a Church with rules. To Hegel at this time a religion of virtue meant, in the first instance, something like the free and natural Hellenic religion of beauty, as he conceived it: Part II begins with an eloquent lament that the Greeks, and the other pagan nations, too, had their own freely imagined mythologies, home-grown and linked with their history, but "Christianity has emptied Valhalla," reducing the old German imagery to dead superstition and offering a poor substitute in the shape of the Old Testament. But the young Hegel finds the religion of virtue again in Kant. He had in fact, earlier in a *Life of Jesus* actually tried to express the teaching of Jesus in terms of the Kantian ethics, and the Kantian philosophy had already become a permanent factor in his own thinking.

In three years Hegel moved fast. *The Spirit of Christianity*, a much more profound and subtle writing, makes Judaism its first object of attack. Hegel's condemnation of the Jews throughout their history from Abraham onwards is severe and powerful. The tragedy of the Jews, he says, rouses only horror, not the pity and terror excited by the inevitable slip of a beautiful character.

Theirs "is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of nature itself, clung to alien beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature." There is now no hint of "positivity" in Jesus; the whole emphasis is on his isolation and opposition to his own people. The beauty of the Greek soul still excites Hegel's admiration, but his attitude to Kant is new, and it is the attitude which persisted for the rest of his life. The suppression of inclination by duty (which he takes as the core of Kantian ethics) is a higher thing than the subjection of the Jew to his "objective" and alien God, because it is subjective, in the man himself; but it is not a true autonomy of Reason. Even if duty and inclination should in fact conform, yet Kant cannot show that their conformity is more than an accident. Christianity, as Hegel now sees it, is a synthesis of the Greek soul with the Kantian Reason in what Kroner in his Introduction calls a pantheism of love. In an exposition of the Sermon on the Mount Hegel comes near to presenting Jesus as a critic of Kant who teaches the necessary conformity of duty and inclination in love. "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth," denies that a good action is an action done for duty's sake. The same theme is pursued in discussions of punishment and fate, in which the familiar doctrines of Hegel's maturity are more than half shaped. Expounding the first chapter of St. John's Gospel, Hegel contends that the Logos and Life are not, as predicates of God, universals of the type contained in judgments expressing reflection, because these predicates are themselves also something living—"Life" to Hegel at this period is the equivalent of spirit. The treatment of reflection in this passage closely anticipates Hegel's later logical doctrine of the categories of Reflection, although the terminology (the use, e.g. of *Begriff* and *Wesen*) is not yet that of the Logic. The germ of dialectic is there, but the relation of universal, particular, and individual is not as fully worked out as it is in Hegel's later conception of the Notion (*Begriff*). There is some truth, I think, in Kroner's view that Hegel's conclusion is pantheistic. The separate personality of Jesus is always minimized through the conception of Life as whole in each of its distinctions. The significance of difference, the force of negativity, is perhaps not yet fully present to Hegel. On the other hand, the idea of self-severance and reunion already pervades his thinking. In his pantheism, if pantheism it be, distinction is by no means merely cancelled and swallowed up.

In general, these essays show that the Hellenic, Christian, and Kantian factors, fundamental in Hegel's mature work, were fused before he was thirty. Philosophy was later to sublate religion, but to watch Hegel earnestly, even passionately, forging in a religious medium a position so close to that of his maturity is to realize that the theological language which he often uses in the Logic is to him only barely metaphor.

To English Hegel as readably as Wallace did is difficult, and it produces a version not always as helpful to the student of the German text as to one who knows no German. Professor Knox hits on the whole as happy a mean as may be. His version is usually as smooth as a tolerably close translation of Hegel can be, and it is, where I have tested it, an accurate and serviceable crib. His explanatory notes are helpful, even when he intervenes to comment on a passage of which the exact meaning remains hard to determine.

G. R. G. Mure.

Five Jewish Lawyers of the Common Law. By Professor A. L. Goodhart, K.B.E., K.C. Oxford University Press. 74 pp. 5s. net.

Professor Goodhart's essay—which is an expansion of his Lucien Wolf Memorial Lecture, delivered in 1947—is an assessment of the work of five

great lawyers, two of them English judges (Jessel and the first Marquess of Reading), two of them American judges of the United States Supreme Court (Brandeis and Cardozo), and one, Benjamin, who could claim to be both English and American, and who had practised with distinction in both countries, although he never held legal office in either. They differ very widely in their permanent significance. Rufus Isaacs was one of the greatest advocates of the century. He was also an outstanding administrator, but his contribution to English law, even as a judge, was limited. Sir George Jessel, on the other hand, can be placed in the first five of English Equity judges, although his contribution does not rank with those of Nottingham, Hardwicke, or even Eldon. He possessed a brilliant capacity for clear analysis and for logical exposition of legal principles, but he was not primarily a creative judge. Benjamin (the only Secretary of State the Confederate States of North America ever appointed) wrote a memorable treatise upon the Law of Sale, which reflects his legal erudition and his grasp of comparative law, but he was essentially (and almost exclusively) a practitioner. Brandeis and Cardozo, on the other hand, have further claims to the attention of posterity, for each brought to the judicial office a consciousness of its immense importance in a period of social change. Though they were often in a minority in the American Supreme Court, the outlook upon law which they shared has now triumphed, not only in America but on this side of the Atlantic. In their view, it was the function of the judge progressively to reinterpret the Common Law in the light of the dominant social theories of the age, thereby preserving its flexibility, and advancing the search for abstract justice. They, with the late Mr. Justice Holmes, brought about the revolution in the judicial attitude within the American Supreme Court which dulled the edge of the controversy between the American Judiciary and the Executive, and which restated the place of the judiciary within the Constitution. With great economy of words, Professor Goodhart gives a valuable estimate of the contribution of these five Jewish lawyers to Anglo-American law, emphasizing two qualities common to all five of them—their liberal outlook and the remarkable clarity of their legal thought.

G. W. KEETON.

Philosophy for the Future. The Quest of Modern Materialism. Edited by Roy Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill and Marvin Farber. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1949. Pp. xii + 657. Price $7.50.)

This is a co-operative work consisting of twenty-eight essays by philosophers and scientists, all of whom hold to a materialist philosophy of some kind. The majority of the contributors are American. The editors, in their Preface, refer to the first part of the work as dealing with the history of materialism, the second part with the materialist picture of the universe given by science and philosophy, and the third part with philosophical positions diverging from materialism. This division into parts finds no recognition in the list of contents or the body of the text, though it is possible to make a guess where each part begins and ends. In other ways there is a surprising absence of editorial activity, with the exception of the joint Preface which is an ingenious attempt to discover a plan behind the twenty-eight contributions. The general impression thus created that the book has been thrown together is not dispelled by further investigation.

The first part is, in fact, a desultory examination of arbitrarily selected episodes in the history of materialism. Even Professor Farrington fails to be his usual lively and illuminating self in this company. This part culminates (if

that is the word) in an article by Professor Sellars on *Social Philosophy and the American Scene*. This reads as if it had been dictated at high speed in an hour's rest from Faculty duties. The following is a fair sample: "I have not time to indicate the yeastiness of American social thought in the north until after the Civil War. Both religious and secular experiments in communal living were rife. Mormonism, of course, reflects this era" (p. 69). Professor Sellars, incidentally, is a precarious sort of materialist. He holds that moral principles are irreducible to non-moral terms (p. 71). But he does not explain the *locus* in matter of the moral characteristics they connote.

The second part is better. The essays on *Mathematics, The Structure of the Universe* and *Quantum Mechanics* are interesting and well-written, though I am not competent to judge their soundness. Here too, however, there are some contributions which make little or no impression. The outstanding philosophical contribution occurs in this part, Professor Nelson on *The Category of Substance*. This is a serious and powerful vindication of the concept of substance against phenomenalist attempts to banish it from a purified language of science. It is significant, perhaps, that this essay was not written specially for this book, but is reprinted from the *Philosophical Review* of 1947.

The third part includes a good essay by Professor Churchman attacking the notion of fundamental measurements in science; and a well-written, effective criticism of pragmatism by Professor Conger. Mr. Cornforth, on *Logical Empiricism* is, as usual, interesting.

The reading of this book makes one wonder about co-operative ventures of this kind. Who (other than reviewers) reads them? Is this particular one a disappointing specimen? Or is there something about the co-operative book which makes it almost unreadable? Supposing it can be satisfactory, then I think that this one failed for a number of reasons. First, the treatment is too ambitious. To deal with the history of materialism, the results of the various sciences, natural and social, and then further with other philosophical systems is too much. Secondly, no one in it seeks to define or defend materialism. Dialectical materialists jostle mechanical materialists, substantialists rub shoulders with new realists, and there is a buzzing but not very blooming confusion about the whole work, irritating to anyone with even a moderate liking for clarity. If a number of philosophers had been asked to say (*a*) what they understood by materialism, and (*b*) why they thought it true, the work would have been of more interest to the philosopher. If it was intended for the general reader, the whole plan needed more co-ordination and editorial care, and an exposition at a much more elementary level in the scientific and philosophical sections. As it is, it is likely to irritate the one and perplex the other.

WINSTON H. F. BARNES.

Insight and Outlook. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. (London: Macmillan and Co. 1949. Pp. xiv + 442. Price 25s.)

Mr. Koestler's aim is twofold, first to show that all the creative activities of man are based on a common pattern and thus to present a unifying theory of humour, art and discovery; and, second, to show the possibility of a system of ethics based on the same integrative tendency in the evolutionary process which underlies art and discovery. The result is a stimulating book with a wide range of interest. Three hypotheses are used extensively, the notion of operative fields, of bisociation, and of a conflict between self-assertive and self-transcending tendencies of behaviour. The notion of bisociation is particularly interesting. To put it briefly and crudely, what happens in bisociation is this:

a concept which is habitually associated with one context (i.e. which is a member of one "operative field") is simultaneously associated with a different context or operative field, to which it also belongs. Thus two associative complexes, hitherto habitually incompatible, are connected through the "junctional" concept. This process of bisociation, Mr. Koestler believes, is common to all original creative processes, the latter being distinguished from one another by the quality of the emotive charge associated with them. It can be seen in a simple form in the Comic, and again in the neutral arts (physical science, mathematics, etc.), and in the emotive arts (poetry, drama, etc.). The theory is skilfully elaborated, and Part IV of the book, which is concerned with its application in aesthetics and is furnished with a wealth of examples from a wide range of literature, makes particularly illuminating reading. Where the book is perhaps less convincing is in its second aim, which is concerned with ethics. Here the third hypothesis mentioned above of self-assertive and integrative tendencies figures prominently. These two tendencies are seen at work at every stage in the evolutional hierarchy, and the trouble, Koestler thinks, with our civilization is the over-stimulation of the self-assertive tendencies in man, and the atrophy of the integrative tendencies. At present, with the breakdown of Divine Law, which provided both an explanation of the world and a guide to conduct, "the place for a system of ethics in harmony with our state of knowledge is vacant," and there is no guidance for the integrative tendencies. He himself hopes that eventually what he calls a "natural ethics" will develop, that with the new emphasis on wholeness in all the branches of science from physics to psychology "the ethical neutrality of science will automatically come to an end . . . and natural law resume its original meaning as both a guide to understanding and a guide to conduct." This approach seems to the present writer, if he has not misunderstood, to contain not a few pitfalls—for example the old difficulty seems latent of the distinction between what is and what ought to be. There is, however, no space for discussion here; but it is to be hoped that Koestler will say more to clarify his ethical views in the second volume, which he promises as a more detailed supplement to the general exposition of his theses contained in the present volume.

R. C. Cross.

Storia della Filosofia. Vol. II, parte seconda: Filosofia del romanticismo, Filosofia contemporanea. By Nicola Abbagnano. Turin: Unione Tipografica-Editrice Torinese. 1950. 4to. Pp. ix + 740. Lire 4200.

Professor Abbagnano's work seems to be the largest survey of the history of philosophy that we have had since De Ruggiero's sequence of brilliant volumes; at any rate, I have seen nothing comparable in English, French or German during the last twenty years or so. It is one expression of the remarkable ebullition of philosophical reflection and scholarship in post-war Italy, presumably kept simmering underground during the years of war. The preceding parts of the work are unknown to me. If they are equal in merit to the present one, the author's daring and industry have been amply justified.

The book is not a piece of popularization; neither is it a massive mine of detailed information, like Ueberweg's *Grundriss*; nor a speculative thesis, like Erdmann's *Geschichte*. The audience aimed at seems to be the busy teacher and the fairly advanced student. A further generalization would be that there is throughout an evident abstractness natural to an author whose country has been hospitable to an idealism of the Hegelian type. The abstractness is not excessive: it consists mainly in a concentration of interest on doctrines,

and on basic doctrines, with only a quick notice of historical affiliations and biographical matters. An extremely lucid style carries the reader forward. Each chapter is followed by a bibliography that is comprehensive, up-to-date, and inclusive of foreign writings, yet drastically selective. Just because the interest is in doctrine, an index of subjects would have opened the way to comparative study. The index of names could have been more helpful concerning the outstanding thinkers; e.g. against Hegel's name are set ninety-nine unclassified page references.

The opening chapters deal with the first reactions to Kant, the three dominating German idealists, the romantics (chiefly Schleiermacher), and Schopenhauer. The author's up-to-dateness is shown by his including Marx, Engels, Stirner, and Kirkegaard in his account of the recoil from Hegel, and in his devoting the final chapter to Existentialism; and he proves his breadth of outlook by not giving a disproportionate place to Italian thinkers, not even to Croce and Gentile. Much more attention than is usual in continental histories is given to British thinkers (as early as 1927 Professor Abbagnano wrote an excellent book on English Idealism). The high importance assigned abroad to Spencer is maintained in the account of evolutionist positivism. Nietzsche, Bergson and Dewey have each a chapter. French spiritualism and German neo-criticism are adequately presented. There is an admirable chapter on the philosophy of science, from Mach through Poincaré and Russell to the Logical Positivists. Much of the material is instructively arranged under such general headings. The period being the fullest of all in philosophical production, large omissions have had to be made, but they have been made with a fairly steady standard of what is important. The volume deserves to be noted as one of the most distinguished of its kind, and as the most up-to-date. Only a very ripe scholar could have written it.

T. E. Jessop.

Knowledge and Perception. By H. A. Prichard. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 214. Price 15s.)

This posthumous collection of Prichard's epistemological writings contains lectures on the History of the Theory of Knowledge (1932), papers on "Mr. Bertrand Russell on our Knowledge of the External World" (*Mind* 1915) "The Sense-datum Fallacy" (*Arist. Soc. Supp.* Vol. 1938), "Perception" (undated), and two short papers on "Seeing Movements" and "The Apprehension of Time." The last two should have been omitted, they look like preliminary sketches for matters handled elsewhere, and on one central point there is a flat contradiction between them ("The fact referred to by what we *call* seeing X cannot rightly be described as a process which seems to us to be seeing X," p. 45, and "All that is true is that at the time the state I was in seemed and inevitably seemed to me one of seeing this," p. 49).

The lectures are not properly speaking historical. Prichard says he will treat Descartes' *Meditations* as "a piece of living thought," and all the authors are handled as though they were contemporaries.

Prichard was a philosophical puritan (his response to Hume's *Treatise* is *anger*). His style, like that of a legal document, takes great pains to be exact, but not to be easy or pleasant. His scrutiny of his authors is minute and relentless, and he is unwilling to overlook anything careless or disputable. This approach is most useful in the discussion of Descartes, where Prichard has a single step-by-step argument to examine. In the more complex discussion of Locke, neither Locke's own thought nor the standpoint from which he is being criticized appear so plainly. The section headed "Berkeley" has but

five pages on Berkeley as against seventeen on the general analysis of perception. As for Hume, Prichard holds (rightly, I think, if Hume's theory is taken as a whole) that "to refute him only a close analysis of the argument is needed" (p. 199).

Prichard's theory of knowledge in the narrowest sense (pp. 86–91, 95–104) is a rather clearer re-statement of Cook Wilson's. Knowing and believing are quite different in kind, and mutually exclusive; there is no difference between knowing and being certain, though there are states of mind which are not states of certainty but yet contain no doubt; the difference between knowing and believing can be pointed out, but neither can be defined; in any given case a man can *know* whether he is then knowing or believing (Prichard even claims to *know* that on a given occasion Descartes was knowing and not believing (p. 89)). As Prichard says, argument about such a theory can only consist of answering objections. He discusses the crucial objection that one man's certainties may contradict another's; but not altogether effectively. For (*a*) in defending his claim that only bodies can move, against others who claim that, e.g., waves can move, he has to make such allowances for differences in the meaning of "move," that in the end all he seems to be claiming to know is that only bodies can have the sort of movement that bodies have: such a reduction to "tautology" faces a whole class of pieces of "knowledge." And (*b*) he has to admit, contrary to his own theory as I understand it, that a man may fail in correctly distinguishing knowledge from belief (to say that anybody who does not agree with Prichard has not thought hard enough is unconvincing).

As regards perception, Prichard has in this volume no one clear-cut theory to propound: the doctrine that we perceive bodies, asserted in the article on Russell (p. 32), is later emphatically denied. The problem that chiefly concerns Prichard is this. We all begin by taking for granted that we see and touch "bodies"; but this belief will not survive criticism. Yet, if we suppose that we have begun by seeing colours and recognizing them to be colours, it seems impossible to explain how we came by the firm belief that there are bodies and that we see them. Against phenomenalist analyses of statements about physical objects (Berkeley, Hume, Russell), Prichard argues (cogently, I think) that they all at some point assume some knowledge of the existence and properties of bodies as distinct from "appearances." His own suggestion is that in vision we see certain shaped colours, and forthwith mistake them for bodies; it will not do to say that we "think" they are bodies, or "interpret" them as bodies, for to "see the moon moving" behind clouds, for example, is not the same as to think that it is so moving (p. 43). This view still has to assume that the idea of body is apprehended by us in some non-perceptual fashion (Prichard thinks there are other such ideas, e.g. equality, cause (p. 112–3)). Very strangely, he gives no account of what properties are to be included in the term "body."

From this view it follows that perceiving is not a kind of knowing, since in it we systematically misapprehend something. Moreover, knowledge implies the independence of its object, and the objects of perception are self-evidently dependent on the perceiving of them (p. 207). (But "If we ask how Berkeley can have come to think this obvious, we see that it can only be because he . . . had in mind the physical processes which are usually held to *explain* our perception" (p. 156)). Thus there are no "sense-data," i.e. objects known by sensation. I am not sure that there is anything more than a verbal question here. There is certainly a process of noticing what sensations I am having, comparing them with one another, etc., and it yields knowledge of the nature of some entities which are green, square, loud, shrill, etc. I do not think

Prichard really wants to deny this. "Sense-data" is the name for these entities.

The chief value of the book as a whole is likely to be the value which I as a student derived from hearing Prichard lecture and discuss: that is, the value of following the thought of a philosophical mind not, in my judgment, of superlative insight or ingenuity, but of superlative integrity and perseverance, grappling patiently and subtly with difficult and important problems. Whatever the reader's opinions may be, he is likely to scrutinize them with fresh care in the light of what Prichard has to say.

The misprint "epistomological" occurs on p. 149, l. 23. The last sentence on p. 63 is unintelligible unless the comma after "smells" be moved to follow "do not." The book would be the better for a good index; the one provided is almost useless.

C. H. Whiteley.

Beyond Realism and Idealism. By Wilbur Marshall Urban. (London: Allen and Unwin. 1949. Pp. 266. Price 18s.)

Looking back over the history of philosophy, Professor Urban finds a break with the past not, as others have done, whether rightly or wrongly, with Descartes, but with Locke. Locke's "physiology of knowledge" is said to have been the start of a naturalism which, helped in due course by Darwinism, has come to regard mind as wholly dependent on nature. Against this view Professor Urban appeals to *philosophia perennis*, by which he means not an unchanging body of doctrine, but a philosophy which through all its changes and developments has clung to the same fundamental presuppositions. These presuppositions are, first, "the assumption of antecedent being," secondly, the assumption that *ratio est capabilis* or that there is such a relation between being and mind that being can be known, and thirdly, the inseparability of being and value.

It is Professor Urban's contention that a philosophy so based is beyond both realism and idealism because it is a synthesis of their fundamental motives or, as he is fond of saying, of the "driving force of idealism" and "the resistance of realism." Once the inseparability of being and value is accepted (and with it the rejection of naturalism in all its forms), it becomes possible to maintain that while mind must be organic to the world, the world must be organic to mind.

For these presuppositions (or principles or postulates or assumptions or prejudices or motives—the author uses all these words as if they were synonymous) no proof can be offered. Professor Urban regards them, using a phrase of Pringle-Pattison's, as "logically unsupported judgments of value." And it is judgments of this kind which he finds at the root of realisms and idealisms of every sort. In all the transformations of realism certain elements in the realist *credo* have been shown to be untenable, but the essential postulate of antecedent being (or the "axiom of independence" which by an "axiological necessity" must be acknowledged if knowledge is to retain its meaning and value) remains untouched and is essential to any sound theory of knowledge. But the fundamental postulate of idealism, the relativity of the known object to mind, remains equally untouched and equally necessary to the theory of knowledge.

Now when realists maintain that the object known is independent of the mind that knows it, they may seem to contradict the idealist thesis that what is known cannot be out of all relation to the knowing mind. But, Professor Urban maintains, this is only an illusion; these contentions of realists and

idealists are not conclusions reached by argument: they are judgments about the significance of knowledge and they are thus presuppositions of the realist and idealist arguments. And, so viewed, they are not incompatible, because the realist postulate of the given does not prejudice the problem of what is given, while the idealist postulate of the relativity of the object to mind does not prejudice the problem of how far this relativity extends. Moreover, these postulates, we are told, must be held together, because denial of either refutes itself and makes the assertion of the other meaningless.

These fundamental postulates are elicited from realistic and idealistic theories by a dialectical argument, and their conciliation is clinched by considerations drawn from the nature of communication. Since knowledge entails confirmation, it must also entail communication between mind and mind, and this in turn implies not only entitites and values independent of the knower but also the mutual acknowledgment of these; object and subject transcend one another. Communication presupposes the essence of realism and idealism and reconciles them both.

Professor Urban grants to the positivist that no empirical evidence can be adduced in support of these postulates. So far from being discovered or verified by investigation, they are methodological principles which guide any scientific enquiry. An attempt is made to demonstrate this thesis at some length in relation to both physics and the sciences of mind.

It is difficult to assess the value of this book, the main contentions of which have been here summarized, so far as possible, in its author's own language. A reader may respect its seriousness of purpose. Professor Urban is honestly convinced that much modern philosophy has taken the wrong turning, and, at an advanced age, he makes what may be his final effort to convert the wayward and set them on the true path once more. He takes pains to define the problems which he tries to solve, and if he is animated by missionary zeal he never forsakes argument for exhortation. And yet those who have rejected the teaching of his previous books are unlikely to be moved by this philosophical testament. It is often repetitive, and what is said many times here has often been said by the same author before, for example, in *The Intelligible World*. The value theory from Heidelberg which lies behind so much of Professor Urban's work, has been exposed to keen criticism by Croce and others, and to such criticism there is here insufficient reply. The assertion that history is a *Wertwissenschaft* was questionable thirty years ago; it is surprising to find it reasserted, with no new defence, to-day. Moreover, the author realizes that the problem of transcending realism and idealism is an old one; he quotes Hegel in his Preface and might have quoted Bradley too; yet he scarcely considers the solutions offered by his predecessors. Collingwood's speculations on absolute presuppositions, though highly germane to his argument, he does not mention. All this helps to give the book an archaic air and to make it, however well-intentioned, unconvincing.

T. M. Knox.

Science and Literary Criticism. By Herbert Dingle. (Nelson. 1949. 7s. 6d.).

That literary criticism should become a science like everything else is a natural hope in our time; perhaps it is natural also that attempts to make it so are often the work of non-scientists, and fare accordingly. Professor Dingle is not one of these. His book is, first, a brilliant destructive analysis of some influential modern attempts to found criticism as a science, and second, a modest proposal that in one subordinate respect the methods of science, if not its conclusions, can lead to informative results. Of these two, the former is

particularly valuable at a time when crude speculative psychoanalysis or confused and vulgarized physiology are so often advanced as a substitute for criticism or as its essence. Professor Dingle easily shows that psychoanalytic biography is both irrelevant to criticism, and as unscientific as it well could be. In somewhat greater detail, he then considers I. A. Richards' account of the nature of communication in poetry and of the value attaching to poetic experience, and disposes of that too.

Richards' criterion of poetic value has by now become notorious, if not famous: poetry is good in proportion as it satisfies our "appetencies." Professor Dingle shows, deftly enough, that as these entities are unobservable, to use them as affording a criterion of the difference between good poetry and bad, is merely to restate in jargon that both kinds exist. When, among the various restatements, a workable criterion appears ("universal preference on the part of those who have tried both kinds fairly"—though Mill's authority is unmentioned), Professor Dingle briefly shows that it either begs the question or probably gives the wrong answer, that it is a dogma running counter to everything else in the theory, and that it does not test for value but invites us to adopt Richards' substitute for it. Philosophers nowadays, perhaps, may feel that they learnt these things in their cradles. But the remarkable recent diffusion of "scientific" theorizing in criticism should make us value so lucid an exposure of all the series of its confusions. Eliot, Herbert Read and Harold Nicolson also appear among Professor Dingle's victims; in the end, he leaves the reader almost with a handbook of the confusions besetting critics with logical or philosophical acumen insufficient for the tasks they set themselves.

The book also contains one constructive application of science to criticism: the whole output of, say, a poet can be systematically examined to discover the general characteristics which pervade it. "Qualities that are expressed in all the poems . . . that part of the poet's personality that does not develop." The problem is like that of an astronomer educing the gravitational pattern of the solar system from a mass of observational data. The result is a construction from the poetry which may or may not also describe the living author; but it has its use rather as a preliminary to criticism, in giving a "concise statement" of the nature of the poet's work and in warning us against irresponsible interpretations of single poems.

In pursuing this constructive aim Professor Dingle writes three observant, original essays on Wordsworth, Swinburne, and Browning. He offers them modestly to the reader as specimens of a method, and we should be glad to have them even if they were less interesting than they are. But in science, not every collection of data throws up an order on examination; yet Professor Dingle does not merely offer the reader three instances where his method gave a positive result. He claims that such answers await discovery in every case, and rests his claim on psychological evidence valid for every individual "save in the rare phenomena of dual and multiple personality." His inference is, for example, "it is a necessary truth that Swinburne had a centre" (pp. 134–5). But such evidence is relevant only if we abandon the author's distinction between poet as biographical figure, and poet as construct from the poems. Whether these "concise statements" are possible in all cases will only transpire through examination of cases; and indeed, Professor Dingle's own summaries hint at what might be expected on general grounds—that they will be always possible, only if we agree to accept answers so loosely or peculiarly significant as scarcely to be answers in the normal sense at all. "The central purpose of Wordsworth's life was to be happy" (p. 109), and "the definite impulses . . . expressed in (Swinburne's) verse . . . are all manifestations of . . . a kind of passion for the infinite" (p. 137), are true in so generic a sense—

or in the first case one so distinctive—that ordinary scientific method could not give them. Their use of language is incommensurate with it. The value of the essays as criticism is not determined by these remarks; but, if they were simply scientific analyses, certainly would be so determined, and one concludes that the author's most illuminating criticism is not that which comes nearest to his programme.

For all that he considers his poets to be dogmatic or imaginative rather than intellectual, and to be expressing an attitude rather than a philosophy, Professor Dingle writes of them rather as seers than as craftsmen. But every good poet is to some degree a verbal artist, and it is reasonable to expect the "concise statement" to say something each time of this side of his achievement. On reflection, however, one can see why these aspects evade the scientific approach. Unlike individual readings in a mass of scientific data, the constituent parts of a poem are not easily isolated and classified; significance in literature is controlled by the detail of expression. The assertion that "life, seen through Browning's eyes, lost its magical character" is not proved by showing that Browning often uses spatial metaphors, and tended to see even temporal process in geometrical terms. Whether or not an analogy destroys the sense of mystery depends on the *nuance* of its phrasing, not its general type. Professor Dingle quotes Browning's "Master Hughes of Saxe-Gotha" in support of his argument; here, though, Browning likens music not to architecture in general, but to the dim hieroglyphic patterns of a cathedral roof seen in twilight by the organist. In "Abt Vogler" the lines

> ". . . out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star."

or more notably

> "Give me the keys. I feel for the common chord again,
> Sliding by semitones, till I sink to the minor, yes,
> And blunt it into a ninth, and I stand on alien ground."

certainly describe music in spatial terms, but do not drain it of its intangible quality. They do not provide physical analogues to do duty for music; rather they suggest the sound-originals immediately, in a language that is compressed, powerful, and vivid just because it is that of space, not of music. Professor Dingle's method seems to presuppose an unduly mechanical conception of how figurative language operates in poetry; but many modern critics—among them Rosamund Tuve, L. C. Knights, Rajan, and Richards himself—have shown that such a conception is insufficient.

All in all, the best part of this book is not that which applies scientific methods to poetry, but that which employs philosophical methods to criticize criticism. Here, in his castigation of the contemporary critics who combine logical confusion with appeals for logical analysis, it is enough to say that he moves like a professional among *dilettanti*.

JOHN HOLLOWAY.

My Philosophy and Other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of our Time, By BENEDETTO CROCE. Selected by R. Klibansky. Translation by E. F. Carritt. (Allen and Unwin, London. 1949. Pp. 240. Price 15s. net).

This eloquent and impressive work will be much welcomed by all who are interested in the author's philosophy. It may be doubted whether it adds very much to what is already known of the latter, but it does express in trenchant form principles which are specially relevant to the present situa-

tion. *My Philosophy*, which is printed first, is only one small essay among others and does not deserve the prominence ascribed to it in the title. It is of much interest for its account of the relations between Croce and Hegel and defends the view that there is real progress in philosophy. The second essay, *The Moral Problem of our Time*, is perhaps the one which is most valuable as relating Croce's philosophy to the issue between communism and liberalism. The third, *Why we cannot help calling ourselves Christians*, will impress some, but seems to me to fail to give a really clear answer to the question set in its title. The others are too short and numerous for it to be possible to discuss them individually. They mostly bear on political thought, but there are some on ethics, the philosophy of history and general philosophy. Only one or two deal with aesthetics, the subject most specially associated with their author.

The main ideas of Croce's philosophy brought out here are—the perpetuity of change, the idea of liberty as the very essence of mind (or "spirit"), and the unity of spirit. From the first result Croce's beliefs that no final philosophy is possible, though there is a genuine philosophical progress, and that there must always be evil and strife mixed with good. For evil is the past lesser good as clogging the new higher good. His view of liberty leads him to a sharp distinction between economic and genuine liberalism. Liberalism, he insists, for instance, must not be committed to taking a stand either for or against *laissez faire* but must judge each particular case on its own merits, for liberalism is not itself an economic theory but a defence of that essential nature of man which transcends economics. Economics itself must as a science of means be sharply distinguished from ethics: it is not right to complain that economics is immoral because it does not tell one to pursue anything other than economic advantage, for that is not its business but the business of ethics. However ethical we are, we shall still have to answer the "economic" questions how our physical needs are to be satisfied and what are the best means to a given end. To answer these questions is not to dogmatize whether our physical nature is to be sated at the expense of our higher or whether the means should be adopted in view of the end. Croce has a robust faith that the essentially free spirit of man cannot be finally broken or brought to a standstill by any tyranny, but he is less favourable to "democracy" than to "liberalism." The difference between the two is said to be as follows. "Democracy has an abstract, naturalistic and intellectualist idea of liberty, liberalism one that is concrete and historical; the former is derived from the thought of the eighteenth century, the latter from the nineteenth."[1] Croce leaves no doubt which of the two he prefers, though he thinks the radicalness of democracy is needed to supplement the caution of liberalism. But some of the questions ordinarily asked would on a right conception of liberty be seen to be without significance, he insists. Liberty is simply "the activity of man," and therefore it cannot be given by political means, though it may be supported and enlarged though only by increasing human creativity in every field. The question what men should do with the liberty thus gained is dismissed as stupid, for liberty is not an idle capacity but to be really liberty must itself already be in action. The unity of the human spirit is also emphasized; thus it is insisted that we cannot separate the moral and the philosophical activity.

Valuable as much that is said is, I cannot end upon a note of unqualified approval, for Croce seems to me very liable to succumb to the philosopher's temptation to make far too sweeping general *a priori* statements about what are really matters of concrete fact. A very harmful example of this is to my mind provided by his attitude towards the idea of perpetual peace. This idea,

[1] P. 94.

he declares emphatically, will never be realized.[1] Why? Because man's nature is such that from the nature of the case there will always be strife. This is true in a wide sense of "strife," but no attempt is made to show that this strife must take the *particular form* of international war. Any tiro in psychology knows that the ways in which the contentious tendency in man is manifested are enormously varied. Nor should I think the book likely to convert anyone: its strength rather lies in brilliant ideas well expressed than in sustained argument.

As far as a person who cannot compare it with the original can tell, the translation is very good. It reads like English, and the style is clear, vigorous and eloquent. It is a pity that no index is provided.

A. C. Ewing.

Sri Aurobindo: Indian poet, philosopher and mystic. By G. H. Langley. Foreword by the Marquess of Zetland. (David Marlowe, Ltd. For the Royal Indian and Pakistan Society. 1949. Price 10s. 6d.)

Professor Langley has given us an enlightening and sympathetic account of one of the most remarkable Indian thinkers of to-day. Sri Aurobindo speaks as an Indian, but he does not offer us a mere *réchauffé* of an ancient mode of thought. He brings his own original contribution to the solution of problems that now face both the East and the West, and his former residence among us has enabled him to envisage them from very different points of view.

Sri Aurobindo is introduced to us as "philosopher, poet and mystic." His chief constructive results are given in a large work, *The Life Divine*, and it is chiefly this that Professor Langley analyses and expounds. After a sketch of the author's life he sets out Aurobindo's method and results—ideal and problem, the human mind and its limitations, spiritual knowledge, spiritual discipline, ascent to the supramental, and the criterion of spiritual truth.

The "problem of thought" for Sri Aurobindo is "to find out the right idea and the right way of harmony; to restate the ancient and eternal spiritual truth of the self, so that it shall permeate and dominate the mental and physical life"—and his ideal is no less than "the salvation of the human race." Philosophers and religionists have already had much to say thereon, and the philosophers who receive chief notice here are Bertrand Russell and Dr. Julian Huxley. According to Russell judgments of value are matters of feeling and lie outside the province of science; while Huxley, in a scheme for cultural advancement, excludes any form of religion. But for Aurobindo values are realities, which exist objectively in their own right, and which can be known. This is the positive side of his teaching.

Apart from these agnostic physicists it is a widely held view that there is a reality or realities beyond the senses, which we can come to know. It lies at the basis of all the higher religions, but owing to "dogmatic and credal interpretations" its common ground is obscured. Aurobindo's task is to restate the ancient truth and show how it may come to be known. All religions know that there is a conviction of reality more fundamental than any form of reasoning. That is the position of the mystic. Aurobindo calls it "knowledge by identity." It involves a "sense of the transcendent," which rises to the "supramental or spiritual," and spiritual knowledge becomes spiritual experience. All that Professor Langley says in his analysis needs the closest study as well as his chapter on Aurobindo's remarkable achievement as a poet, and they should lead to the direct study of the thought of this Indian seer.

E. J. Thomas.

[1] Pp. 118, 124, 222.

Paths in Utopia. By MARTIN BUBER. Translated by R. C. F. Hull. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 1939. Pp. 152. Price 15s.)

Prof. Buber's object in writing this short work is first to sketch the history of "Utopian" formulations of Socialism (as Marx scathingly called them), and second to show that these are more likely to build us a better world than the rigidly authoritarian and centralist type of Communism which Lenin, by violent revolution, brought into being.

The author examines, with favouring eye, the doctrines of Proudhon, Kropotkin, Landauer and others; and has no difficulty in demonstrating how strongly opposed all these political theorists were to State centralism, and how unerringly they inclined towards a loose federalism—towards his own ideal Socialist State in fact, which would be a true *communitas communitatum*, "a confederacy of various small organic and social unities, each of which would be autonomous in its given sphere."

Another matter which Prof. Buber emphasizes is that, partly owing to Marx's deficient vision and partly owing to this centralizing tendency which pervades all Communist theory and practice, the political principle has ousted the more important *social* principle. And should the Kremlin type of government continue to extend itself, this disaster might ultimately engulf the whole world. "At this point . . . we are threatened by a danger greater than all the previous ones: the danger of a gigantic centralization of power covering the whole planet and devouring all free community. Everything depends on not handing the work of planetary management over to the political principle."

Few would disagree with Prof. Buber on this point. On the other hand, one wonders if his Utopian form of Socialism, with its understandable abhorrence of central direction, would actually work in a modern Nation-State and be able to accommodate itself to highly complex *economic* conditions. Some measure of centralization—unfortunately perhaps—is necessary to enable society to earn its daily bread and balance its imports and exports; all that we have to ensure is that the rulers of the State are periodically answerable to a free electorate, and prevented, by adequate safeguards, from turning the police force into a private army of oppression. And it is precisely this that a liberal democracy can, by definition, achieve—whether or not it adopts some form of Socialism. Indeed, that freedom and social progress can and do obtain in a capitalist society, numerous examples before our very eyes bear ample witness; and we have therefore to enquire whether the "inevitability" of Socialism (which Buber seems to take for granted) is anything more than another piece of political mythology. In Communist States we are now witnessing the tragic results of putting into force, with a diabolical twist, a political theory that was philosophically unsound (not to say ludicrous) from the start. But is there any guarantee that, economic complications apart, a benevolent federalistic type of Socialism, with a sounder theoretical basis, could survive undistorted in practice? Recent experiences have convinced many that, in even the most well-meaning and mildly imposed Socialist experiments, man as an individual, with tastes and feelings and creative propensities of his own, tends to become more and more subordinated to the imperious demands of an all-powerful Leviathan. And yet it is precisely man as an indivudual who is supremely important in Buber's eyes: "one cannot treat either an individual or a social organism as a means to an end absolutely, without robbing it of its life-substance." To rebut the charge that Utopian Socialism is either unworkable or might lead to undesirable consequences, Prof. Buber would no doubt cite the case of the Jewish Village Communes in Palestine—described in his Epilogue. But this experiment, which appears to

have been successful, hardly provides a safe analogy for those who wish to introduce similar experiments on a national or even planetary scale.

The translator has, for the most part, done his work well, and skilfully transmitted the vigorous and often luminous quality of Buber's thought. But he has also nodded on occasion and given us sentences of intolerable length and Teutonic complexity. Taken as a whole *Paths in Utopia* is a stimulating work which will be appreciated by those who believe in Socialism, as by those who abhor it.

J. Hartland-Swann.

The Ways of Genius. By R. A. Tsanoff. (Harper. Pp. 310. Price $4.)

Mr. Berenson in his newest book *Aesthetics and History* says "Creative Genius is a fascinating subject for study or, to be more accurate, for meditation and guessing." So Professor Tsanoff seems to have found it. His aim is to discover a nature and method common to what is called genius in the arts, criticism, science, law, politics, morality and religion. Far the greater part of his data is gathered from the arts, and much the most of this from poetry. He claims that he will proceed "in a resolute spirit of naturalism," but "will try to recognize nature for what it is even if we cannot always take its measure by our ordinary yardsticks." His instances from poetry show a wide and appreciative reading in many languages, but are of course selected to illustrate what he thinks to have the stamp of genius as he defines it; and the phrases in which it is described are rhetorical rather than scientific or philosophical. "Inspired poetry sounds a convincing note of insight and sublime vision, and scientific genius manifests a creative quality of contemplation. The two radii converge as they approach the centre." The marks of genius are "creative originality," "integration in which is the truth of the spirit," "a spiritual activity radiant and absorbent throughout."

Besides poetry he quotes critics and the prose confessions of poets, sometimes platitudinous and often, again, in a rhetorical strain; and he admits that his "method of enquiry may be called anecdotal—commonly following the vein of gossiping familiarity"—Balzac's dinners, Schiller's rotten apples, Rousseau's bare head in the sun, Bossuet's fur bonnet, drugs.

All this is a rather slight basis for the lofty structure with which he crowns it. "In the sublime achievements of genius reality reveals itself as a creative process, unique in each productive mind, inexhaustible and infinitely perfectible.—Reality here is not a body of facts, but a scale of ideal prospects of actuality which operate as standards and bases of evaluation.—Genius is creative in aspiration and achievement, and it contemplates the vision of Creative Reality."

The most interesting of the literary chapters is that on *Creative Translation of Poetry*, containing some unfamiliar and striking instances. The chapter on *Prophetic and Mystical Genius in Religion*, though less original, is well selected. Perhaps the most precise suggestion for a common quality in artistic and scientific genius—less obvious in religion, morality and philosophy—is the flair for analogies, appearing now as the gift for metaphor and simile, now as Darwin's leap from Malthus to Natural Selection.

E. F. Carritt.

La Pensée en Orient. By P. Masson-Oursel. (Collection Armand Colin No. 255.) Pp. 216. Paris: Armand Colin. 1949. Fr. 180.

The East stretches from the Aegean to the frontiers of India with occasional extensions beyond these boundaries. This area is a unity, due in part to the

existence of an Asian race which underlies the mixture produced by later intruders; differences are little more than skin deep. Sumer produced the first known civilization in Mesopotamia and further developments were due to the clash of varying systems in the area and those brought by invaders. In Egypt the king, as the son of the sun god, was the representative of the people, but later every Egyptian at his death was identified with Osiris and had to come before the tribunal of the god of the dead where his acts were weighed justly. In Mesopotamia no one hoped for anything from the next world and a man was hardly an individual, rather an incorporation of the fate which was allotted to him at the beginning of each year. Peoples from the Aegean conquered parts of Anatolia and Syria; had the conquest been complete, the old order would have continued, but the mixture of an Aryan ruling class with varying brands of Semites under the pressure of the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia produced a new world. Agrarian rites, celebrating the death of vegetation and its rebirth, were extended to human life and grew into the mysteries. These with their ideas of purification and guides for souls gave rise to the idea of a saviour; Hebrew prophets oppressed by the calamities suffered by the state looked for a messiah; Zoroaster calling for good deeds and good thoughts dreamed also of a saviour. These three strains combined to create a belief in the last judgment and life in the hereafter. Christianity was unique in making the saviour God. With the advent of canons of scripture religion became scholasticism. This was not limited to western Europe; the Talmud and later Jewish studies, as also all Byzantine literature, are forms of it and, as a consequence, the theology of Islam also. "It was fortunate that printing was invented when the West was tired of books and was turning to things." Now it takes too great an interest in things, and the East despises it for so doing, for the East sees things only in and through the absolute. These are some of the ideas which form the framework of the book. Some of the generalizations may be too general, but it must be remembered that a space of four thousand years is covered in two hundred pages. It is suggestive, one might say exciting, and is very readable. A. S. Tritton.

Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics. By the Rev. T. J. Higgins, S.J. (The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee. 1949. Pp. 607.

This book is divided into three parts: Book I: "General Principles of Morality," Book II "Principles of Individual Ethics," and Book III "Principles of Social Ethics." Throughout Fr. Higgins appears to be trying to do too many different things at once without realizing that they are different. There is, naturally, philosophical discussion of the concepts of goodness, duty, and (in Book III) of the State and of political obligation. Secondly, "proofs" are put forward of the various precepts of morality and of evaluations of social institutions. This proceeds in two sorts of ways. Sometimes it is by dogmatic appeal to something called "The Law of Nature" or to "the nature of man," but sometimes (a good example is the discussion of socialism, pp. 279 ff) it proceeds by a straightforward utilitarian consideration of the advantages or disadvantages of the precept or institution in question. More often the proof is an amalgam of the appeal to "nature" (whose logic it is difficult to understand) and of empirical considerations of utility. (An example is the discussion of communism, on pp. 278–9.) Sometimes the "proofs" are not of precepts or of evaluations of institutions, but are of metaphysical conclusions. Thus we seem to have three different forms of argument: (1) The metaphysical, (2) the metaphysico-ethical, (3) the straightforward ethical. To

make matters worse, all these diverse arguments are put into the same quasi-geometrical strait-jacket of "Thesis" and "Proof."

In Book I we find the questions "What is man for?" and "What is the end of man?" Far too little is done to establish that these are proper questions. I understand "what are screwdrivers for?" but why must we talk about men as though they were screwdrivers? It is nonsense to ascribe moral responsibility to a tool. In any case God cannot have made us as tools, for if we were made *for* something we could only not be good *for* that thing if we had been inefficiently constructed.

Fr. Higgins' Aristotelian approach is blended with a deontology which appeals to the Law of Nature. The blend appears to have been done as follows: Man's end is his own perfection. Murder, lying and theft (acts contrary to the Law of Nature) degrade man. Therefore to do murder, lying or theft is to do something which does not conduce to man's end. This is unilluminating. *Why* do murder, lying and theft degrade man? Surely there are *arguments* against allowing murder, lying and theft. Fr. Higgins gives us no arguments; he merely reiterates that such acts are "contrary to man's nature" or "unfitting." In any case it is impossible to make a successful blend of the talk about the Law of Nature, which is valuable in so far as it stresses (though in a misleading way) that moral imperatives are categorical and quite different from rules of skill and of prudence, with the Aristotelian approach which regards ethics as an art comparable with, though more universally applicable than, carpentry and cobbling. However, Fr. Higgins does not seem clearly to recognize the difference between the "ought" of morality and that of prudence, for he says (p. 81) that "The ought of duty or moral obligation arises only from the compelling will of a superior embodied in moral law." This makes "I ought to do it" equivalent to "it will be the worse for me if I do not do it" and reduces morality to prudence.

On p. 22 (§ 50) there is a noteworthy failure to appreciate the spirit of Aristotle while doing him lip service. The soul is described as the form of the body, and then it is said that according to some authorities if the soul were apart from the body it would be in an unnatural state of separation and would long for reunion with the body, while other authorities "rightly say that the resurrection of the body cannot be proved from reason, that while the soul needs the body in this life, once this life is over it can exist, operate, and be happy without the body." Surely if Aristotle in speaking of the soul as the form of the body was saying anything sensible at all it was this: that to talk of the soul flying away from the body is as nonsensical as to talk of the elasticity flying away from a spring. It is worth suggesting that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body may be most satisfactorily interpreted as recognizing this *logical* truth and as saying that if the doctrine of immortality involved disembodied spirits there would be something *logically* wrong with it, not that *as a matter of fact* it would be false.

The confusion of questions of fact with questions of logic, and of both with questions of ethics, however, runs right through this book. No one laid greater stress than Aristotle on clearly distinguishing the considerations appropriate to different kinds of question. If Aristotle were alive to-day he would not have ignored the advances in this direction made by modern philosophy as his scholastic admirers seem to do, and would not have written a book like this in which so many considerations of so many different logical sorts are confused together.

It must be added, however, that the precepts of morality which are enunciated by Fr. Higgins are *worth* arguing for. Catholic morality shows a rigour and sound sense noticeably absent from the lax secular morality of our

day. It is not the precepts in this book that are objectionable; it is the confused methods of supporting them.

The book is extremely well produced, with an excellent index and extensive bibliographies. I have noticed only one misprint (p. 476, line 4 from bottom).

J. J. C. SMART.

S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Communis Ecclesiae Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora ad fidem codicum restituit ac edidit R. P. Joannes Perrier, O.P. Tomus Primus: Opuscula Philosophica. (Paris: P. Lethielleux. 1949. Pp. xx + 620. Price Fr.1,500)

The *Opuscula* of St. Thomas are an aggregate or artificial grouping of small treatises, which were written independently and which had been copied several times before being united under a common title after the author's death. It follows that the production of a critical edition, in the full sense, of all the *Opuscula* would be a formidable task. Father Perrier, working by himself and beginning his labours under the difficult conditions prevailing in France in 1943, wisely decided to leave the production of a definitive version to the editors of the Leonine Edition of the complete works of St. Thomas. On the other hand, the fact that Mandonnet's 1927 edition is out of print, coupled with the unsatisfactory state of the text, led him to undertake an edition, which, while not pretending to be definitive, would be an improvement on existing editions. In his preface he gives the reasons which led him to choose as basic manuscript the Paris MS. Bibl. Nat. lat. 14546. This manuscript is probably to be assigned to the end of the thirteenth century; and it seems to have been compiled precisely with a view to obtaining textual accuracy. After Aquinas' death in 1274 preparations for an official edition of his works were begun; and it appears that the author or authors of the manuscript in question had in mind the production of at least preliminary accurate texts of the *Opuscula* which they included. Castagnoli, who used the manuscript in his 1933 edition of the *De forma absolutionis* (the MS. contains two copies of this work, one with and the other without corrections), thought that it contained corrections based directly on the autograph, though the truth of this opinion cannot be proved. However, the manuscript in question is not equally good in regard to all the works it contains. Father Perrier has, therefore, referred to other manuscripts, as noted in the critical apparatus.

I am not in a position to evaluate Father Perrier's edition from the point of view of a textual critic; but, as far as I am able to judge, it seems to me much superior to any general edition of the *Opuscula* yet issued. The complete works of Aquinas now being issued in America are a reprint of the Parma edition of 1852–73; and the editors of the critical Leonine Edition have scarcely shown a tendency to over-haste. Father Perrier's edition thus fulfils a real need.

The volume under review includes the philosophical *Opuscula*, the *De ente et essentia* and the authentic part of the *De regno* being the most important. In determining which works to include the author has followed a commonsense criterion rather than a rigid rule. He first gives ten authentic works which are followed by an appendix containing the continuation of the *De regno* or *De regimine principum* by Ptolemy of Lucca. A second appendix contains eleven doubtful or unauthentic works, which either have some sponsors or are of some importance for the Thomist tradition. On the other hand, the certainly unauthentic *Summa totius logicae* has been omitted. Critical apparatus has been omitted for the works given in appendices, though the text has been

prepared with the same care as that of the certainly authentic works. There is an *Index auctoritatum*.

The second volume will contain *Opuscula theologica* and the third commentaries on the Pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius and the *Liber de causis*.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

Philosophen-Lexikon. Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen. Unter Mitwirkung von Gertrud Jung verfasst und herausgegeben von Werner Ziegenfuss. Erster Band, A-K. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1949. DM 30.)

In 1937, when this work was almost completely in print and had begun to appear, it was condemned, on the ground that it had been written as though "a 30th of January 1933 were entirely without importance in regard to a science so strongly bound up with *Weltanschauung* as philosophy is." The bibliographies have been brought up to date as far as circumstances permitted; and it is to the credit of the publishers that they undertook and have carried through the publication of the work in the difficult conditions prevailing since the war.

The author has paid special attention to the philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century and of the twentieth century; and more than half the available space has been devoted to philosophy since Hegel. German philosophy is, naturally enough, most to the fore. In some cases the philosopher has himself written the account of his thought for the Lexicon. This is so in the case of, for example, Berdiaeff, N. Hartmann and Husserl. To Hartmann's presentation of his philosophy (pp. 454–69) is added a list, not only of his own writings up to 1944, but also of works and articles on his thought. It is these "self-portraits," with accompanying bibliographies, which would probably constitute the chief value and interest of the work for the English reader.

Dr. Ziegenfuss rightly adopted the principle of avoiding all judgments concerning the truth or falsity, merits or demerits, of the philosophical ideas presented and of not being guided by such value-judgments in the inclusion or exclusion of philosophers in the Lexicon. It was, of course, this excellent principle of objectivity which prevented the publication of the work before the war. Nevertheless, it is perhaps a little surprising to an English reader to find five pages allotted to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, while F. H. Bradley gets little more than a paragraph. The only remark made about Bosanquet's political theory is that it resembles that of Treitschke. Madame Blavatsky, one is glad to see, obtains no more than a mention. In this respect her status in the Lexicon is similar to that of Emile Coué, Fénelon, André Gide and the poets Stefan George and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Ernst Jünger, however, is honoured with more than a page, while Carnap has to be content with a short paragraph. E. Gilson is not mentioned, though some not very distinguished scholastics of an older generation are. But it is easy to criticize inclusions, omissions and comparative lengths of treatment in a work of this kind. Philosophers like Kant, Fichte and Hegel are, of course, treated at some length.

In any future edition lists of non-German books should be brought up to date. For example, Professor H. J. Paton's *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (1936) does not seem to be mentioned. But, given the history of Germany since 1933, such omissions could hardly have been avoided, I suppose.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

Philosophy of Nature. By Moritz Schlick. (Philosophical Library, New York. 1949. Pp. 136. Price $3.00.)

Moritz Schlick was from 1922 to 1936 a distinguished and influential holder of the professorship in the University of Vienna that had acquired fame from its earlier tenure by Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann. His own contributions to philosophy scarcely rank with those of other members of the "Vienna Circle." But he played a leading part in inspiring and sustaining the recent remarkably fruitful phase of its activity.

Schlick was killed in 1936 by a demented student. His untimely end prevented the preparation of a systematic account of the views he had reached in his later years. Besides the various essays published during those years, he did, however, leave the manuscript of the lectures on the philosophy of physics which he had all but finished delivering at the time of his death. This manuscript constitutes the main material for the present book. Certain sections of his article "Naturphilosophie" in Dessoir's *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Berlin, 1925) referred to in the lectures are also reproduced. Further, it was known that Schlick planned that his lectures should lead on to a discussion of the relations between biology and physics, though the manuscript had not yet been extended to this. So the book includes notes taken by a pupil on the latest previous occasion of his dealing with this matter. The whole of the material has been edited by Schlick's former colleagues W. Hollitscher and J. Rauscher and translated by Amethe von Zeppelin.

The editors and publishers have performed a commendable service in thus placing on permanent record some of the teaching of such a one as Moritz Schlick. It is possibly as such a record that the book will be chiefly valued. Nevertheless, these lectures must have been addressed to a fairly general audience. They can scarcely be expected to afford much insight into his influence upon contemporary thought.

The writer of the present review was not long ago called upon to give a course of lectures on the foundations of natural philosophy to students reading for honours degrees in mathematics. The purpose was not to develop any particular system of philosophy but to make the students aware of some of the philosophical problems associated with their studies. One attempted to deal with such matters as the structure of physical theory, the status of physical laws, scientific inference, the meaning of measurement, and with certain problems concerning the formulation of specific theories (Newtonian mechanics, relativity theory, etc.). Notwithstanding his authority and learning as a professional philosopher, such appears also to have been the purpose and general level of treatment adopted by Schlick in his lectures, and to say this may most readily convey an idea of their character (apart from the fact that they were not addressed particularly to mathematical students). The ground covered by him was also very much what has just been mentioned.

The reviewer knows of no other single book covering the same ground. Anyone now planning to lecture on the subject will find it a stimulating source of ideas. It may be of less assistance to the student in his private reading; though always clear, the presentation is over-concise and sometimes over-dogmatic. For it is evident that the author included in his notes only the essentials of what he intended to say. In delivering the lectures he must have amplified and qualified many of the statements.

Only one general comment will be added. While the author gives in his first chapter a very careful brief analysis of the relationship between a philosophy of nature on the one hand and natural science on the other, it appears to the reviewer that he does not give due prominence to the problems of *scientific*

inference. In the reviewer's opinion, it is these problems which lead almost inevitably from what is regarded as "pure" science to the philosophical questions treated in the rest of the book. W. H. McCrea.

The Christian Way: a Study of New Testament Ethics in Relation to Present Problems. By Sydney Cave, D.D. (Nisbet & Co. 280 pp. Price 16s.)

"Morality is not as yet a problem for the English." Nietzsche was not very polite to the "shallow-pated English." But here he spoke the truth, at the time when he wrote. "In England, for every emancipation from divinity, people have to recognize respectability by becoming moral fanatics." Dogmatic materialism and materialistic dogmatism were equally puritanical in the reign of Queen Victoria. Frederic Harrison was as strict in matters of sex as Dr. Pusey. But a society cannot live for ever on its moral capital. The reaction under Edward VII, the loosening of all restraints in the war years, and the feminist claim for equal freedom, broke up the tradition which had been accepted ever since the victory of the middle class in 1832. The change was facilitated by the relativism which was gaining ground in philosophy and even in science. Christian ethics could no longer claim an absolute sanction. This is the situation with which Dr. Cave deals in a judicious and valuable book.

"This is an age without standards." Another way of putting it would be that our age no longer believes in a Law of Nature. This fruitful conception, which Christianity took over from the Stoics, is part of the *philosophia perennis* which has been the intellectual basis of European civilization. Right and wrong are absolutes; man has inalienable rights and duties. This belief was affirmed not only by the Stoics and Cicero and Aquinas, but in the American Declaration of Independence and in the French Revolution. We are now told that "psychology can make up for the loss of ethical absolutes." Dr. Cave rightly says that it cannot. There are signs, he thinks, that recent events are beginning to have a wholesome effect in this respect. The attempt, encouraged by Luther, to exempt the State from the trammels of moral law, has had hideous consequences, as might have been foreseen.

The cult of virginity, which was no part of the Palestinian Gospel, captured the Church so completely that marriage was regarded as a concession to human frailty, a notion which is echoed deplorably even in the Anglican marriage service. Dr. Cave deals with this subject wisely and temperately, and also with the revolt against monogamy which has gone further in parts of the United States and of the continent of Europe even than in this country. He speaks judiciously of the growth of birth-control, which the new morality refuses to condemn.

Dr. Cave's book is excellent, within the limits which he has set for himself. But his treatment of "present problems" is a little disappointing. I must not complain that he has not noticed my book *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*; but surely he ought not to have ignored so massive and formidable a challenge as Westermarck's *Christianity and Morals*. He has cramped himself by giving too much of his space to the Bible. Christianity is not the religion of a book, like Judaism and Islam, not even of the New Testament and certainly not of the Old. This is the great error of Protestantism, which was forced to find an external authority to combat the claims of an infallible Church. There are several questions which are engaging the attention of our contemporaries, but on which we cannot expect to find direct guidance in the Gospels and Epistles. The Founder of Christianity was not a legislator; He gave us prin-

ciples which we accept as of permanent validity; the application of them to present-day problems is the difficult task which we cannot shirk. Some of these problems will occur to most of us.

Did Christianity fail to inculcate our moral duties towards (*a*) the lower animals, and (*b*) posterity? Are we justified in punishing certain vices, e.g. homosexual perversions, as if they were crimes? It is as Christians, not as Biblical students, that we must make up our minds on capital punishment, voluntary death, abortion, sterilization, artificial insemination. We shall not all agree on these difficult questions; but it is precisely in problems the solution of which is not obvious that we should welcome the opinion of so experienced and thoughtful a teacher as Dr. Cave. W. R. Inge.

The Structure of the Universe. By G. J. Whitrow. (Hutchinson. 1949. Pp. 172. 7s. 6d.)

This is a lucid and trustworthy account of researches which are highly significant to philosophy. So much new knowledge has accumulated in the last few years that the standard works, such as those of the late Sir James Jeans, can no longer be said to represent the present state of the subject; and a fresh presentation was clearly desirable.

Our earth is a dependent of the sun, which is one of the hundred thousand million or so of stars constituting the galaxy: and the galaxy is a member of the vast system of nebulae. Is this in its turn a member of some still larger system? It now seems that this question can be answered in the negative: the world of nebulae is the ultimate background of the physical universe, and occupies the whole of space. Moreover, we are centrally situated in it —that is, the distribution of the nebulae is effectively the same in every direction. This, however, does not imply that we occupy a privileged position: paradoxical though it may sound, every other point in space is also centrally situated with respect to the nebulae. The paradox can be explained by supposing that when very great distances are concerned, the geometry of space is not the geometry we learnt at school, and in fact is such that the total volume of space is finite.

After discussing space, time, and relativity, Dr. Whitrow describes the various models that have been proposed for the cosmos: first studying the Einstein and de Sitter worlds (which are static solutions of Einstein's gravitational equations) and the expanding universe, which was regarded by Eddington as a system expanding from the Einstein model. He then goes on to discuss some of the remarkable results that have been discovered in this connection, and gives an original proof that Eddington's order of magnitude for the mass of the universe can be obtained by a concise argument partly based on Newtonian mechanics. An account is then given of Professor E. A. Milne's theory of Kinematic Relativity, to which Dr. Whitrow has himself made important contributions. In particular, Milne's views on time are explained: he distinguished *absolute* time t from *ephemeral* time τ; t-time is the time kept by a clock whose action is based on the statistical regularity of radioactive processes, while τ-time can be measured by the angle through which the earth has rotated. At the present moment the two scales of time are indistinguishable; but they diverge widely in the remote past and the remote future: in τ-time the Creation belongs to the infinitely distant past, whereas in t-time it took place only a few thousand million years ago. In t-time the nebulae are receding with constant velocities, whereas in τ-time they are stationary, and the universe is not expanding.

The author gives an instructive history of the dispute between the advocates of the "long" estimate of the age of the universe (over a million million years) and the "short" estimate (two to five thousand million): this has ended in a victory for the latter.

There is, however, much uncertainty regarding some of the most fundamental questions of structure in the universe. For instance, a large proportion of the nebulae have a spiral form. This may mean that the stars composing a nebula are actually arranged in spirals, and many theories of cosmogony have been based on this obvious interpretation. In recent years, however, a considerable amount of evidence has indicated that the spiral structure is shown only by very luminous types of stars, and that the whole space occupied by the nebula is filled more or less uniformly with stars of lesser brightness, so that the appearance of spirality is a luminosity effect rather than an indication of the actual distribution of matter.

The last chapter gives a thoughtful philosophical discussion of the principles underlying the *a priori* world-models of Eddington and Milne.

Altogether an excellent book. EDMUND WHITTAKER.

Introduction to Comparative Mysticism. By JACQUES DE MARQUETTE. (Philosophical Library, New York. 1949. Pp. 229. Price $3.75.)

Though this course of lectures by Dr. Jacques de Marquette, entitled "Introduction to Comparative Mysticism," was delivered originally at the Lowell Institute of Boston in 1944, it is difficult to understand for what specific audience it was really intended. It is obvious that a book which treats of the whole of Indian Mysticism, its scope and methods, in a single chapter, covers the whole of Buddhist philosophy in two short chapters, and all Greek and Hebrew Mysticism, including Philo, Plotinus, and the Neo-Platonists, with Gnosticism thrown in for good measure, in one chapter, cannot but be too sketchy to be of any use to the serious student with a background of philosophical training, and at the same time too condensed for the enlightenment of the general reader.

In any book which deals explicitly with the nature and scope of mysticism one is naturally concerned at an early stage to learn how the author defines mysticism, and to read his exposition of his theme in the light of it. Dr. de Marquette comes to the point fairly soon in his first chapter in which he states that mysticism "deals with the attempt to reach, while still alive in the world, a knowledge and experience of the next world promised by the teachings of religion and generally held to be experienced after death only." As this review appears in a philosophical journal I need not pause to comment on the inadequacy, if not the positive inaccuracy, of such a definition. It does, however, serve to indicate that Dr. de Marquette's concern is more with the psychology of mysticism, that is, with mystical experiences and their validity, than with the philosophy of mysticism. In the eighth and last chapter, entitled "The Message of Mysticism," the author, to some extent makes amends for the disproportionate amount of space devoted to the purely psychological aspect of mysticism, for in these final pages, in criticising the intellectualistic approach to mysticism, he answers lucidly and with sufficient cogency many of the points raised by Royce in his treatment of mysticism as one of the four main ontological theories, in his well-known Gifford lectures, "The World and the Individual." In particular, he exposes the fallacy of the logical argument against mysticism, which rests on the hollow premise that the absolute is the opposite of the relative. He ably meets the oft repeated charge that the mystic can only define his God in terms of the *theologia negativa*,

and that the Absolute of Mysticism, being defined by nothing but the absence of finitude, is apparently equivalent to nothing at all.

In the concluding paragraph of the book Dr. de Marquette deplores the fact that much of importance had to be ignored in his rapid survey. But however cursory the survey, it is inexcusable that in a book which purports to be a study of comparative mysticism, and which actually discusses Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Hebrew mysticism, no room should be found even for a bare mention of Chinese mysticism, which in the form of Taoism, stands coeval with the Vedanta in the history of Eastern philosophy, alike in its profundity of thought, the wide range of philosophical literature which it has inspired, and in the number of adherents to its doctrine.

One would expect a study of Comparative Mysticism to be particularly rich in bibliographical details, but the so-called bibliography at the end of this book is valueless, bearing every sign, as it does, of hasty and ill-informed compilation, including gross misspellings.

LEO. C. ROBERTSON.

Morality and God. By EDWARD WALES HIRST. (London: Epworth Press Pp. 86. Price 6s. net.)

"This essay," says the author, "is a plea for the view that morality in its essential nature depends for its validity upon belief in the being and character of God." The style of argumentation is not unlike that of a typical eighteenth-century divine; it might indeed have served as a text for Hume's celebrated observation:

> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but it is of the very last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from the others, which are entirely different from it. (*Treatise*, III, 1, i.)

After a brief criticism of some traditional ethical theories, which he rejects because they are "unipersonal," (i.e. self-centred), Mr. Hirst seeks the origins of morality in certain biological, psychological and sociological tendencies, which he surveys with a kindly optimism. He fails, nevertheless, as he well may, to find in the mere facts of human and animal behaviour any *authority* which could oblige us to continue to behave morally. In the best chapter of his book, he rightly criticizes some of the well-worn expedients for performing the impossible feat of deriving the "ought" from the "is." His mistake lies in supposing that inferences which cannot be validly drawn from natural facts can somehow be drawn from supernatural facts; he therefore goes on to seek in the existence of a loving God—which he endeavours to demonstrate by a version of the "Moral argument"—a foundation for his own "interpersonal" morality, a morality, that is, which is based upon mutual love between men and between man and God. He fails to see that unless we are prepared to make certain moral judgments about God—for example that we ought to love Him or do His will—we cannot derive a system of morality

from the fact of His existence or character; and these original moral judgments will lack a ground until we attain a clearer idea of how moral judgments are grounded.

It is hardly surprising that little is done in this book to help Christians to meet the challenge to their faith and morality presented by recent logical researches. Until Christian thinkers have either assimilated the results of these researches, or else shown reasons for rejecting them, they cannot hope to say much that is relevant to present-day ethical controversies in so far as those controversies have logical difficulties at their root.

R. M. HARE.

The Foundations of Common Sense. A Psychological Preface to the Problems of Knowledge. By NATHAN ISAACS, O.B.E. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1949. Pp. vi + 208. Price 15s.)

Mr. Isaacs is dissatisfied with what philosophers have traditionally called "The Theory of Knowledge." He rightly sees that if the "Theory of Knowledge" is to be a *genuine* theory, it must be a psychological theory. His criticism of traditional theory of knowledge is that it depends on "vague, questionable, and invalid data," and that what is wanted is an up-to-date psychological theory of knowledge, i.e. one which depends on hard and trusty data. He thus has failed properly to see what was wrong with the philosophical theories of knowledge. This was that philosophers had no business to be talking about "theories" and "data"; that what they were in a confused way trying to do was to clear up the logical grammar of words like "know," "believe," "certain," "probable," etc.

Sir Cyril Burt, in a foreword, says that Mr. Isaacs' book is "based on a sound psychology." This makes one wonder, for the book is written in the worst possible manner of "analytic" or "introspective" psychology. What can such a method yield but dreary verbiage? Is the appeal to "introspection" or to "immediate experience" any more than the pompous enunciation of platitudes? It is true that in addition to the data of "experience" we are also told about the behaviour of children, but this part of the book is platitudinous also. We are told in very obscure language what every ordinary person knows perfectly well about children. Science should surprise us; never in this book did I come across a sentence which, assuming it could be made intelligible at all, did not say something which no one could doubt. Consider for example the last sentence of Chapter IV: "And we are simply registering the history and outcome of all our experience when we sum up that entire far-flung system of beliefs in the single *acknowledgment* of an objective world of endless diverse things and happenings in which our bodies are objects like any others; in which we have our place and biography as local parts of a vastly larger history; and in which our particular story includes a progressive but always fractional learning-to-know about both itself and the rest."

Mr. Isaacs criticizes the traditional philosophers for their insufficiently critical attitude. After saying on p. 14 such things as "Philosophic discussion still too often deals in notions such as that of *'the* knower,' *'the* mind,' *'the* subject,' *'the* object,'" he says a thing like this on p. 15: "The true basic experiential datum is a focalised field." What does this mean? Is this not as bad as the talk he is criticizing? In a book on electricity I read how "field" is there used; an explanation is given, for the physicist knows that to have learnt the word "field" as in "field of potatoes" is no help to knowing how

he is going to use it. Mr. Isaacs omits to tell us what he means by "field," still less by "focalised," and I even think that some attention ought to be paid to "datum." Furthermore, if Mr. Isaacs had really understood the modern philosophical attitude to language (as he gives us to understand that he has) he would have been more suspicious about chapter-headings like "Experiential Basis for our Belief in the Objective World." He does not seem to realize how different this phrase is from "Experiential Basis for our Belief in Elephants," or to ask himself how we should take a person's words if he said "I do (don't) believe in the objective world." It is intelligible to discuss how children come to believe in turnips or to disbelieve in fairies, but I fear that to discuss how children come to believe in an objective world is to involve oneself in the metaphysical puzzle of the escape from solipsism; a puzzle which philosophers should show us how to avoid, and not a genuine problem for psychologists or any one else. Hence it is difficult to see how the programme which Mr. Isaacs sets himself in this book, that of giving a psychological description of the genesis of our belief in the "objective" or "common sense" world is a real programme.

I think that there are psychological investigations which are genuine and which would merit the title "theory of knowledge." I suggest that "theories of learning" would do so. Experiments with rats in mazes no doubt gives us a basis for theorizing; the results of the experiments may even surprise us. Mr. Isaacs' continual appeal to "experience" on the other hand gives us nothing but verbiage; nowhere does he describe an experiment and nowhere (as far as I can see) does he tell us anything we didn't know before.

J. J. C. Smart.

Nature and Man. By Paul Weiss. (Henry Holt & Co., New York. 1947. Pp. xxii + 287. $2.80.)

This volume, while complete in itself, is intended to be the prelude to a volume on Ethics. Its aim is to show that man's freedom is a particular form of a freedom which is essential to all natural beings whatever; for if this can be shown, then, it is held, full justice can be done to the concepts of duty, obligation, good, guilt, etc., which depend on man's freedom, without denying man's complete naturalness.

What is involved is a new systematic account of nature. A discussion of causation and of activity occupies Part I. Part II is devoted to a detailed application of this concept to the various grades of beings from inanimate beings to man.

The whole undertaking is based on the principle that the causal factors involved in any situation do not determine the complete specific outcome of the situation. Causes do not produce effects. It is indeed improper to speak of a cause of an event until after the event has been produced. What he calls "one of the most intrusive of phenomena" is "the occurrence of multiple independent lines of causation, each of which owes its being to the interplay of a limited number of active beings" (p. 32). This interplay he speaks of as a "course of causation" or a "course." Before a course is run, the factors involved in the situation determine a limited range of alternatives within which the specific outcome must fall. The course, the means whereby the outcome is made fully determinate, cannot be other than free. After an event has happened, we can speak of the outcome as an effect and of the togetherness of the agents as its cause.

The way is thus prepared for a discussion of activity. Of the fundamental concepts used here the central one is that of "concern." On the one hand, "concern" seems to correspond to purpose in human beings, widened and generalized to make it appropriate to all beings, animate and inanimate alike. On the other hand, it links with his account of a course of causation, through which the possibilities foreshadowed by the togetherness of the agents are given determinate actuality. The way he uses the notion may be illustrated by a sentence in which he speaks of an apple as "a substantial being with a definite predilection towards the limited possibility of being ripe, nourishing, and fruitful," and as being "concerned with realizing" this (p. 55).

However many difficulties it may involve, the concept of a "concern" is perhaps inevitable, given the starting point in the concept of an agent as participator in a course of causation. Much more disputable is the account of the relations between higher and lower beings. The higher types of being are held to have evolved from the lower types as the result of free acts. The account given of these acts is based on a distinction (though not of course a separation) between a being and its body—even in the case of inanimate beings. It is the being itself which has a concern; the body is "an instrument for the being, an instrument which functions in part without supervision, and which may bring about results that go counter to those the concern requires" (p. 71). Clashes of this sort provide the opportunity for evolution. For example, "the body of an inanimate being can become so recalcitrant to its concern that the only way of having an effective concern is for the being to change the nature of that concern. The living arise from the non-living when the latter modify their concerns so as to overcome the recalcitrance which their bodies offer to the expression of those concerns" (p. 73). He repeats this formula with practically no change at higher levels; even the human embryo arises from an animal embryo under precisely these conditions (p. 140).

Professor Weiss admits that his "metaphysical biology," as he calls it, may appear at points strange; and it is only fair to refer readers to the section (pp. 81–84) in which he justifies the attempt to develop it. But the account of the spur which incites to evolution seems to err on the side of concreteness and detail. It does not follow from a general argument, as does the principle of free activity. And one cannot see how it could possibly be tested by observation of facts. Professor Weiss holds that a successful philosophy "exposes in sophisticated prose truths open only to innocence" (p. x). But it would, I think, be carrying innocence too far to credit it with insight into the concerns and the struggles of embryos. The only possible kind of justification I can see for his principle would be in its fruitfulness, when taken with the rest of his metaphysical biology, in helping us to fresh insights into the observed facts of nature and of man.

It is just these fresh insights that he attempts to supply in detail, in Part II. In doing this, he uses two main principles. The first I have already touched on, but he gives it greater flexibility as he proceeds. It is the principle that there are varying types and degrees of tension between a being's inner nature, as manifested by its concern, and its outer or bodily nature. The second is the principle that there is a variety of ways in which a being's concern is related to the concerns of other beings in its environment. He tells us, for example, that "A living being is one whose activities are sustained by a concern, not only for its own good but also for the good of other beings" (p. 74).

These principles are the basis on which rest his discussions of sensitivity, perception and intelligence; of consciousness and mind; of the will and the self. The account of signs and of language is based on them. The account of the absolute good is in terms of them.

Other readers may have more success, but I often found it exceedingly difficult to get into effective contact with these discussions. It was often uncertain whether one was in the presence of a fresh insight, or merely of a new formula. Sometimes the difficulty of understanding comes from Professor Weiss's tendency to give his statements the maximum generality possible. He holds that it is the business of philosophy to reach generalizations, and that generalizations are reached from more concrete statements by imaginatively rejecting details (p. xx). I have often found difficulty in seeing what his generalizations involve, because they are for the most part accompanied by only slight indications of the kind of concrete fact from which one should begin, and of the type of rejection of details by which one should proceed, in order to reach them. The difficulty is increased by the fact that since Professor Weiss is endeavouring to build up a fresh representation of the world, he has to use familiar words in new ways. If this book could be supplemented by a poet's description of the concrete facts in harmony with Professor Weiss's generalities, it might be found more persuasive. There are certainly many stimulating discussions, summed up and brought to a focus in memorable and pregnant sayings. It is not a book to be read lightly; but it is not a book to be lightly set aside. I have the feeling that one must give it time to make its effect on one's thinking, if one is to judge it adequately.

L. J. Russell.

Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. A revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949. Pp. 690. Price 42s.)

With this work Sir David Ross has very considerably increased the debt which students of Aristotle already owed him as editor of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. It is hardly necessary to say that he has devoted to these logical treatises the same philological learning, the same insight into problems both of text and interpretation, the same unrivalled power of lucid exposition; this last can perhaps be best appreciated by reading Chapters II–VII of his introduction, where the main doctrines of the two treatises may profitably be studied before tackling the text and commentary.

As to form, the author has gone back to his practice in the *Metaphysics* of analysing his material at the beginning of each chapter of the commentary instead of prefacing the whole commentary by a continuous analysis, as in his *Physics*: this seems to me a convenience. There is also a conspectus of contents of both treatises placed between text and commentary, and a useful table of the valid moods of syllogism "taken in the main, but with certain alterations and additions, from O. Becker's *Die arist. Theorie der Möglichkeitsschlüsse.*"

To speak first of the Introduction, after a short chapter on the title and plan of the treatises, Ross passes in Chapter II to discuss the relation between them; here he is mainly concerned with F. Solmsen's theory, which put the *Posterior Analytics* earlier than the *Prior*. This theory is treated with sympathetic consideration, but little doubt can be left in the reader's mind that Ross has completely vindicated the opposite and traditional view. Incidentally he holds later on (p. 75) that *An. Post.* II is a good deal later than I, chiefly on the ground of its frequent concern with natural science, whereas I looks almost exclusively to mathematics for illustrations of logical doctrine. Chapter III deals with Pure Syllogism, and contains an illuminating discussion

of the contribution of the *Phaedo* to Aristotle's syllogistic theory, and of the relation of that theory to Platonic "division," as well as of Aristotle's method of validation of moods (which involves an examination of *reductio ad absurdum*), of the "tyranny" of the First Figure, and of the charge of *petitio principii*. The seven pages of Chapter IV deal with Model Syllogisms; here perhaps the most interesting matter is an elucidation of the meaning or meanings of "possible" (ἐνδεχόμενον), involving a defence of Aristotle on an important point against the objections of his immediate disciples, Theophrastus and Eudemus. Chapter V is on Induction; a short but convincing examination of the meaning of the *word* ἐπαγωγή and its cognates is followed by an account of the various sorts of Induction which Aristotle recognizes or employs; the last complete paragraph of p. 50 is a good example of Ross's ability to sum up the results of a discussion with masterly terseness and lucidity.

With Chapter VI (on Demonstrative Science) we pass from the *Prior Analytics* to the first book of the *Posterior*, probably the most important of the four. Here attention may be called to two points: first, the exposure of Aristotle's mistaken analysis of propositions of the form "that white thing is a log," where Ross points out that "his mistake is made more easy by the Greek usage by which a phrase like τὸ λευκόν may stand either for 'the white thing' or for 'white colour.' For the speaker of a language in which τὸ λευκόν ἐστι ζύχον might mean 'white colour is a log' it becomes easy to suppose that the statement is an improper statement." Secondly, an observation *à propos* of Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic notion of a single ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή: "The search for a single all-explaining principle seems to be a product of the equally mistaken desire to have proof of everything. If we cannot have proof of everything (so its advocates seem to say), since the ultimate premisses of any proof are obviously themselves not proved, let us at least have as few unproved principles as possible, and if possible only one. But there is really nothing more scandalous in a plurality of unproved premisses than in a single one." There is, however, one passage in this chapter, viz. on p. 54, where Ross seems to me to come short of his usual clarity. In summarizing the doctrine of 71B 16ff. he appears to waver on the meaning of προγινωσκόμενα, one of the terms used by Aristotle of scientific premisses. It may well be that I have misunderstood him here, but my doubts are not resolved by the commentary. Chapter VII deals with *An. Post.* II—a rather desultory book—and here what I find most illuminating is Ross's discussion of the eleventh chapter ("one of the most difficult chapters in the whole of Aristotle"), and in particular of that "cause" which here and here only replaces the material cause in the quartet, viz. τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι or the "eternal ground of an eternal consequent." The important last chapter of the treatise (II, 19) gives Ross an opportunity for some judicious remarks on Aristotle's general epistemological position, ending with these words: "He must be given the credit for having at least seen the general position in its true light—that it is the role of science to wait on experience for the facts to be explained, and use reason as the faculty which can explain them. Of the further function of reason—that of reasoning from facts known by experience to those not yet experienced—he has little conception."

With regard to the text (with *apparatus criticus*), the preparation of which was in itself a major task, I must be content to note a few places where Ross's own emendations, insertions or excisions are convincing: viz. 24B 17, 46A 38, 59A 31–41 (the whole passage is removed as a gloss), 67A 30, 72A 29, 73B 7, 77 B 21. I have noticed two important transpositions, of 70A 9–10 to the beginning of the chapter, and of 77A 5–9 to follow 83A 35. This latter is the well-known passage where Aristotle denies the need for a ἓν παρὰ τὰ πολλά as

distinct from a *ἓν καιὰ πολλῶν*. Ross does, in fact, print this where it occurs in the MSS., but suggests the transposition in his critical notes at both places. The position he finds for it is certainly more appropriate than either that in which Themistius appears to have found it in his text or that to which Zabarella transferred it. It may be remarked that the text of 72B 36–37 has gone awry owing to some curious misprints; but I have found very few misprints either in the Greek text or elsewhere.

More than half the book is occupied by the commentary, which includes an analysis chapter by chapter. Here Ross's thoroughness and sound judgment are apparent on every page; there are perhaps a few places where the analysis might have been made somewhat clearer by a note, or a fuller note; but if the reader wants to sample Ross's quality as a commentator, let him turn to such notes as those on *An. Post.* I, 22 or II, 11, and give thanks. A reviewer, or at least the present reviewer, must let it go at that.

It is slightly inconvenient at times that the page headings of the Commentary do not indicate which of the two treatises the page is dealing with: more especially when (as e.g. on pp. 575–7, 639–45) the Bekker page reference does not appear. But in general the book—an outstanding achievement of scholarship—is excellently printed and produced.

R. Hackforth.

Darwin: Before and After. The Story of Evolution. By Robert E. D. Clark, M.A., Ph.D. The Second Thoughts Library. (London: The Paternoster Press, 1948. Pp. 192. Price 6s. net.)

In this book the reader will find an entertaining account of the history of evolutionary theories before and after Darwin, of the controversies to which they gave rise, and of the great variety of mutually conflicting social, moral and economic opinions which have supported themselves on them. The main argument seems to be that the doctrine of evolution is contrary to the second law of thermodynamics, and should therefore be abandoned. But the author does not consider the possibility that the second law does not apply to open systems, and that living organisms are open systems. Much use is made of the notion of preformation but without subjecting it to sufficient analysis. What the author says about preformation is very strongly reminiscent of eighteenth-century rationalism. For example, on p. 26 we read: "As yet, the victory of preformationism, though certain, is not complete, for the outlook in embryology is still epigenetic. Yet no one to-day doubts that this is only because our knowledge is still so limited." This recalls the saying of Charles Bonnet in 1762 that if development should seem to be by epigenesis "our senses deceive us. A mask of falsehood obscures the whole face of nature. Development is a complete illusion, or what appears to arise only emerges from a state of invisibility to one of visibility."

J. H. Woodger.

Books also received:

P. A. Sorokin. *Altruistic Love: A Study of American Good Neighbours and Christian Saints.* The Beacon Press, Boston, Mass. 1950. Pp. 253. $3.

George Santayana. *Atoms of Thought.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. xv + 284. $5.00.

Alexander Cannon. *The Power Within.* London: Rider & Co. 1950. Pp. 208. 18s.

ETIENNE GILSON. *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy.* Translated by A. H. C. Downes. (Gifford Lectures of 1931–32). London: Sheed & Ward. 1950. Pp. 490. 18s.

ALAN W. WATTS. *The Supreme Identity: An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion.* London: Faber & Faber. 1950. Pp. 204. 12s. 6d.

T. V. FLEMING, S.J. *Foundations of Philosophy.* Sydney: Shakespeare Head Press. 1950. Pp. x + 210. 15s.

C. E. M. JOAD. *A Critique of Logical Positivism.* London: Gollancz. 1950. Pp. 154. 10s. 6d.

E. W. F. TOMLIN. *The Great Philosophers: The Western World.* London: Skeffington & Son, Ltd. 1950. Pp. 296. 15s.

JULIAN HARRIS (ED.). *The Humanities: An Appraisal.* University of Wisconsin Press. 1950. Pp. xx + 168. $2.75.

B. C. SEN. *Stray Thoughts on Life.* Published by the Author. 1950. Pp. x + 125. Rs. 2/8.

PARAMHANSA YOGANANDA. *Autobiography of a Yogi.* London: Rider. 1950. Pp. xii + 403. 21s.

CHARLES ISSAWI. *An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis.* London: John Murray. 1950. Pp. 190. 6s.

M. M. SHARIF. (1) *The Nature of Tragedy—Three Lectures;* (2) *Beauty Objective or Subjective?;* (3) *Beauty and Expression.* Lahore (Pakistan): Sh. Muhammad Ashraf. 1950. Pp. 110, 87 and 133. Prices: Rs. 5, 4s., 7s. 6d.

LEONE VIVANTE. *English Poetry.* (Preface by T. S. Eliot.) London: Faber & Faber. 1950. Pp. xv + 340. 21s.

GEORGE CLARKE SELLERY. *The Renaissance—Its Nature and Origins.* University of Wisconsin Press. 1950. Pp. 296. $3.75.

SCHMITT. *S. Anselmi—Opera Omnia.* Vol. IV. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1950. Pp. xv + 232. No price stated.

ROGER TROISFONTAINES, S.J. *Existentialism and Christian Thought.* Trans., Martin Jarrett-Kerr, C.R. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd. 1950. Pp. 76. 4s. 6d.

Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume XXIII. *Politics, Psychology and Art.* Symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, July 8–18, 1949. London: Harrison & Sons. 1949. Pp. 194. 21s.

Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume XXIV. *Psychical Research. Ethics and Logic.* Symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, July 7–9, 1950. Pp. 231. 21s.

PAUL WEISS. *Man's Freedom.* Yale University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. ix + 325. 32s. 6d.

JOSEF PIPER. *Über das Ende der Zeit.* München: Kösel-Verlag. 1950. Pp. 192. D.M. 6.80.

AUGUST BRUNNER. *Der Stufenbau der Welt.* München: Kösel-Verlag. 1950. Pp. 579. D.M. 19.50.

FÉLIX CESSELIN. *La Philosophie Organique de Whitehead.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 248. 500 Fr. fr.

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The following lectures have been arranged for the 1950–51 Session: University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, at 5.15 p.m.

1950		
October 13.	"The Concept of Motion"	A course of four lectures by G. J. Whitrow, M.A., D.Phil., on "Synoptic Philosophy (A Philosophy of Nature)."
October 20.	"The Forces of Nature"	
October 27.	"The Epistemological Foundations of Natural Philosophy"	
November 3.	"The Ontological Foundations of Natural Philosophy"	
November 10.	"Aristotle's Doctrine Concerning the Connection of Soul and Body"	W. F. R. Hardie, M.A.
November 17.	"The Notion of an Imperative in Morality and Elsewhere"	Professor C. D. Broad
November 24.	"The Nature of Aesthetic Experience"	The Rt. Hon. Earl of Listowel, P.C., Ph.D.
1951		
January 26.	*"Knowledge of Good and Evil"*— (1) "Reflection and Feeling"	A course of four lectures by A. J. T. Wisdom, M.A., on "The Philosophy of Mind and Value."
February 2.	(2) "Guilt, Abnormality and Prejudice"	
February 9.	*"Knowledge of Thought and Feeling"*— (1) "Knowledge of others—Isolation"	
February 16.	(2) "Knowledge of Oneself—The Unconscious"	
February 23.	"The Nature of Religious Knowledge"	The Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.Litt., D.D. (Dean of St. Paul's).
March 2.	"The Function of Art in Civilization"	Stanley Spencer, R.A.

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RUSSELL F. MOORE CO.

PUBLISHERS

475 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
11 JAN 1950